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Abstract 
The present study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the physical and 
economic forces that influence the dynamic path of hybrid seed pricing for a broad acre crop 
over time. Of the physical and economic forces influencing the dynamic path of hybrid 
development, the sequential and cumulative nature of crop development is particularly discussed. 
Specifically, the canola hybrid seed industry in Canada is studied. This study will have 
particularly important implications for industries that are considering stronger intellectual 
property rights inside and outside Canada.  
The model presented in Chapter 2 makes a significant contribution to the “product variety” 
literature. While Chamberlinian models are confined to one representative consumer and location 
models are not very helpful in analysis of more than two characteristics, the model developed in 
Chapter 2 incorporates differentiated buyers and multiple characteristics. Schumpeter’s 
temporary market power can be derived from new characteristics embodied in old products. 
Results show that more progressive industries are likely to have a smaller equilibrium number of 
firms and shorter product cycles, ceteris paribus. 
Chapter 3 endogenizes rate of yield potential growth as a function of firms’ initial investment. 
Results show that greater investment productivity results in fewer varieties in the market, shorter 
product cycles, higher prices, higher profit levels, lower optimal investment, and higher 
consolidation. Also, it is shown that if increased differentiation creates enough space in the 
market for a new entrant, then entry of a new rival will increase competition and may result in a 
decrease in the incumbents’ profit. 
Chapter 4 uses data from Canadian canola industry to empirically test some of the 
propositions discussed in Chapter 2. Results confirm that as a variety becomes more specific its 
market share decreases. It is also shown that degree of specificity is a proper measure of 
adaptability for seed varieties as it provides high explanatory power in the regression models and 
also can be used to make direct economic interpretation.  
Chapter 5 presents a conclusion, policy implications, and potential approaches for future research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
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1.1. Background 
Innovation is a dynamic process that very often takes place through embodying new 
characteristics in existing products. Buyers care about many characteristics when buying a 
product. While many desirable characteristics are already embodied in products, some are not. 
Innovators are aware of the fact that buyers have a desire, and therefore a positive willingness to 
pay, for these characteristics not yet embodied in a product. There is an opportunity for 
innovators to increase their profit by creating and embodying a new characteristic in products 
and then offering the products to the market. This provides an incentive to innovate through the 
addition of new characteristics. 
The introduction of new characteristics is a particularly important means of innovation in 
agricultural input industries. Like final consumers, farm input buyers value the characteristics of 
the inputs they purchase. New GPS systems for tractors and combines, more fuel-efficient 
engines and new herbicides are some examples of innovations that offer new characteristics to 
farm input buyers. Biological innovation is a particularly important mechanism for innovators to 
respond to farmers’ desires for new characteristics. Seed producers, for example, sequentially 
introduce new varieties of seed that feature new traits, new disease resistance and other 
characteristics that suit different regions and areas. The existence of thousands of distinct corn 
seed varieties1 in the U.S. seed market is evidence of demand for many characteristics. 
In the seed industry, the dynamic path of industry development is strongly influenced by the 
sequential and cumulative nature of crop development, as new varieties are built on the result of 
past selection and breeding efforts (Pardey, et al., 2004). Seed companies sequentially add to the 
value of existing varieties resulting in new varieties. The result has been an accumulation of 
knowledge and yield improvement over time, often with farmers paying increasing prices for 
new varieties of seed. Exploring the incentives and the strategies employed by firms in an 
industry characterized by sequential and cumulative innovation will provide important insight 
into the evolution of such industries over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A variety must be distinct from other varieties to be registered. 
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1.2. Importance and Implications of the Research 
Understanding the development of a seed industry, which is characterized by sequential and 
cumulative innovation, and the impact it has had on producers will give important insights into 
the potential impact of innovation on the seed industry and the wider economy over time. Given 
the high rates of return to research, and the scope of the potential costs and benefits for 
producers, economic research could have profound impact on producers and the economic future 
of the region.  
Policies put in place over the next few years will shape the future of the grain industry for 
many decades to come. A more complete understanding of how an industry, characterized by 
sequential and cumulative innovation, can develop will inform better policy choices and 
investment decisions. This study will have particularly important implications for industries that 
are considering higher levels of investment in developing new production inputs, inside and 
outside Canada.  
1.3. Literature Review: background on the main concepts of the study 
While protected seed pricing has received some attention in economic literature, surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to how these industries dynamically evolve over time. Shi et al. 
(2010) studied the economics of pricing of hybrid corn seed and postulated that under strategic 
bundling and imperfect competition farmers are likely to be charged higher prices for seed. 
Perrin and Fulginiti (2002) examine the implications of the durability of crop traits in a 
monopolist seed producer’s pricing behaviour. Goeschl and Swanson (2003) studied the impact 
of genetic use restriction technologies (GURT) on the appropriability of returns to research and 
private investments in agricultural R&D. Ambec et al. (2008) investigated the incentives for an 
inbred line seed producer to switch to nondurable hybrid seed. Although these studies, and many 
other studies in this area, consider different aspects of seed pricing, (e.g. durability of traits, 
market structure, etc.) none of them explores how an agricultural industry, characterized by 
sequential and cumulative innovation, evolves over time. Given the sequential and cumulative 
nature of crop research, it is important to consider the dynamics at play. 
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This study borrows the concepts of characteristics and differentiation from the works of 
Hotelling, Chamberlin, and Lancaster. Also, this study’s perspective towards innovation is 
borrowed from works of Schumpeter (1939, 1942) and Moschini and Lapan (1997). For this 
reason, these studies are reviewed in more depth than other works that are used in the current 
study. Next few paragraphs review works of Schumpeter (1939, 1942) and Moschini and Lapan 
(1997), Hotelling (1929), Chamberlin (1933), and Lancaster (1966, 1971, 1990) from the 
perspective of this study. The literature on sequential and cumulative innovation owes to many 
scholars, particularly Suzan Scotchmer. This literature is reviewed in this section as well. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 briefly describe other works that are relevant to each chapter of this 
dissertation.  
1.3.1. Schumpeter: Dynamics at Play 
Schumpeter (1939, 1942) is perhaps one of the very first to place great emphasis on 
importance of dynamics in evolution of market economies. In Schumpeterian perspective, 
innovation is the main pivot of industrial evolution. Schumpeter argues that innovation-
originated market power creates temporary above normal profits. He believed that the temporary 
above normal profits resulting from temporary market power is necessary to “induce” 
innovation, although this market power is doomed to be competed away as new and existing 
firms start imitating the monopolist’s innovation (Schumpeter, 1939).  
Schumpeter (1939), in Business Cycles, defines four phases for a business cycle: prosperity, 
recession, depression, and revival. Innovation is the ignition of a business cycle. An entrepreneur 
implements the new innovation and obtains above normal profits. Above normal profits in the 
industry encourages new and existing firms to adopt the new innovation. Those businesses that 
are not able to adopt the new, usually cost-reducing, innovation will be forced out of the market. 
Schumpeter calls this process creative destruction because the creativity embodied in the new 
innovation literally destroys the stock of capital used in older innovations (Schumpeter, 1939). 
Business cycles, in Schumpeter’s thoughts are irregularly regular (Schumpeter, 1939: 25). 
That is, there is no doubt that business cycles happen and they will happen in the order suggested 
by Schumpeter, but history and economic theory cannot help much predict how long a particular 
cycle or phase will take.  
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Answering the question who performs innovations, Schumpeter initially suggested that small 
companies might have a flexibility advantage over large companies (entrepreneurial innovation 
or Mark I model). For example, it could be more difficult for large companies to deal with 
bureaucratic structures. In his later works, however, Schumpeter argues that larger companies 
have a privilege in producing innovations via R&D investments (Mark II model). Schumpeter 
specifically attributes this privilege to economies of scale and barriers to entry that larger 
companies create over time (Schumpeter 1947, 1949).  
Three elements are always prominent in Schumpeter’s ideas: the dynamic outlook he took 
from Marx, the emphasis on historical specificity he learned in the historical school, and the need 
for a micro-based approach he borrowed from the Neoclassicals  (Fagerberg, 2002). 
Throughout his writings, Schumpeter uses the term “neighbourhood of equilibrium”. This is 
not the same as the concept of equilibrium with the neoclassical meaning. In the neighbourhood 
of equilibrium, the capitalist economy is constantly moving away from an old equilibrium and 
towards a new equilibrium.  
1.3.2. Moschini and Lapan: Drastic vs. Non-drastic Innovation 
Arrow (1962) introduced the concept of drastic innovation. Moschini and Lapan (1997) show 
how to appropriately measure the welfare effects of innovations in agricultural markets. They 
claim that the welfare effects of an innovation in the agricultural markets depend on whether the 
innovation is drastic or non-drastic as well as on the existing market structure before the 
innovation occurs. An innovation is drastic if it’s valuable enough to lead to “unconstrained 
monopoly price of the innovated input” and is non-drastic if “the monopolist's pricing decision is 
constrained by the threat of competition” (Moschini and Lapan, 1997).  
Drastic innovations are very unlikely to occur in crop research. This is in part due to 
sequential and cumulative nature of crop innovation. In crop development, new varieties are built 
on the result of past selection and breeding efforts (Pardey, et al., 2004). Also, drastic 
innovations are very unlikely to occur in crop research because farmers differ in their demand for 
new varieties and any new variety is unlikely to be superior to existing varieties for all farmers. 
Non-drastic innovations, on the other hand, are very common in the seed industry.  
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Figure 1.1 shows this pattern for four canola varieties in Saskatchewan (2008-2012). As 
shown in Figure 1.1, none of the varieties were able to take over all other varieties and dominate 
the whole market. The common trend is a hill-shaped adoption curve. Even when a variety is at 
the top of its adoption hill, a number of other varieties have significant market shares. For 
example, market share of 5020 decreases as 5440 and 45H28 become adopted. Similarly, 5440 
continues its disadoption process when L150 is introduced. The co-existence of more than one 
variety in the market signifies the non-drastic nature of these varieties.  
	  
Figure 1. 1. Adoption rate of four Canola Varieties in Saskatchewan (2008-2012).  
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation. 
Although he never uses the term “drastic innovation”, in his innovation theory, Schumpeter 
implicitly assumes innovations are drastic. That is, the new innovation destroys the old ones. 
However, he does consider room for non-drastic innovations in his framework. Schumpeter 
suggests that a new innovation acts similar to a wave that creates a dynamic cycle in the 
economy. On the back of each wave, however, innovations of smaller magnitude (i.e. non-drastic 
innovations) could be performed by the original entrepreneur or imitators (Schumpeter 1939). 
These smaller non-drastic innovations, which are cumulatively built on the original drastic 
innovation, compete with the original drastic innovation. As a result, the original entrepreneur 
can no longer charge a monopoly price and the original drastic innovation turns into a non-
drastic innovation.   
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1.3.3. Scotchmer: “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” 
Suzan Scotchmer did many studies on sequential and cumulative innovation. Many of her 
studies have been focused on patent policies in a world of sequential and cumulative innovation. 
In a paper titled “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law” 
Scotchmer (1991) criticizes the economics literature on patenting for ignoring the cumulative 
nature of innovation and explores different policy options to provide incentives to innovate when 
research is of cumulative nature. 
Green and Scotchmer 1995 argue that in markets with sequential innovation imitators erode 
the original innovator’s profit. In quest of an effective policy, they argue that in order to ensure a 
large enough share of the “second-generation” profits, patents should be of longer life when 
more than one firm is involved in the process of sequential innovation. 
O'Donoghue (1998) investigates the patentability requirement when firms engage a series of 
sequential innovations. He suggests that “a patentability requirement can stimulate R&D 
investment and increase dynamic efficiency.” 
Grossman and Helpman (199la, 1991b), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Romer (1986), and 
Stokey (1995)) study the relationship between investment in sequential innovation and economic 
growth. This literature also highlights the role of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” in 
“endogenous-growth”. It is worth noting that this literature investigates non-drastic innovations 
whereas Schumpeterian “creative destruction” relates to drastic innovations (O'Donoghue, 1998). 
Role of cumulative innovation in technological improvement has also been emphasized by 
Rosenberg (1982, 1994), Usher (1954), Gilfillan (1935), and Hunter (1949). 
This literature is very important for the current study, particularly for Chapter 3. Grossman 
and Helpman (1991a) argue that “almost every product exists on a quality ladder, with variants 
below, that may already have become obsolete, and others above, that have yet to be 
discovered.” This is similar to the Schumpeterian innovation theory in which older products 
enjoy the above-normal profit for a limited time and then they are replaced by newer and higher 
quality products, resulting in product cycles. Grossman and Helpman (1991a) criticize the 
literature on patent races introduced by Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Lee and 
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Wilde (1980) for having a “one-shot framework [that] fails to capture an essential aspect of 
quality competition.” Grossman and Helpman (1991a) refer to the works of Segerstrom et al. 
(1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1990) as “the beginning of a theory of repeated quality 
innovations.” An important element of these models is “endogenous technical change” 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991a). Chapter 3 of this dissertation endogenizes investment in yield 
potential improvement as a function of future expected profits.  
O'Donoghue et al. (1998) introduce the concept of “effective patent life”, which is a function 
of “patent breadth” and “patent life”. They investigate the role of these two factors in the “pace 
of technological progress”. They argue that “to fully capture the impact of the cumulative nature 
of the innovations on the incentive to innovate, it is useful to consider a dynamic model where 
improvements of the innovation arise randomly.”  
Langinier and Moschini (2002) investigate the role of patents as incentives to innovate, for 
both single and cumulative types of innovation. They also investigate the relationship between 
patent systems, market structure, and R&D investment. They argue that “by endowing 
discoverers with property rights over the fruits of their efforts, patents affect the incentive to 
innovate and are likely to increase the flow of innovations.”  They also claim that in a world of 
cumulative innovations, the occurrence of the original innovation is important for facilitating the 
next generations of the innovation.  
Wright et al. (2007) provide a discussion around the agricultural research funding systems 
with a focus on the role of various incentives to innovate. In particular, they highlight the role of 
intellectual property rights. 
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) explore the incentives for “preemptive patenting”. They argue 
that (under the deterministic invention assumption) a R&D market with no imperfections makes 
the preemtive efforts costless and the persistence of the monopoly “doubly attractive”.  
Reinganum (1983) investigates Gilbert and Newbery’s results under the assumption of 
stochastic invention. She shows that the original innovator is less likely than the “challenger” to 
patent the innovation. She argues that this is because if the original innovator is successful then 
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he “merely replaces himself”. This means the original innovator has “a lower marginal incentive 
to invest in R&D than does the challenger”.   
1.3.4. Hotelling, Chamberlin, and Lancaster: Differentiation and Characteristics 
Another key feature of crop research is the differentiation of crop varieties; dozens, 
sometimes thousands of distinct crop varieties, grown on spatially distributed, heterogeneous 
land. Existence of heterogeneous land implies the creation of distinguished varieties with 
differentiating characteristics. These varieties are usually sequentially introduced to acquire 
profits by responding to the needs of farmers that are differentiated with respect to their land and 
other factors.  
This study uses the concept of characteristics to describe sequential innovation. The concept 
of “characteristics” has been discussed in “product variety” literature (Lancaster, 1990). 
Lancaster (1990) categorizes the monopolistic competition models of analyzing product variety 
into those tracing back to Chamberlin’s work (Chamberlin, 1933) and those based on Hotelling’s 
location model (Hotelling, 1929). Location models, including Hotelling’s linear town and 
Salop’s circle (Salop, 1979), incorporate differentiated buyers but are confined to two 
characteristics. Chamberlinian models allow for multiple characteristics but are confined to one 
“representative consumer”.   
The “characteristics approach” introduced by Lancaster (1966, 1971) expands the concept of 
“location” to non-spatial contexts. Models that use the characteristics approach replace locational 
space by “a virtual space of goods or their characteristics” (Lancaster, 1990). These models are 
known as “locational analog” models. The current study takes a similar approach as it replaces 
locational space by a virtual space of seed varieties’ characteristics.  
1.4. Canola Industry in Canada 
As Canada’s most valuable crop, Canola adds $19.3 billion a year to the economy (Canola 
Council of Canada, 2015). Every year, 43000 farmers, mostly concentrated in Western Canada, 
grow canola. As the largest canola producing country in the world, Canada produced 18 million 
tons of canola in approximately 20 million acres in 2013 (FAO, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2015). 
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Canadian canola is either exported as seed or processed into oil and meal for human and 
livestock consumption, respectively, through 13 processing plants across Canada (Canola 
Council of Canada, 2015).  
With introduction of the hybrid varieties and improved Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) the role 
of private sector in the Canadian canola industry has dramatically increased (Brewin and Malla, 
2012). From 1998 to 2003 the industry moved from predominantly inbred to mainly hybrid seed 
varieties. Along with the domination of the hybrid varieties, the role of private sector in canola 
research has increased. From 1970 to 2000, share of the public sector in canola research 
decreased from 87 to 30 percent (Brewin and Malla, 2012). Meanwhile, cost of canola seed 
increased from $6/acre in 1998 to $38.75/acre in 2011 (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 
1998 and 2011). Today, although most of the canola research is performed by the private sector, 
the public sector still has an important role in basic research (Brewin and Malla, 2012).  
The canola industry owes the increasing private sector involvement to biotechnology and 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) (Brewin and Malla, 2012). The use of 
biotechnology, particularly herbicide tolerant (HT) and the resulting hybrid technology, and 
enforcement of IPRs (e.g. Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) and technical use agreements (TUAs) 
has helped private firms prevent the re-use of seed by farmers and increase their revenues to 
approximately $800 million in 2012 (Brewin and Malla, 2012). This, however, has created at 
least two, perhaps related, sources of concern; one regarding market concentration and the other 
regarding dramatically increasing prices (Brewin and Malla, 2012; Howard, 2009). As 
mentioned in the last paragraph, canola seed prices have increased more than 6 times in the 
1998-2011 period.  
As for market concentration, most of Canadian canola seed is provided by Bayer Crop 
Science, Monsanto Canada Seeds Inc., Dow Agroscinces Canada Inc., Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Production Limited, DL Seeds, and Cargill Specialty Oils. Bayer has a significantly higher 
market share than its rivals (Brewin and Malla, 2012). For example, in 2012, Bayer varieties 
5440, 5770, 1145, L120, L130, L150, and L154 dominated 76 percent of Manitoba’s canola seed 
market (see Table 1.1).  
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Table 1. 1. Market Concentration of Canola Seed Companies in Manitoba, 2012. 
Company Variety Area(acre) Market Share (%) 
Bayer 5440 585240 22 
Bayer 5030 0 0 
Bayer 5020 0 0 
Bayer 5070 0 0 
Bayer 5770 74332 3 
Bayer 8440 0 0 
Bayer 5108 0 0 
Bayer 9590 0 0 
Bayer 2573 0 0 
Bayer 2663 0 0 
Bayer 1145 44866 2 
Bayer L120 28602 1 
Bayer L130 410188 15 
Bayer L150 864541 32 
Bayer L154 27962 1 
Bayer L159 0 0 
Bayer Total 2035730 76 
Monsanto 34-55 0 0 
Monsanto 34-65 0 0 
Monsanto 35-85 0 0 
Monsanto 71-45RR 0 0 
Monsanto 73-45RR 61530 2 
Monsanto 72-55RR 0 0 
Monsanto 73-75RR 114278 4 
Monsanto 73-65RR 0 0 
Monsanto Total 175808 7 
Pioneer 9553 0 0 
Pioneer 45H21 0 0 
Pioneer 45H29 93194 3 
Pioneer 45H28 0 0 
Pioneer 45H26 0 0 
Pioneer 45H25 0 0 
Pioneer 46H75 (ST) 0 0 
Pioneer Total 93194 3 
Dow 1012RR 232057 9 
Dow 2012CL 107742 4 
Dow NEX 845CL  0 0 
Dow NX4 105 RR 0 0 
Dow Total 339799 13 
Other Companies Total 46014 2 
Source: Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and 
author’s calculations.  
The most popular hybrid seed technologies in Western Canada are Liberty Link and Roundup 
Ready used by Bayer and Monsanto respectively. Both technologies are GM and provide 
herbicide tolerance. Clearfield is another non-GM technology currently used by both Pioneer and 
Dow. It is worth noting that as a result of cross-licensing these companies have been able to use 
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technologies originally developed by their rivals (Howard, 2009). For example, all of the rivals 
except Bayer, are using Monsanto’s Roundup Ready technology. Therefore, the 7 percent market 
share in Table 1.1 may not truly represent Monsanto’s role in the Canola seed industry (Brewin 
and Malla, 2012).  
The seed companies have been responding to farmers’ needs by not only focusing on 
improved yield potential, but also offering other characteristics such as standability, herbicide 
resistance, pesticide resistance, Blackleg resistance, Clubroot resistance, and Sclerotinia 
resistance. 
1.5. Objectives 
Considering the central role of innovation in economic growth, it seems important to study the 
incentives to innovate. The present study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by exploring the 
physical and economic forces that influence the dynamic path of hybrid seed pricing for a broad 
acre crop over time. Of the physical and economic forces influencing the dynamic path of hybrid 
development, the sequential and cumulative nature of crop development is particularly discussed. 
This study attempts to answer the following questions: What is the incentive to create new 
production inputs that embody new characteristics? How are these sequentially introduced inputs 
priced? What role does sequential innovation play in the seed producers’ pricing decisions? How 
does a seed industry characterized by sequential and cumulative innovation evolve over time? 
Understanding the role of sequential innovation in the seed producers’ behaviour and the seed 
industry’s evolution path has important policy implications for innovators and policy-makers.   
1.6. Organization of the Study 
This dissertation consists of three main papers presented as Chapters 2, 3, and 4, as well as an 
introduction (Chapter 1) and Summary and Conclusions (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 2 introduces a new theoretical model that explains the incentives to create new 
characteristics for new production inputs. This model incorporates competition among n 
differentiated production inputs each embodying new characteristics. In this chapter, some 
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properties of the model are shown in form of propositions and algebraic proofs. Particularly, 
effect of rate of innovation on equilibrium conditions is explored. 
This model makes a significant contribution to the “product variety” literature. While 
Chamberlinian models are confined to one representative consumer and location models are not 
very helpful in analysis of more than two characteristics, the model developed in Chapter 2 
incorporates differentiated buyers and multiple characteristics. What distinguishes this model 
from similar models is the focus on farm input characteristics rather than characteristics in 
consumer products as well as incorporating sequential innovation via new seed characteristics.  
Chapter 3 builds on the results derived from the theoretical model to consider other aspects of 
sequential innovation. In chapter 3, numerical simulations are performed to further investigate 
the validity of the propositions presented in Chapter 2. This chapter seeks to provide some 
insights into dynamic aspects of the model, such as product cycles.  
The most important contribution of this chapter to the literature is the insights that it provides 
into the effect of rate of innovation, degree of specificity of seed varieties, and cost structure on 
length of product cycles, number of equilibrium varieties, and other equilibrium conditions. It is 
found, for example, that a higher rate of innovation results in fewer equilibrium products that are 
priced higher.  
Chapter 4 uses data from Canadian canola industry to empirically test some of the 
propositions discussed in chapter 2. For this purpose, an “adoption model” is estimated. The 
adoption model is modified to incorporate the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity 
of seed varieties rather than their average and variance yield. This chapter makes a significant 
contribution to the adoption literature by explicitly considering and successfully incorporating 
the adaptability of varieties via a more tangible measure, degree of specificity, rather than yield 
variance. Also, this study uses a new econometric approach for estimating adoption models. The 
adoption model is estimated as a fixed effect panel regression rather than a simple Ordinary 
Least Squares.   
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At the end of each chapter policy implications of the findings are discussed. Also, technical 
limitations and approaches for future studies are discussed at the end of each chapter. Chapter 5 
provides a conclusion of the findings of this dissertation.  
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2.1. Introduction 
Innovation often takes place in a sequential manner (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). 
Particularly, the process of adding new characteristics to products is likely to be sequential. Plant 
breeders typically use existing elite varieties in their breeding programs to create new varieties 
with new traits. As discussed by Schumpeter (1939), these sequentially introduced innovations 
are built on the back of a bigger wave called the original innovation. The original innovation, and 
the innovations of smaller magnitude built upon the original innovation, are doomed to fade by 
entry competition, creating business cycles (Schumpeter, 1939). This is particularly evident in 
the seed markets, where the old varieties are eventually replaced with the new ones.  
This study fills a gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model that lays out a process 
of adding new characteristics to agricultural production inputs, with the purpose of 
understanding the incentives for sequential innovation via the addition of new characteristics. As 
elaborated in the body of the chapter, this study derives the equilibrium conditions for n varieties 
of seed sequentially introduced in n time periods, each of which is differentiated from other 
varieties with respect to one characteristic. By allowing multi-brand competition, the model 
overcomes the “immediate neighbours” problem2, which is common in location models. The 
model also allows differentiated input buyers so that it is not confined to only one 
“representative consumer” as in Chamberlinian models. Although the model may have 
similarities to monopolistic competition models of analyzing product variety (i.e. location, 
Chamberlinian and hybrid models), it has a different perspective in that it uses the concept of 
“characteristics” introduced by Lancaster (1966) to explain competition among n differentiated 
production inputs.  
The flexibility of the model in terms of the number of production inputs in the market, 
potential quality improvements, and the addition of new characteristics leads to interesting and 
intuitive findings. It is shown that the rate of yield potential improvement and the degree of 
specificity (the inverse of adaptability) of seed varieties are important determinants of their 
prices and market shares. Farm input buyers experience unbounded gains from variety. Buyers’ 
gains from variety increase as inputs become more specific. Although this chapter only briefly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The problem refers to firms only competing directly with their immediate neighbors.  
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explores Schumpeterian innovation cycles, the model provides the basis to study this concept 
through numerical simulations.  
 Next is a review of the “product differentiation” literature, and a comparison of the model 
introduced in this study with existing monopolistic competition models of analyzing product 
variety. Later, a conceptual framework for incentives to innovate through creation of new 
characteristics is presented. The theoretical model follows, with some properties of the model 
presented through propositions and algebraic proofs to provide a better understanding of the 
behavioral implications. Last, a conclusion and the technical limitations of the study are 
presented.  
2.2. Characteristics in Literature 
This study seeks to explore the incentives for sequential innovation via the creation of new 
characteristics for production inputs. In addition, this study attempts to provide a basis for an 
analysis of Schumpeterian innovation-induced cycles. For this purpose, this study requires a 
model that allows for: 1) Differentiated input buyers; 2) Multiple characteristics; and 3) 
Sequential entry. The next few paragraphs summarize the monopolistic competition models of 
analyzing product variety that incorporate one or more of these three elements.  
Literature on the introduction of new farm input characteristics is sparse. The concept of 
“characteristics”, however, has been discussed in “product variety” literature (Lancaster, 1990). 
Lancaster (1990) categorizes the monopolistic competition models of analyzing product variety 
into those tracing back to Chamberlin’s work (Chamberlin, 1933) and those based on Hotelling’s 
location model (Hotelling, 1929). Although incorporating differentiated buyers, traditional 
location models are not very helpful in the analysis of more than two characteristics. Eaton and 
Lipsey (1976) show the “non-uniqueness” of equilibrium in a two-dimensional (Loschian) 
location model. Salop (1979) solves the non-existence of equilibrium problem by locating firms 
on a circle, which has no “end-points.” Nevertheless, Salop’s circle model faces the “immediate 
neighbours” problem with more than three firms in the market.   
The “characteristics approach” introduced by Lancaster (1966, 1971) expands the concept of 
“location” to non-spatial contexts. Models that use the characteristics approach replace locational 
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space by “a virtual space of goods or their characteristics” (Lancaster, 1990). These models are 
known as “locational analog” models.  
Lancaster (1990) argues that the dimension of the product space affects the structure of the 
market equilibrium and optimum variety in locational analog models. He points out that: 
“…the two-characteristic single-dimension model possesses special 
features that one cannot generalize to higher dimensions. …As the number 
of relevant characteristics increases the configurations become very 
complex, with no locational models to draw upon.” (Lancaster, 1990). 
This quote highlights the fact that even in more advanced location models, such as 
Lancaster’s locational analog model (Lancaster, 1979) and Salop’s circle model (Salop, 1979), 
dealing with multiple characteristics is still an issue. More importantly, location models do not 
deal with entry very well as they run into the “immediate neighbours” problem with more than 
two products (or more than three in Salop’s model) in the market. Therefore, use of location 
models for the purpose of this study may be difficult.  
Chamberlinian models, on the other hand, are based on the assumption of one representative 
consumer purchasing all available brands. Neo-Chamberlinian models, such as that of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), have this assumption in common with their ancestry. Although the representative 
consumer assumption allows for multi-brand competition, and thereby multiple characteristics, it 
also means that buyers are not differentiated in these models. This assumption is inappropriate 
for agricultural input industries where farmers are differentiated with respect to land, 
management and other characteristics. Chamberlinian models are not applied to the current 
study.   
Perloff and Salop (1985) were perhaps first to explicitly acknowledge the necessity of 
combining features of both Chamberlinian and location models in order to allow for 
differentiated products, differentiated consumers and multi-brand competition. A few other 
studies (such as those of Anderson and de Palma, 1992a, 1992b; Sattinger, 1984; Besanko et al., 
1990; Deneckere and Rothschild, 1992; Irmen and Thisse, 1998) have developed models that 
combine features of both location and Chamberlinian models. Carlton and Perloff (2005, p. 230) 
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call these hybrid models. Hybrid models start with consumer valuations of all (possible) brands 
(Perloff and Salop, 1985). Then, demand for each brand is obtained by calculating the proportion 
of consumers that give the highest valuation to that brand. Equilibrium conditions (e.g. prices 
and market shares) are then found by substituting the demand for each brand in the firms’ profit 
functions and solving the profit-maximization problem for firms. Two facts are evident in the 
existing hybrid models. First, although these models incorporate multiple characteristics, they 
only focus on characteristics embodied in final consumer products. The current study, however, 
is interested in characteristics embodied in production inputs. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge, none of the existing hybrid models incorporates sequential entry and/or sequential 
innovation.  
To summarize, in order to understand the changes in market structure and equilibrium 
conditions in a seed industry over time, it seems necessary to develop a model that focuses on the 
incentive to create new characteristics for new production inputs in a sequential manner. 
Specially because non of the existing location, Chamberlinian and hybrid models incorporate 
sequential entry of production inputs that are differentiated with respect to more than two 
characteristics and differentiated buyers. As Benkard (2004) claims, “Models of entry for 
differentiated products are not yet well understood for even just a two-dimensional space.”  
This chapter develops a theoretical model that focuses on the incentive to create new 
characteristics for new production inputs. The locational side of the model is locational analog as 
it treats “location” in a non-spatial context. Nevertheless, similar to Chamberlinian models, 
competition in this model is non-localized. That is, the model allows every seed variety to 
compete with every other seed variety.  
The model developed in this study is a production-side hybrid model as opposed to the 
existing consumption-side hybrid models. Chamberlinian and Hotelling-type models (and their 
descending branches, including hybrid models) have the final consumers of the products on the 
demand side of the model. In these models, demand for goods is obtained from consumer 
valuations of various brands. In the current study, however, the demand side of the model 
consists of demand for a production input, namely seed. Relying on the Neoclassical 
assumptions, demand functions for various varieties of seed are obtained from a producers’ 
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surplus maximization process. This maximization problem translates the demand for n 
differentiated varieties into demand for one commodity, land, and then uses the land constraint to 
find the land allocated to each variety and thereby find the demand for each variety. The model 
overcomes the complexity of dimensionality of characteristics space by use of this simple 
maximization problem on the demand side. 
The next section presents the conceptual framework for incentives to create new seed 
characteristics. This conceptual framework, outlined for a two-input case, provides the basis for 
the theoretical model presented later.   
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
Assume two varieties of canola seed can be planted in two parcels of land: a drought-resistant 
and a herbicide-tolerant variety. The two varieties, however, are not equally suitable for either 
parcel of land. In parcel 1, the herbicide-tolerant variety yields more than the drought-resistant 
variety. Panel i of Figure 2.1 shows the position of each variety on a two-dimensional 
characteristics space and the isoprofit curves associated with each variety. 
Horizontal and vertical axes measure drought-tolerance and herbicide-tolerance 
characteristics, respectively. It is assumed that the relationship between varieties of seed and 
their characteristics is nonlinear in the sense that quantity of the characteristics embodied in a 
seed variety does not increase as the amount of seed increases. For example, a variety either has 
the herbicide-tolerance characteristics or not; the amount of herbicide-tolerance characteristic 
does not increase when more seed is used. It is also assumed that characteristics in varieties of 
seed are “nonadditive.” This is because varieties of seed are “noncombinable” in the sense that 
two varieties of seed cannot be used simultaneously.3 
Variety A embodies only the drought-resistance characteristic, while variety B embodies only 
the herbicide-tolerance characteristic. This is why variety A is located on the horizontal axis and 
variety B is located on the vertical axis. Any variety that is not located on either vertical or 
horizontal axis contains a bundle of both characteristics. The issue of trait bundling is discussed 
in Appendix 2.B.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For more information on this issue, please see Lancaster (1979, page 22).  
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Isoprofit curves associated with varieties A and B are shown by ISA and ISB, respectively. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that isoprofit curves are linear. Since both varieties are located on the 
axes, curvature of the isoprofit curve does not affect the analysis.  
In parcel 1, variety B, the herbicide-tolerant variety, corresponds to a higher isoprofit curve, 
ISB, because it performs better on this particular parcel of land. Thus, the farmer who owns 
parcel 1 will use variety B if A and B are both available and priced equally. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Panel i-Parcel 1 (well-suited for variety B)  Panel ii-Parcel 2 (well-suited for variety A) 
Figure 2. 1 Illustration of Ideal Variety for Two Parcels of Land in a Two-Dimensional 
Characteristics Space.  
Source: Adapted from Lancaster (1979). 
Now assume variety B is not yet present in the market. When variety B does not exist, variety 
A has to be used in parcel 1, which corresponds to a lower isoprofit curve, ISA. There may be 
many parcels of land in a region that would move to a higher isoprofit curve if variety B were 
available. That is, although farmers need the herbicide-tolerance characteristic, they cannot 
reveal their preferences for this characteristic until the herbicide-tolerant variety is introduced to 
the market. This provides an incentive for innovators to create the herbicide-tolerance 
characteristic, embody it in a variety (say variety B) and offer it to the market. Therefore, the 
seed producers’ incentive for the innovation is earning a higher level of profit by offering a well-
suited variety to a group of seed buyers. Seed buyers, on the other hand, purchase the new 
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variety, or more specifically the new characteristic embodied in the new variety, in their quest to 
find a well-suited variety that accommodates higher profit levels.  
Panel ii of Figure 2.1 depicts the isoprofit curves for a parcel of land that is well-suited for 
variety A compared to variety B. For instance, parcel 2 is more prone to drought and has less 
weeds than parcel 1. In parcel 2, variety A, the drought-resistant variety, corresponds to a higher 
isoprofit curve, ISA, because it performs better in this particular parcel of land. Thus, the farmer 
who owns parcel 2 will use variety A if A and B are both available and priced equally. However, 
if variety A does not exist, variety B has to be used in parcel 2. This corresponds to a lower 
isoprofit curve, ISB. This provides an incentive for innovators to create the drought-resistance 
characteristic, embody it in variety A and offer it to the market. 
In his locational analog model, Lancaster (1979) looks at this issue from a slightly different 
perspective. In Lancaster’s model, each consumer has a “compensating function” that represents 
how distance from the consumer’s “ideal good” can be compensated by increased consumption 
of a second-best good. In other words, “distance” from the ideal good decreases the consumer’s 
utility and that decrease is compensated by an increased consumption of another good. In the 
above example, it is assumed that farmers have to commit to the prescribed seeding rate so they 
cannot compensate the distance from the “ideal variety” by increasing the seeding rate of the 
second-best variety. In the current model, buyers earn lower producer surplus from a non-ideal 
variety until the ideal variety is introduced to the market.  
With this introduction, it is now postulated that there are n characteristics that buyers have a 
positive willingness to pay for, whether or not those characteristics are yet introduced to the 
market. Each of these n characteristics is latent until an innovator reveals it. When a firm 
introduces a new product, it incorporates a new characteristic that differentiates it from 
competitor products. For example, if there are no insect-resistant varieties, a seed producer can 
differentiate its variety from existing varieties by making an insect-resistant variety. Only once 
this variety is introduced is the insect-resistant characteristic present. Now a group of seed 
buyers can reveal their preferences for this characteristic. Thus, the innovators’ incentive for 
creating a new characteristic is capturing a dimension of the n-dimensional characteristics space 
that has not been taken previously by other products. By successfully doing, so the innovator 
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creates the opportunity to capture a portion of the market and potentially increase his or her 
profit.  
The next section presents the theoretical model developed for analyzing the competition 
among n new characteristics embodied in n new production inputs.  
2.4. Theoretical Model  
2.4.1. Assumptions 
This section presents the critical assumptions of the theoretical model. In order to focus on 
multiple characteristics, differentiated inputs and seed buyers, sequential innovation, and 
competition among differentiated products the model has made a few simplifying assumptions. 
While some of these assumptions are traditional in the literature, some are specific to this study 
and the model developed to study a seed industry. The technical limitations that these 
assumptions may create are discussed at the end of this chapter.  
Farmers: It is assumed that there are 𝑓 ∈ 1,⋯ ,𝐹  canola farmers in a region. Each farmer 
owns at least one parcel of land. The farming activity is assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
Farmers maximize their surplus from their crop. For simplicity, it will later be assumed that 
output price is equal to 1.  
Land: Each parcel of land 𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚} is characterized by a row vector of n characteristics 𝜃! = 𝜃!! ,𝜃!! ,… ,𝜃!" , which differentiates each parcel from other parcels. Characteristics 𝜃! to 𝜃! are determined by land characteristics (e.g. soil texture, soil nutrients and soil moisture, 
weather, disease pressure), farmers’ management skills, machinery in use, past land management 
(e.g. previous crop pattern, previous diseases), and other factors unique to each parcel of land. 
For simplicity, it will later be assumed that total available land is equal to 1. Within the 
landscape, land characteristics are assumed to be i.i.d. and random with uniform distributions 
scaled to [0,1] lower and upper bounds. 
Seed varieties: It is assumed that there are 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛} crop varieties that are sequentially 
introduced into the market. Each variety consists of n latent characteristics. For simplicity it is 
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assumed that each variety offers only one characteristic. Therefore, each variety is differentiated 
from other varieties with respect to a unique characteristic in the vector of seed characteristics 𝐿! = 𝐿!! , 𝐿!! ,… , 𝐿!" .4 This vector determines whether or not a variety embodies a specific 
characteristic. Therefore, each element of this vector can only take the values zero and one. If a 
variety embodies a characteristic, the corresponding element in the 𝐿!  vector is one and 
otherwise zero. Since the elements of the vector of seed characteristics can only take one value, 
one or zero, seed characteristics do not have a distribution.  
Interaction of Seed and Land: For tractability, it is assumed that each variety characteristic 
linearly interacts with only one corresponding land characteristic to determine yield (i.e. a one-
to-one relationship between seed and land characteristics). The model assumes that 
characteristics embodied in a production input determine the value of that input; it is the traits 
embodied in a seed variety that determine farmers’ willingness to pay for that variety. 
The Seed Industry: Varieties of seed are introduced by 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛} seed producers. Market 
structure of the seed industry is assumed to be monopolistic competition. Therefore, each seed 
producer faces a downward sloping demand curve. This is consistent with the differentiated 
nature of the seed varieties. It is also assumed that all firms have the same cost structure with 
positive sunk fixed cost equal to FC and zero marginal cost. 
Although in reality the new varieties are usually introduced by existing firms, for simplicity 
this study assumes that varieties are separately owned. Another underlying assumption is that 
firms have no foresight. That is to say the model presented in this study is not a dynamic 
Industrial Organization model. Instead, it is assumed that there is no price stickiness, so firms 
can choose a new profit-maximizing price in each period when a new product is added to the 
market.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, variety 1 is drought-resistant, the second variety is not drought-resistant but is disease-resistant, and 
the third variety is neither drought-resistant nor disease-resistant but is herbicide-tolerant.  
With simple modifications the model works for trait bundling as well. The issue of trait bundling is discussed in 
Appendix B.  
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2.4.2. Demand for seed 
In this “production side hybrid model”, the demand for characteristics (embodied in seed 
varieties) originates from the surplus-maximizing input purchase decisions of firms endowed 
with heterogeneous fixed factors of production. Specifically, parcels of land are differentiated 
with respect to land characteristics.  
Each variety has a yield potential of 𝑦!. The yield potential 𝑦! determines the highest yield 
level that a variety could potentially reach. The response of varieties to a change in land 
characteristics incorporated in the analysis through the vector 𝜇! = 𝜇!! , 𝜇!! ,… , 𝜇!" .  This vector 
represents the response of the yield of variety i as a result of one unit change in the 
corresponding land characteristics.  
In short, in order to determine the yield of variety i in parcel j one needs to know the yield 
potential of variety i (𝑦!), land characteristics of parcel j (θ!), the characteristics that variety i 
embodies (𝐿!), and how variety i responds to the land characteristics (𝜇!).  
The one-to-one interaction of land and seed characteristics determines the yield level of each 
variety in each parcel of land. Thus, yield of variety i at parcel j is determined by the interaction 
of characteristics of variety i and characteristics of parcel j. This linear 5 one-to-one interaction 
could be shown in matrix form: 
[𝑦!]!×! − [𝜃!"]!×!×[𝜇!!]!×!×[𝐿!!]!×! = [𝑌!"]!×!  
or 
𝑦! ⋯ 𝑦!⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝑦! ⋯ 𝑦! !×! − 𝜃!! ⋯ 𝜃!!⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝜃!! ⋯ 𝜃!" !×! ×
𝜇!! ⋯ 𝜇!!⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝜇!! ⋯ 𝜇!! !×! × 𝐿!! ⋯ 𝐿!!⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝐿!! ⋯ 𝐿!! !×! = 𝑌!! ⋯ 𝑌!!⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝑌!! ⋯ 𝑌!" !×! 
where [𝑦!]!×! represents the yield potential levels of varieties 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, [𝜃!"]!×! the levels of 
n independent land characteristics in j=1,…,m parcels of land,  [𝜇!!]!×! the response of the yield 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For simplicity, it is assumed that the relationship between yield, seed characteristics and land characteristics is 
linear. This is merely to show that observed yield levels could be traced back to observed and unobserved seed and 
land characteristics.  
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of variety i as a result of one unit change in the corresponding land characteristics, [𝐿!!]!×! the 
seed characteristics in varieties 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛} , and [𝑌!"]!×!  the yield levels of varieties 𝑖 ∈ {1,… ,𝑛}, at parcels 𝑗 ∈ {1,… ,𝑚}. For example, yield level of variety 1 in parcel 1 is found 
as follows:  
𝑌!! = 𝑦! − (𝜃!!𝜇11𝐿!! + 𝜃!"𝜇21𝐿!" + 𝜃!"𝜇31𝐿!" +⋯+ 𝜃!!𝜇𝑛1𝐿!!) 
As mentioned before, it is assumed that each variety offers only one characteristic. Therefore, 
the off-diagonal elements in [𝜇!!]!×! and [𝐿!!]!×! matrices become zeros and 𝜇!! and 𝐿!! can be 
simplified to 𝜇! and 𝐿!, respectively. That is, 𝐿! represents characteristic i, which is only offered 
by variety i, and 𝜇! represents the response of the yield of variety i as a result of a unit change in 
the land characteristic that corresponds to the seed characteristic i.  
Since land characteristics are i.i.d. uniform variables (𝜃!~𝑢(0,1)) and seed characteristics do 
not have a distribution, the resulting yield levels are i.i.d uniform variables with the following 
distribution: 
 𝑌!~𝑢(𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖, 𝑦!) 
That is, yield of variety i is uniformly distributed between 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑦! over the range of the 
parcels of land.  
Now it can be explained why the land characteristics are chosen to be independently 
distributed. Given the one-to-one relationship between land and seed characteristics, the 
independence of land characteristics’ distributions implies new varieties have independent yield 
distributions. This independency is necessary as this study is only focusing on new products with 
characteristics that are completely new. Note that if the new characteristics are not completely 
new, then the distributions of the yield levels will be correlated (i.e. not independent). 6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Although the issue of substitutability is not discussed in this study, it is worth noting that as the yield levels of two 
varieties become more positively correlated, the degree of substitutability of the two varieties increases. Similarly, 
as yield levels of two varieties become more negatively correlated, substitutability decreases. Therefore, 
substitutability could be incorporated in the model through distribution of land characteristics.  
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The following numerical example shows how the interaction between land and seed 
characteristics determines yield of each variety. Assume there are 10 parcels of land 
characterized by 𝜃!, 𝜃!, and 𝜃!. 𝜃!, 𝜃!, and 𝜃! are random and independent land characteristics. 
The following matrix shows these randomly drawn land characteristics for parcels 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10.  
12345678910
𝜃!           𝜃!         𝜃!0.230.29 0.450.04 0.390.190.250.480.340.960.860.520.710.21
0.730.410.900.090.960.850.220.19
0.330.450.230.530.890.850.980.50
 
Assume there are three varieties of seed available. Variety A offers only characteristic 𝐿!, B 
offers only 𝐿!, and C offers only 𝐿!. Thus, matrix of variety characteristics can be formulated as 
follows:  
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶𝐿!𝐿!𝐿! 10 0 01 00 0 1  
Also assume that matrices of yield response and yield potential are as follows:  
𝜇! = 0.50 0   01 00 0 1.5 , 𝑦! =
11 1.51.5 2211111111
1.51.51.51.51.51.51.51.5
22222222
  
These matrices show that variety A has a yield potential of 1 and yield response of 0.5 to 
characteristic 𝐿!. Variety B has a yield potential of 1.5 and yield response of 1 to characteristic 𝐿!, and variety C has a yield potential of 2 and yield response of 1.5 to characteristic 𝐿!. 
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Assuming 𝐿! , 𝐿! , and 𝐿!  correspond to 𝜃! , 𝜃! , and 𝜃! , respectively (i.e. a one-to-one 
relationship), yield levels of varieties A, B and C in parcels 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10 can be obtained as 
follows: 
11 1.51.5 2211111111
1.51.51.51.51.51.51.51.5
22222222
−
0.230.29 0.450.04 0.390.190.250.480.340.960.860.520.710.20
0.730.410.900.090.960.850.220.19
0.330.450.230.530.890.850.980.50
0.50 0   01 00 0 1.5 10 0 01 00 0 1 =
12345678910
𝐴           𝐵         𝐶0.890.85 1.051.46 1.421.720.870.760.830.520.570.740.650.90
0.771.090.601.410.540.651.281.31
1.511.331.661.210.670.730.531.25
= 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 
The yield of variety A in parcel 1 is determined by the yield potential of variety A, which is 1, 
and the interaction of characteristics of parcel 1, 0.23, 0.45, 0.39 , the yield response of variety 
A, !.!!! , and characteristics of variety A, !!! . The yield levels of varieties A, B, and C in parcels 1 
to 10 are determined in a similar fashion.  
There is a pattern in the yield levels matrix above. Each variety reaches its yield potential 𝑦! 
at a certain parcel of land. Variety A, for example, yields most in parcel 10 (Y10A=0.90). The 
second-best parcel of land for variety A is parcel 1 (Y1A=0.89). By following this pattern, one can 
see that as the area of one variety expands from the best-suited parcel to the second best, third 
best and so on, the average yield of that variety drops. With no scale economies in producing 
seed, this does not need to occur because the market will produce an ideal variety for each parcel 
of land (Lancaster, 1990). The existence of fixed costs and scale economies on the supply side, 
however, results in fewer varieties than the number of parcels of land. This implies that each 
variety will be used in some parcels of land other than its best-suited parcel. As a result, seed 
varieties lose their marginal productivity as their area expands to parcels other than their ideal 
parcel of land.7  
Assuming that land is uniformly distributed between the best-suited and worst-suited parcels, 
and that land parcels are arbitrarily small, then the decline in yield of each variety will be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The area does not necessarily expand around the highest-yielding parcel.  
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continuous linear function of the amount of land allocated to that variety. Thus, the relationship 
between yield and area of variety i can be written as:  
(2.1)     𝑌! = 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋!         
where 𝑌! is the yield of variety i per acre, 𝑦! the potential yield of variety i per acre (i.e. yield at 
the best-suited parcel), 𝑋! the area or number of parcels allocated to variety i, and 𝜇! is the yield 
decrease of variety i as its area expands by one unit. This relationship holds for each column of 
the yield levels matrix [𝑌!"]!×!. Equation 2.1 indicates that each variety i yields most at a 
particular parcel of land and its yield drops in a linear fashion by the rate of 𝜇! as the area 𝑋! 
allocated to variety i expands.8 In other words, 𝜇!, or the yield response of a variety to a change 
in its corresponding land characteristic, reflects the degree of specificity of variety i for different 
parcels of land. Hereafter 𝜇! will be referred to as degree of specificity of variety i. A larger 𝜇! 
means the yield of variety i drops faster as the area expands and this implies variety i is more 
specific to particular parcels of land and vice versa.      
The surplus created from variety i in each parcel 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10 can be formulated as follows:  
 (2.2)     𝑆!" = 𝑃.𝑌!" −𝑊! ; 𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,10 
where 𝑆!" is the surplus created from variety i in each parcel 𝑗, P is the output price, 𝑌!" is the 
yield of variety i in parcel j, and 𝑊! is the price of variety i. Assuming output price P is equal to 
1 and all three varieties are equally priced at 𝑊! = 0.1, the surplus (𝑆!" ) in each parcel 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10 is as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 With non-uniform distribution of parcels of land, the relationship between yield and area of variety i (equation 2.1) 
becomes non nonlinear, and with parcels of land that are not arbitrarily small the continuous linear function turns 
into a step function. 
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𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑆!" :
12345678910
𝐴           𝐵         𝐶0.790.75 0.951.36 1.321.620.770.660.730.420.470.640.550.80
0.670.990.501.310.440.551.181.21
1.411.231.561.110.570.630.431.15
  ; 𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,10  
Highlighted cells show the varieties that return the highest surplus level for each parcel of 
land. On any given parcel of land there is one variety that creates higher producer surplus (i.e. 
return to fixed factors of production) than any other variety for that parcel of land. 9 Farmers pick 
the variety that provides the highest surplus (Si) for their parcel of land. In parcel 1, for example, 
variety C offers the highest surplus while in parcel 8 variety A returns the highest surplus.  
Figure 2.2 provides a graphical analysis corresponding to the matrix analysis that is presented 
above. Figure 2.2 depicts how parcels of land with independent characteristics are allocated to 
two equally priced varieties of seed that have the same yield potential and degree of specificity 
of 1 and 0.5, respectively. Each of the 100 red points on the graph represents a parcel of land. 
The locus of each parcel is determined by the yield levels of varieties 1 and 2 in that parcel. 
Yield levels of each variety are randomly distributed between 0.5 and 1 (i.e. 𝑌!~𝑢(𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖, 𝑦!)). 
The green line represents P.Y1-W1= P.Y2-W2 for the case of W1=W2, so it divides the area 
between Y1 and Y2 axes to two equal size triangles. For all parcels of land above the green curve 
P.Y1-W1 is greater than P.Y2-W2. For all parcels underneath the green line P.Y2-W2 is greater than 
P.Y1-W1. Therefore, all parcels above the green line choose variety 1 over variety 2 and all 
parcels underneath the green line choose variety 2 over variety 1. It is obvious that in the absence 
of variety 2 all the points between Y1 and Y2 axes collapse on the Y1 axis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This is similar to “ideal goods” for different groups of consumers in consumption-side hybrid models. 
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Figure 2. 2. Allocation of Parcels of Land to Two Equally Priced Varieties with Same Yield 
Potentials.  
Given the matrix and the graphical analyses above, now an algebraic analysis can be 
presented. Ideally, surplus needs to be maximized for each parcel of land. Appendix 2.C presents 
the Lagrangean corresponding to the surplus maximization problem for each parcel of land. This 
approach, however, is analytically difficult, if not impossible, to solve for n varieties. Figure 2.3 
shows how demand curves for the case of only two varieties can be found. Panel i of  Figure 2.3 
is similar to Figure 2.2. As shown in panel i, as price of variety 1 (W2) increases while price of 
variety 2 (W2) is fixed, the price line shifts up in a parallel fashion and some parcels of land 
switch from variety 1 to variety 2. However, as the green curve moves higher and higher, fewer 
and fewer parcels switch to variety 2. This is because the land characteristics that varieties 1 and 
2 correspond to are independent and, thus, parcels of land are spread over the space in between 
Y1 and Y2 axes with the same density. Similarly, each time price of variety 1 is decreased, fewer 
and fewer parcels switch to this variety. This relationship between change in price of a variety 
and number of parcels that switch implies a non-linear demand curve for the variety. This 
demand curve is illustrated in Panel ii of Figure 2.3. 
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Panel i- Allocation of Parcels of Land to Two Varieties  Panel ii-Demand for Variety 1 
Figure 2. 3. Exact Non-Linear Demand for the Case of Independent Land Characteristics. 
Appendix 2.C derives the equation for this non-linear demand curve as follows:   
 
𝑋! = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! < 0                                                                                                                                      𝑋! = !!!!!!! !!!!   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑊! ≥ 𝑊!  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! ≥ 0                      𝑋! = 1 − !!!!!!! !!!!   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑊! ≤ 𝑊!  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! ≥ 0𝑋! = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! < 0                                                                                                                                    
  
This exact demand equation is difficult to generalize to more than two varieties. An 
alternative approach is presented below. This approach results in an approximate demand curve 
that is depicted by the dashed downward sloping curve in Figure 2.3. Appendix 2.C discusses the 
relationship between the exact and approximate demand curves in more depth.  
Farmer 𝑓’s surplus or return to fixed factors of production from growing variety i is as 
follows:  
(2.3)     𝑠!" = 𝑃 𝑌!𝑑𝑋!!"! −𝑊!𝑋!"       
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where 𝑠!" is farmer 𝑓’s surplus from variety i, 𝑃 is output price, 𝑋!" is the area farmer f allocates 
to variety i, 𝑌! is the yield of variety i per acre, and 𝑊! is the price of variety i.10 With the 
perfectly competitive agriculture industry assumption, maximizing the surplus for each 
individual farmer is equivalent to maximizing the total surplus for all the farmers in the region 
subject to the corresponding land constraint. 11  The farmers’ total surplus from varieties 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛 is as follows: 
𝑆 = 𝑠!"!!!!!!!! = 𝑠!!!!! = (𝑃 𝑌!𝑑𝑋!!! −𝑊!𝑋!)!!!!        
Therefore, the objective function for the whole region can be written as: 
(2.4)     𝑀𝑎𝑥!! 𝑆 = 𝑠!!!!! = (𝑃 𝑌!𝑑𝑋!!! −𝑊!𝑋!)!!!!     s.t. 𝑋! = 𝑋!!!! =1     
Without lack of generality, the total available land 𝑋  is assumed to be equal to 1. By 
substituting equation 2.1 in 2.4, the Lagrangean function corresponding to the above 
maximization problem can be formulated as follows: 
(2.5)     ℒ! = 𝑃 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖𝑋! 𝑑𝑋!!! −𝑊!𝑋! + 𝜆(1 − 𝑋!!!!! )!!!!           
where 𝜆, the Lagrangean multiplier, represents the shadow value of the last (i.e. least productive) 
parcel of land allocated to each variety.  
The Lagrangean of 2.5 maximizes the region’s total surplus by translating the demand for n 
differentiated varieties into demand for one commodity, land, and using a single land constraint 
to find the optimum market share for each variety such that the shadow value of the last parcel of 
land allocated to each variety equals 𝜆. 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for maximization of 2.5 are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It is assumed that there are a sufficiently large number of parcels of land such that the variable 𝑋!, although a 
discrete variable, can be used in the integral.  With a sufficiently large number of parcels, this integral provides a 
close approximation.  
11 According to Ackerberg et al. (2007), the “outside” alternative can be added to a model through an individual 
specific constant term without changing the preferences over products. Thus, this study takes a similar approach to 
Ackerberg et al. (2007, page 4186) and does not include an outside alternative in the model. 
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(2.6)      
!ℒ!!!! = 0⟹ 𝑃 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝜆                        !ℒ!!! = 0⟹ 𝑋! =!!!! 1                                                                         
The FOCs of the Lagrangean ensure that surplus in the last (marginal) parcel of land that is 
allocated to each variety is equal to the opportunity cost of land (𝜆). That is, the maximum 
willingness to pay for the marginal parcel of land that is allocated to each variety is equal to the 
opportunity cost of land (i.e. its true production scarcity). This satisfies the condition for a Pareto 
optimum and ensures that total surplus from all the varieties is maximized.  
Notice that the land constraint implies that total land allocated to this crop must equal 𝑋! =!!!! 𝑋 = 1. If there are any abandoned parcels of land, this condition does not hold. 
However, this condition holds as long as the land constraint is binding. Land constraint is 
binding as long as land rents are positive.   
Without lack of generality, it is assumed that output price P=1 in 2.6. Now FOCs of equation 
2.6 can be written as follows:  
(2.7)     𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋! −𝑊! = ⋯ = 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝜆                      𝑋! + 𝑋! +⋯+ 𝑋! = 1                                                                                                                                                                                      
Demand for each seed variety can be obtained by solving the n+1 equations for n+1 
unknowns in the FOCs.  In section 2.5, it is shown that the demand system introduced above is 
consistent with economic theory. It is important to mention that the above FOCs are driven for 
the case of full information. That is, it is assumed that farmers have perfect information about the 
yield potential and degree of specificity of all varieties. 
2.4.3. Supply of seed 
In this section, the FOCs of equation 2.7 are used to obtain the demand for varieties of seed and 
to solve the seed producers’ profit-maximization problem. The Nash equilibrium is first found 
for two varieties with two unique characteristics and then for three varieties with three unique 
characteristics. The process is continued until the model is solved for n varieties with n 
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characteristics. For simplicity, it is assumed that all seed varieties have the same degree of 
specificity. That is, 𝜇! = 𝜇 for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛.  
Period 1: In period 1 variety 1 is the only variety in the market. Hybrid technology is 
introduced to the market through this variety for the first time. The seed producer has market 
power over this new “drastic innovation” and prices variety 1 at a monopoly level (Moschini and 
Lapan, 1997). 12 Schumpeter (1939) argues that the innovation-originated market power creates 
temporary above-normal profit that is necessary to “induce” innovation. This new innovation 
acts similar to a wave that creates a dynamic cycle in the economy. On the back of this wave, 
however, innovations of smaller magnitude (i.e. “non-drastic innovations” in Moschini and 
Lapan’s terms) are performed by the original entrepreneur or by imitators. Schumpeter suggests 
that these smaller non-drastic innovations, which are cumulatively built on the original drastic 
innovation, compete with the original drastic innovation. As a result, the original entrepreneur 
can no longer charge a monopoly price and the original drastic innovation turns into a non-
drastic innovation (Schumpeter, 1939).  
Variety 1 offers characteristic L1. Therefore, the vector of characteristics for variety 1 is 𝐿! = 1,0,0,… ,0 . First element in L1 corresponds to at least one element, say 𝜃!!, in 𝜃! ∈𝜃!! ,𝜃!! ,…𝜃!" . Variety 1 is the ideal variety for the parcel of land that is characterized by the 
highest relative 𝜃!!  in 𝜃! ∈ 𝜃!! ,𝜃!! ,…𝜃!" . However, when variety 1 is the only available 
variety, those with low relative 𝜃!! have to buy variety 1 even though it is not their ideal variety. 
Producer of variety 1 is a monopolist. This firm sets the price where profit is maximized. It is 
assumed that yield of variety 1 in the least productive parcel of land is high enough that 
maximum willingness to pay in this parcel is equal to or larger than the monopoly price. This is 
to ensure that all canola farmers buy this variety and no parcels of land are left abandoned. 13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 An innovation is drastic if it leads to “unconstrained monopoly price of the innovated input” and is nondrastic if 
“the monopolist's pricing decision is constrained by the threat of competition” (Moschini and Lapan, 1997).  
13 Given the uniform distribution of the yield levels (𝑌!~𝑢(𝑦! − 𝜇! , 𝑦!)), maximum willingness to pay in the least 
productive parcel allocated to variety 1 is equal to 𝑃(𝑦! − 𝜇!). Assuming output price is equal to 1 and marginal 
cost of the seed producer is equal to zero, if !!! = 𝜇!then monopoly price will be equal to 𝑊! = (𝑦! − 𝜇!)=  !!!  and 
market share will be equal to 1. This ensures that all canola farmers buy this variety. 
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Period 2: In period 2, variety 1 (the original innovation) is in the market and a seed producer 
releases variety 2 into the market.14 Upon entry of variety 2 firms engage in competition. Variety 
2 offers characteristic L2. That is, the vector of characteristics for variety 2 is 𝐿! = 0,1,0,… ,0 . 
The second element in L2 corresponds to at least one element, say 𝜃!!, in 𝜃! ∈ 𝜃!! ,𝜃!! ,…𝜃!" . 
Variety 2 is the ideal variety for the parcel of land that is characterized by the highest relative 𝜃!! 
in 𝜃! ∈ 𝜃!! ,𝜃!! ,…𝜃!" . However, when varieties 1 and 2 are the only available varieties, those 
farmers with low relative 𝜃!! and 𝜃!! have to buy varieties 1 or 2 even though neither is their 
ideal variety. 
Varieties 1 and 2 are the same except for the fact that variety 1 offers characteristic L11 while 
variety 2 offers characteristic L22. 15  Varieties 1 and 2 compete with respect to two 
characteristics, L11 and L22. The FOCs of equation 2.7 for two varieties can be written as follows: 
𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊!	  
𝑋! + 𝑋! = 1	  
Demand for varieties 1 and 2 are obtained by solving the above equations for the two 
unknowns 𝑋! and 𝑋!: 
(2.8-a)	  	  	  	  	  𝑋! = !! + (!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
(2.8-b)	  	  	  	  	  𝑋! = !! + (!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The above demands are used in the seed producers’ profit-maximization problems as follows: 
𝜋! = 𝑊!𝑋!−𝐹𝐶 = 𝑊! !! + (!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! − 𝐹𝐶	  	  ,	  !!!!!! = 0	  
𝜋! = 𝑊!𝑋!−𝐹𝐶 = 𝑊! !! + (!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! − 𝐹𝐶	  	  ,	  !!!!!! = 0	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is assumed that the producer of variety 1 cannot deter entry of variety 2 via limit pricing since both firms have 
similar cost structures (i.e. zero marginal and equal fixed cost levels). This holds for entry of varieties 3, 4, …, n as 
well.  
15 One could assume that both varieties originate from one generic variety. Variety 1 is the generic variety with the 
characteristic L11 embodied in it, whereas variety 2 is the generic variety with the characteristic L22 embodied in it.  
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Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices, quantities and profits resulting from the above profit 
maximization problems are as follows: 
𝑊! = !!!!!! + 𝜇	  ,	  𝑊! = !!!!!! + 𝜇	  
𝑋! = !! (1 + !!!!!!! )	  ,	  𝑋! = !! (1 + !!!!!!! )	  
𝜋! = !  !!!!!!! !!"! − 𝐹𝐶	  ,	  𝜋! = !  !!!!!!! !!"! − 𝐹𝐶	  
Period 3: In the 3rd period, varieties 1 and 2 are in the market. The producer of variety 3 
foresees a positive willingness to pay for a new differentiated product and, therefore, releases 
variety 3 into the marketplace. This variety differentiates itself with respect to a new 
characteristic, L33. 16 The vector of characteristics for variety 3 is 𝐿! = 0,0,1,… ,0 . In period 2, 
variety 3 did not exist and buyers who were interested in characteristic L33 could not buy it. 
Therefore, a portion of buyers reveals their preference for L33 by switching from varieties 1 and 2 
to variety 3. This means smaller demand for varieties 1 and 2 in period 3 compared to period 2. 
Appendix 2.A discusses this in more depth.   
The FOCs of equation 2.7 for three varieties imply the following conditions: 
𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊!     
𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊! = 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑋! −𝑊!     
𝑋! + 𝑋! + 𝑋! = 1	  
Market shares for varieties 1, 2 and 3 are obtained by solving the above equations for the 
three unknowns 𝑋!, 𝑋!, 𝑋!: 
(2.9-a)     𝑋! = !! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!!       
(2.9-b)     𝑋! = !! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!!       	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The new variety does not have the characteristics L11 and L22 that were embodied in varieties 1 and 2 but has 
characteristic L33 that differentiates it from existing varieties on a new dimension.  
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(2.9-c)     𝑋! = !! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!!      	  
Best response functions (BRFs) are obtained by substituting 𝑋!, 𝑋!, and 𝑋! in the following 
profit-maximization problems: 
𝜋! = 𝑊!𝑋! − 𝐹𝐶 = 𝑊![!! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! ] − 𝐹𝐶	  ,	  !!!!!! = 0 
𝜋! = 𝑊!𝑋!−𝐹𝐶 = 𝑊![!! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! ] − 𝐹𝐶	  ,	  !!!!!! = 0 
𝜋! = 𝑊!𝑋!−𝐹𝐶 = 𝑊! !! + !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)!! − 𝐹𝐶	  ,	  !!!!!! = 0 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium results are obtained by solving the BRFs simultaneously: 
𝑊! = !!!!!!!!!! + !!,	  𝑊! = !!!!!!!!!! + !!	  ,	  𝑊! = !!!!!!!!!! + !!	  
𝑋! = !! (1 + !!!!!!!!!!!!! ), 𝑋! = !! (1 + !!!!!!!!!!!!! ), 𝑋! = !! (1 + !!!!!!!!!!!!! ) 
𝜋! = !  !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!"#! − 𝐹𝐶 , 𝜋! = !  !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!"#! − 𝐹𝐶 , 𝜋! = !  !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!"#! − 𝐹𝐶 
The critical assumption is that variety 3 competes with both varieties 1 and 2. This is because 
variety 3 competes with varieties 1 and 2 on a new dimension (i.e. with respect to a new 
characteristic). Variety 3 is differentiated from varieties 1 and 2 with respect to characteristic L33, 
a characteristic that neither 1 nor 2 embody.  
This study assumes that seed producers’ cost structure consists of a positive fixed cost and a 
zero marginal cost. If the discounted value of revenues from product 3 over time is greater than 
the fixed cost, then there is an incentive for the seed producer to create the L33 characteristic and 
introduce variety 3 to the market. As shown in the profit equation above, if 𝑦! ≥ 𝑦! and 𝑦! ≥ 𝑦! 
then revenue is greater than zero. Even if 𝑦! < 𝑦! and 𝑦! < 𝑦! it is still possible to have a 
positive revenue for product 3. That is, if the yield potential of variety 3 is equal to or even 
smaller than the yield potential of variety 1 and variety 2, it is still possible for variety 3 to 
profitably enter the market by offering a new characteristic if, and only if, the discounted value 
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of revenues is larger than fixed cost. Nevertheless, a higher yield potential will accommodate 
higher profit levels for the new variety. The expected profit creates the incentive to innovate.   
Period t (General Model): In period t, the new variety, n, enters the market. This variety 
reveals the nth characteristic Lnn and adds the nth dimension to the model. The n-dimensional 
choice set can perfectly capture buyers’ preferences for n characteristics. Assuming there is no 
exit, all the varieties that have previously entered the market still exist. In such a case the variety 
introduced in time t competes with all the existing varieties introduced in times 1, 2, 3,…, t-1. 
Subscript t is used to refer to the time period and not to be confused with number of varieties n.  
By generalizing the results of periods 2 and 3, the price, market share and profit of a variety 
introduced at time t are as follows: 
(2.10)     𝑊! = (!!!!!)!!!!!!!! + !!!!     ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.     
(2.11)     𝑋! = !! 1 + (!!!) !!!!!!!!!!!!! !    ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.      
(2.12)     𝜋! = [! !!!!! !(!!!!)!]!!!! !!!!! ! !!! !" − 𝐹𝐶  ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.    𝑊!, 𝑋!, and 𝜋! can be used to calculate the price of all the varieties that have been introduced 
in times 1 to t. For example, when calculating the price of variety 5 at time period 5, one needs to 
set t=5, n=5, and i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. In order to calculate the price of variety 3 in period 5, one needs 
to set t=3, n=5, and i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5.   
The price, demand and profit equations above correspond to economic intuition. The price of 
a new variety is a positive function of its own yield potential and the price of its rivals and a 
negative function of the yield potential of its rivals. Market share or demand for a new variety is 
a positive function of its own yield potential and its rivals’ price and a negative function of its 
own price and yield potential of its rivals. Demand for a variety is also a function of number of 
varieties in the market. The profit of a new variety is a positive function of its own yield 
potential and the price of its rivals and a negative function of the yield potential of its rivals. 
Equation 2.12 also implies that even with a yield potential that is lower than its rivals, a variety 
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still has a chance to profitably enter the market by introducing a new characteristic if, and only 
if, the discounted value of revenues over time is greater than the fixed cost.  
Another interesting case is when yield potential does not improve. In this case all varieties 
will have the same yield potential. As a result, price and market share become a function of only 
degree of specificity 𝜇 and number of firms n. Profit level also becomes a function of degree of 
specificity 𝜇, number of firms n, and fixed cost FC.   
Section 2.5 explores some properties of the model that add novel contributions to the 
literature on sequential innovation.  
2.5. Propositions 
The model presented in the previous section, if not the first, is perhaps one of the first 
monopolistic competition models of analyzing product variety that incorporates competition 
among n production inputs with n differentiating characteristics. Some properties of this new 
model need more exploration. This section attempts to briefly discuss some properties of the 
theoretical model through algebraic proofs. These properties will be referred to as propositions.   
Proposition 1: Increase in variety (i.e. increase in number of seed varieties) improves farmers’ 
total surplus, ceteris paribus.  
Proof: Here, it is shown that seed buyers’ surplus is a positive function of the number of 
available varieties. In equation 2.1, the relationship between yield of a variety and its area is 
described as follows: 
(2.1)     𝑌! = 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋!        
where 𝑌! is yield of variety i per acre, 𝑦! potential yield of variety i per acre, 𝑋! area allocated to 
variety i, and 𝜇! is the degree by which variety i loses its yield as area expands. Equation 2.2 
could be rewritten for all farmers that use variety i as follows: 
(2.13)     𝑠! = 𝑃𝑋!𝑌! −𝑊!𝑋!    
	   41	  	  
where 𝑠! is the farmers’ surplus from variety i, 𝑃 is the output price, 𝑋! is the area allocated to 
variety i and 𝑊! is the price of variety i. Assume that 𝑋 acres of land are equally shared among n 
available varieties.17 That is,  
(2.14)     𝑋! = !!          ∀  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.  
Assume 𝜇! is a constant 𝜇 for all available n varieties. By substituting equations 2.1 and 2.14 
in equation 2.13 surplus from variety i is as follows: 
𝑠! = 𝑃 !! (𝑦! − 𝜇 !!  ) −𝑊! !!        
Total profit for n varieties is then as follows: 
(2.15)     𝑆 = 𝑃𝑋𝑦! − 𝑃𝜇 !!!   −𝑊!𝑋        
In order to find the effect of an increase in the number of varieties on total surplus the 
derivative of equation 2.15 is taken with respect to n: 
(2.16)     !!!! = 𝑃𝜇 𝑋2𝑛2 > 0        
As shown in 2.16, the farmers’ aggregate surplus increases with the number of available 
varieties. This is evidence of unbounded gains from variety that is also shown in Neo-
Chamberlinian models, such as that of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).18  
Further, equation 2.16 shows that the increase in the buyers’ aggregate gain from variety is 
larger with a higher 𝜇. That is, the buyers’ aggregate gain from variety is higher with more 
specific products (i.e. products with higher degrees of horizontal differentiation). This also 
means that a region with more heterogeneous pieces of land benefits more from an increase in 
the number of varieties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is possible when all varieties have the same yield potential level.  
18 According to Lancaster (1990), in Dixit and Stiglitz’s model “the consumer is always better off spending 1/nth of 
his group budget on each of n goods than spending 1/(n-1)th of the budget on each of n-1 goods, implying an 
insatiable taste for variety.”  
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Proposition 2: Market share for a superior variety increases as the degree of specificity 
decreases, ceteris paribus.  
Proof: The derivative of equation 2.11 with respect to degree of specificity is as follows: 
(2.17)     !𝑋𝑡!𝜇 = 1𝑛 − 2𝑛−1 (𝑛−1) 𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑖=12𝑛−1 2𝜇2 < 0        ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑦! > 𝑦!.   
Market share for higher quality varieties decreases as varieties become more specific. Also, it is 
worth noting that as varieties become more specific, the number of varieties in the market 
increases. However, finding the relationship between the degree of specificity and the number of 
firms is mathematically intractable. Further evidence of this is obtained via numerical 
simulations in sections 3.2 and 3.3.3 of Chapter 3.   
Proposition 3: The more specific varieties are, the higher they can be priced, ceteris paribus. 
Proof: The derivative of equation 2.10 with respect to the degree of specificity of varieties is as 
follows:  
(2.18)    !𝑊𝑡!𝜇 = 1𝑛−1 > 0       
A specific variety is a variety that suits a specific group of farmers. In other words, it contains a 
unique characteristic that not all farmers require. The positive sign of 2.18 suggests that the more 
specific varieties are, the higher they can be priced.   
Proposition 4: If potential yield sequentially improves with new varieties, a higher rate of yield 
improvement results in a higher market share for the superior variety, ceteris paribus.  
Proof: To incorporate sequential innovation, it is assumed that the yield potential of new 
varieties improves over time with rate of k such that: 
 (2.19)     𝑦! = 𝑦!!! + 𝑘          
where t represents time. Incorporating equation 2.19 into equation 2.11 results in:  
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(2.20)     𝑋! = !! 1 + (!!!)(!"! !)!!!!!!!!! !     ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛.     
where 𝑋! is market share of the variety introduced at time t and k is the rate of yield potential 
growth. The derivative of equation 2.20 with respect to the rate of yield potential growth is as 
follows: 
 (2.21)     !𝑋𝑡!𝑘 = 1𝑛 (!!!)(!"! !)!!!!!!!! !       ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛.         
Equation 2.21 is greater than zero for all t=n. That is, a higher rate of yield potential 
improvement results in a higher market share for the newest variety, which also has the highest 
yield potential level. For t<n, 𝜕!!𝜕!  could be greater or smaller than zero depending on age or 
relative yield of the variety. With a higher rate of yield potential improvement, the superior (i.e. 
the newest) variety always obtains a higher market share than it would with a lower rate. 
However, this also means that the older varieties with lower yield potential obtain lower market 
shares than they would with a lower rate of yield potential improvement. This is because the 
difference between the yield potential of the superior and the inferior varieties is greater when 
rate of yield potential improvement is higher. In other words, with a higher rate of yield potential 
improvement, the difference between the yield potential of the varieties increases and that 
changes the distributions of market shares in favour of the varieties with higher quality. For 
example, if there are 4 varieties in the market, then 𝜕!!𝜕!  will be positive for varieties 4 and 3 and 
negative for varieties 1 and 2. That is, the difference between the yield potential of the 4 varieties 
increases and that changes the distributions of market shares in favour of the two higher quality 
varieties.   
Proposition 5: Higher rate of yield potential improvement results in a higher price for the 
superior variety, ceteris paribus. 
Proof: Similar to proposition 4, it is assumed that the yield potential of new varieties improves 
over time with rate of k such that: 
 (2.19)     𝑦! = 𝑦!!! + 𝑘          
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By incorporating equation 2.19 into equation 2.10 it can be written as follows:  
(2.22)     𝑊! = (!"! !)!!!!!!!!! + !!!!     ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛.     
The derivative of equation 2.22 with respect to the yield (potential) growth rate is as follows: 
(2.23)     !𝑊𝑡!𝑘 = (!"! !)!!!!!!!!     ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛.        
Equation 2.23 is greater than zero for all t=n. That is, a higher rate of yield potential 
improvement results in a higher price for the newest variety, which is also the variety with the 
highest yield potential level. For t<n, 𝜕!!𝜕!  could be greater or smaller than zero depending on the 
age or relative yield of the variety. Newer varieties that are introduced later in time and have 
higher yield potential levels will experience a higher price at higher rates of yield potential 
improvement and older varieties with lower yield potential levels will experience a lower price at 
higher rates of yield potential improvement. This is because a higher rate of yield potential 
improvement increases the difference between the yield potential of the varieties and that 
changes the relative prices such that higher quality varieties receive relatively higher prices and 
lower quality varieties receive relatively lower prices compared to the case of lower rate of yield 
potential.    
Combining the findings of propositions 4 and 5 has interesting implications for product cycles. 
Propositions 4 and 5 show that prices and market shares are relatively higher for the newer 
varieties and relatively lower for the older varieties when the rate of yield potential is higher 
compared to when this rate is lower. This implies that prices and market shares drop faster when 
the rate of yield potential improvement is higher. The present study assumes marginal cost is 
equal to zero and fixed cost is fully sunk. In such a setup, products never exit the market. 
Nevertheless, in a hypothetical scenario where firms would exit the market when revenues are 
lower than “avoidable costs” (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, page 59), a faster decrease in both price 
and market share results in a shorter life cycle for the product. This means, in industries with 
higher rates of quality improvement product cycles are shorter. This, in turn, results in smaller 
equilibrium number of firms. That is, more progressive industries are likely to have a smaller 
equilibrium number of firms, ceteris paribus. While this chapter attempts to provide a theoretical 
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background on this issue, Chapter 3 uses numerical simulations to discuss the effect of rate of 
innovation on length of product cycles and number of equilibrium products in more depth.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explores the incentives for sequential innovation via the creation of new 
characteristics for production inputs. In addition, this study attempts to provide a basis for an 
analysis of Schumpeterian innovation-induced business cycles. Existing location, Chamberlinian 
and hybrid models do not incorporate sequential entry of production inputs that are differentiated 
with respect to more than two characteristics. As Benkard (2004) claims, “Models of entry for 
differentiated products are not yet well understood for even just a two-dimensional space.” This 
chapter fills a gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model that lays out the process of 
adding new characteristics to agricultural production inputs. Specifically, this study derives the 
equilibrium conditions for n varieties of seed sequentially introduced in n time periods and each 
of which is differentiated from other varieties with respect to one characteristic. By allowing 
multi-brand competition, the model overcomes the “immediate neighbors” problem, which is 
common in location models. The model also allows differentiated input buyers so that it is not 
confined to only one “representative consumer” as in Chamberlinian models. Although the 
model may have similarities to monopolistic competition models of analyzing product variety 
(i.e. location, Chamberlinian and hybrid models), it has a different perspective in that it uses the 
concept of “characteristics” introduced by Lancaster (1966) to explain an innovation process 
characterized by sequential entry of production inputs that embody new characteristics.  
This model provides important insight into the incentives for innovation through the creation 
of new characteristics. It shows that even with a yield potential that is lower than its rivals, a seed 
variety still has a chance to profitably enter the market by introducing a new characteristic. 
Schumpeter (1939) argues that innovation-originated market power creates temporary above-
normal profits, which is necessary to “induce” innovation, although this market power is doomed 
to be competed away as new and existing firms start imitating the monopolist’s innovation. 
Results of the theoretical model provide more insight into Schumpeter’s innovation theory. 
While Schumpeter attributes the temporary market power to new products, the current study 
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shows that it could, in fact, be the new characteristics embodied in old or new products that 
create the temporary market power.  
Having a setup that allows for sequential innovation leads to novel findings regarding the 
effect of rate of innovation on equilibrium conditions. The model shows that a higher rate of 
yield potential improvement results in a faster decrease in prices and market shares of older 
varieties in the market. This, in turn, results in shorter life cycles for the products and smaller 
equilibrium number of firms, ceteris paribus. This implies that more progressive industries (i.e. 
industries with higher rates of innovation) are likely to have fewer products at equilibrium. This 
is simply because in a highly progressive industry older products become unattractive faster than 
they would in industries with lower rates of innovation. This finding is novel considering the fact 
that locational analog and neo-Chamberlinian models find equilibrium product variety to be a 
function of “economies of scale”, “substitutability between group and outside goods” and “share 
of the group in total expenditure of the economy” (Lancaster, 1990). This study determines that 
rate of innovation has an important role in equilibrium product variety as well. However, rate of 
innovation, itself, may be endogenous and determined by the other exogenous factors including 
the ones mentioned above.   
Flexibility of the model in terms of number of production inputs in the market results in 
interesting findings as well. It is shown that, similar to final consumers, farm input buyers 
experience unbounded gains from variety. Buyers’ gains from variety increase as inputs become 
more specific. The model also confirms that the rate of yield potential improvement and the 
degree of specificity (reverse adaptability) of seed varieties are important determinants of prices 
and market shares. The model provides a basis for more exploration through numerical 
simulations and empirical estimations. For example, it is observed in many industries, including 
the seed industry, that new higher-quality products with new features enter the market and older 
products exit. This chapter only briefly explores such innovation-induced product cycles. 
Chapter 3 incorporates sequential entry of new products that embody new characteristics and 
allows exit of older products when their revenues fall below avoidable costs and they are no 
longer viable.  
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2.7. Technical Limitations and Future Research 
In order to focus on multiple characteristics, differentiated inputs and seed buyers, sequential 
innovation, and competition among differentiated products the model has made a few 
simplifying assumptions. While some of these assumptions are traditional in the literature, some 
are specific to this study and the model developed to study a seed industry. Nevertheless, it is 
important for the reader to be aware of the technical limitations that these assumptions may 
create. This section explains the technical limitations created by these assumptions.   
Outside Good: It is traditional in such models to incorporate an “outside good”. As Ackerberg 
et al. (2007, page 4186) claim, the “outside” alternative can be added to a model through an 
individual specific constant term without changing the preferences over products. A change in 
price of the outside alternative although may change the total land allocated to the crop under 
consideration and thereby total demand for its seed, does not change farmers’ preferences over 
different varieties of seed. That is, although a change in price of the outside alternative (i.e. price 
of substitute crops) may pivot the demand curve for each variety, it does not change their relative 
prices and market shares. Thus, the outside alternative does not affect the competition among 
seed varieties of one crop. Since the model merely focuses on competition among different seed 
varieties of one crop, this study does not include an outside alternative in the model. 
Output Price: The model allows yield to improve sequentially. Higher yield levels may result 
in an outward shift of the supply curve and reduction in market price of the output if demand 
curve is downward sloping. For the case of a small country, however, higher yield levels do not 
result in a reduction in market prices. This study assumes the small country case and does not 
endogenize output price in the model. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that similar to the 
outside alternative, output price does not change farmers’ preferences over different varieties of 
seed. A change in output price will pivot the demand curve for each variety without changing the 
relative prices and market shares of the varieties. Therefore, a change in output price does not 
change the nature of competition among different varieties of one crop.  
Land Constraint: The existence of outside land would increase the overall elasticity of 
demand for new characteristics as introduction of new varieties with new characteristics may 
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encourage farmers to use the marginal land that has not been allocated to that crop previously. 
However, this is unlikely to be quantitatively important except in the case of drastic innovation, 
where a new variety significantly expands total crop area. This chapter attempts to lay out the 
building blocks of the model, such as differentiated input buyers, and multiple characteristics for 
the case of sequential, non-drastic, innovations. This is why the model assumes a constant land 
constraint that does not allow any increases or decreases in the total acreage of the crop. 
Incorporating the effect of acreage expansion is left for future studies with a focus on drastic 
innovations.      
Entry Decision: In this model firms do not conduct a benefit-cost analysis before introducing 
new varieties. It is assumed that varieties will continue to be introduced until revenues minus 
fixed costs are no longer positive.  
Firms versus Products: The model does not consider multiproduct firms. It is assumed that 
each firm releases only one product in the market. The model focuses on the effect of new 
differentiated entrants on competition. Therefore, despite the potentially insightful results, the 
multiproduct case is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it would be very interesting 
for future studies to explore pricing decisions of multiproduct firms in a setup that incorporates 
multiple characteristic and sequential innovation.  
Symmetry: For simplicity, it is assumed that all products have the same degree of specificity 
(i.e. all of the varieties are assumed to be equally adaptable). Although equal adaptability is 
certainly not the case in reality, releasing the symmetry assumption adds significant complexity 
to the model. As mentioned, however, in reality various varieties of seed have different degrees 
of specificity. Chapter 4 considers this in by estimating the degrees of specificity for various seed 
varieties and exploring the effect of this variable on the varieties’ market shares.  
Investment decisions: The model does not incorporate the seed producers’ investment 
decisions. In reality, however, rate of yield growth is probably a function of seed producers R&D 
investments. Endogenizing the yield growth rate and seed producers’ R&D investments as a 
function of their profit levels will add more generality to the model. For example, one can 
explore the relationship between the seed producers’ cost structure, their investment levels, and 
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equilibrium number of seed varieties or length of product cycles. Although the theoretical model 
introduced in this chapter ignores the issue of endogenizing investment decisions for simplicity, 
this issue is explored through numerical simulations in Chapter 3. 
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Appendix 2.A: change in demand for old characteristics with entry of new ones 
In pages 8 to 10 it was shown how interaction of land and seed characteristics determines the 
demand for seed varieties. This appendix shows how demand for one characteristic changes 
when a new characteristic is introduced.  
Assume for output price of 1 and equal variety prices of 0.1 surplus (𝑆!") in each parcel 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10 is as follows:  
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑗 :
12345678910
𝐴           𝐵         𝐶0.130.19 0.350.06 0.290.090.150.380.240.860.760.420.610.11
0.630.310.800.010.860.750.120.09
0.230.350.130.430.790.750.880.40
  ; 𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,10  
Highlighted cells show the varieties that return the highest surplus level for each parcel of 
land. Farmers pick the variety that provides the highest surplus (Si) for their parcel of land.  
Assume products A, B, and C enter the market in periods 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In period 1, 
variety A is the only available variety. Gross surplus (𝑃.𝑌!) created by variety A in parcels 𝑗 = 1,⋯ , 10 determines maximum willingness to pay (MWTP) for variety A in each parcel. 
MWTP for variety A in the absence of varieties B and C (i.e. in the absence of characteristics L1 
and L2) is presented by MWTP(A) in Figure A1 below. Parcels 6 and 10 have the highest and the 
lowest gross surplus (i.e. yield multiplied by output price) from variety A, 0.96 and 0.21, 
respectively. Therefore, shadow value of land, 𝜆, is equal to 0.21.  
In period 1, L1 is the only available characteristic. All buyers have to buy the variety that 
contains characteristic L1 for their 10 parcels of land. Nevertheless, parcels 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8 gain 
higher gross surplus levels from characteristic L2. Therefore, after introduction of characteristic 
L2 in period 2 these buyers switch to the variety that contains characteristic L2. As a result, 
demand for variety A pivots from MWTP(A) to MWTP(A’) in Figure 2.A.1.  
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In period 2, those who receive higher surplus from C have to buy either A or B because C is 
not available yet. With introduction of C in period 3 some buyers switch from A and B to C 
because C offers characteristic L3 that offers a higher surplus level to parcels 8, 9, and 10. As a 
result, demand for variety A pivots from MWTP(A’) to MWTP(A”). This shows how introduction 
of new characteristics affects the demand for older characteristics.   
 
Figure 2.A.1. Change in Demand for Variety A with Introduction of Varieties B and C. 
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Appendix 2.B: Trait Bundling 
This appendix explains how the conceptual framework introduced in section 2.3 can be 
adjusted to incorporate trait bundling. A more comprehensive discussion of trait bundling, 
nevertheless, is not in the scope of this paper and is left for future studies.  
In Figure 2.B.1, horizontal and vertical axes measure drought-tolerance and herbicide-
tolerance characteristics, respectively. Assume variety A embodies only the drought-resistance, 
variety B embodies only the herbicide-tolerance, and variety AB embodies both drought-
resistance and herbicide-tolerance characteristics. Figure 2.B.1 shows the location of varieties A 
and B on the two-dimensional characteristics space. Variety AB, however, does not have a 
unique locus on the characteristics space. Depending on the quality of the bundled variety it 
could be anywhere on the thin diagonal dashed line. This refers to technical aspects of trait 
bundling. Yield of variety AB, which bundles both A and B, does not necessarily equal the simple 
summation of yield levels of A and B in a particular parcel of land. The bundled variety could 
yield more or less than the A or B (although it is unlikely that AB would yield less than both A 
and B). The profit level obtained from variety AB, of course, depends on its performance in the 
parcel of land. Isoprofit curves associated with different yield potential levels for AB are shown 
in Figure 2.B.1. The higher the bundled variety yields, the higher the isoprofit curve is.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.B.1. Trait Bundling in Two-Dimensional Characteristics Space (Adapted from Lancaster, 1979). 
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Appendix 2.C: Exact Demand Curve For Two Varieties With Uniform, Independently 
Distributed Land Characteristics 
Ideally, surplus needs to be maximized for each parcel of land. The surplus maximization for 
each of 𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,𝑚 equal size parcels of land from seed varieties 𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑛 can be formulated 
as follows: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥!!" 𝑃.𝑌!" −𝑊! 𝑋!"!!!!!!!!   𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜   𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑋!" ≤ !!!!!!    for all 𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,𝑚 
where 𝑋 is the total amount of land in the region that is available for this crop and 𝑋!" is the 
amount of land in parcel j that is allocated to variety i.   
The Lagrangean approach is used to convert the above constrained maximization problem 
into an unconstrained maximization problem. The Lagrangean function corresponding to the 
above maximization problem is as follows: 
(2.C.1)  ℒ! =   𝑃.𝑌!" −𝑊! 𝑋!"!!!!!!!! + 𝜆!(!! − 𝑋!"!!!! ) for all j  
where 𝜆!, the Lagrangean multiplier, represents the opportunity cost of parcel j. This general 
maximization problem finds the variety(s) that maximizes the surplus in each parcel of land and, 
thus, provides an exact solution to the surplus-maximization problem.   
As 𝜆! indicates, the above maximization problem incorporates the fact that opportunity cost of 
land is different for each parcel of land. This, however, makes the problem analytically difficult, 
if not impossible, to solve for n varieties. More importantly, solving this maximization problem 
does not determine the total demand for each variety. In order to make the problem tractable and 
incorporate demand for each variety, equation 2.5 is used to maximize the surplus for each 
variety rather than each variety in each parcel of land. Maximization of 2.5 is analytically 
tractable. Also, since equation 2.1 is substituted in the Lagrangean of 2.5, optimum market share 
of each variety, 𝑋! , can now be easily obtained through the first order conditions of the 
Lagrangean.  
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Maximization of 2.5 translates the demand for n differentiated varieties into demand for one 
commodity, land, and then uses a single land constraint, as opposed to one constraint for each 
differentiated parcel of land, to find the demand for each variety. This means equation 2.1, which 
is formed on a different dimension for each variety, is assumed to have the same dimension for 
all varieties when substituted in equation 2.5. While equation 2.1 shows exactly how much yield 
decreases with increase in area for each variety in the absence of other varieties, it is a linear 
approximation of the decrease in yield as a result of increase in area with the existence of other 
differentiated competing varieties in the Lagrangean of 2.5. Thus, this simplification (i.e. 
translating the demand for n differentiated varieties into demand for land and using one land 
constraint rather than one for each parcel) results in an approximation.19  
This appendix derives the exact demand curve for the simple case of only two varieties with 
independent land characteristics and compares the results to the linear approximate demand 
curves that are obtained from the maximization of 2.5.  
For i.i.d. land characteristics the maximization of 2.5 provides an approximation. Figure 2.C.1 
shows the source of this approximation for a simple case of only two varieties. Panel i of Figure 
2.C.1 is similar to Figure 2.2. This panel shows the allocation of parcels of land between two 
varieties that correspond to two independent characteristics and have the same yield potential 
(𝑦! = 𝑦!). Each dot on the Figure represents a parcel of land. The locus of each dot represents 
the yield level that the parcel can obtain from varieties 1 and 2. Panel ii of Figure 2.C.1 depicts 
the demand curve for variety 1 assuming varieties 1 and 2 have the same degree of specificity 
(𝜇! = 𝜇! = 𝜇) and output price P is equal to 1.  
The green price line in Panel i is the locus of the parcels of land that obtain the same level of 
surplus from either variety 1 or variety 2. The equation for this line is as follows: 
Y1=	  W1-­‐W2	  	  +	  Y2	   
where W1 and W2 determine the intercept, and slope is equal to 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 While this study focuses on the case of uniform i.i.d. land characteristics, it may be interesting for future studies to 
explore the magnitude of the approximation in case of other distributions such as Normal and correlated 
characteristics.  
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As shown in panel i, as W1 increases while W2 is fixed, the price line shifts up in a parallel 
fashion and some parcels of land switch from variety 1 to variety 2. However, notice that as the 
green curve moves higher and higher, fewer and fewer parcels of land switch to variety 2. This is 
because the land characteristics that varieties 1 and 2 correspond to are independent and, thus, 
parcels of land are spread over the space in between Y1 and Y2 axes with the same density. 
Similarly, each time price of variety 1 is decreased, fewer and fewer parcels switch to this 
variety. This relationship between change in price of a variety and number of parcels that switch 
implies a non-linear demand curve for the variety. This demand curve is illustrated in Panel ii of 
Figure 2.C.1.  
 
Panel i- Allocation of Parcels of Land to Two Varieties  Panel ii-Demand for Variety 1 
Figure 2.C.1. Exact Non-Linear Demand for the Case of Independent Land Characteristics.  
In order to find the exact demand curve for variety 1 in the presence of variety 2 one needs to 
measure the market share of variety 1 in Panel i of Figure 2.C.1. As shown in Section 2.4.1, yield 
of variety i in parcel j can is obtained as follows: 
[𝑦!]!×! − [𝜃!"]!×!×[𝜇!!]!×!×[𝐿!!]!×! = [𝑌!"]!×!  
where [𝑦!]!×! represents the yield potential levels of varieties 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, [𝜃!"]!×! the levels of 
n independent land characteristics in j=1,…,m parcels of land,  [𝜇!!]!×! the response of the yield 
of variety i as a result of one unit change in the corresponding land characteristics, [𝐿!!]!×! the 
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seed characteristics in varieties 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛, and [𝑌!"]!×! the yield levels of varieties 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛 
at parcels j=1,…,m. Since land characteristics are i.i.d. uniform variables (𝜃!~𝑢(0,1)) and seed 
characteristics do not have a distribution, the resulting yield levels are i.i.d uniform variables 
with the following distribution: 
 𝑌!~𝑢(𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖, 𝑦!) 
That is, yield of variety i is uniformly distributed between 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑦! over the range of the 
parcels of land. Therefore, Y1 is uniformly distributed between 𝑦! and 𝑦! − 𝜇. Similarly, Y2 is 
uniformly distributed between 𝑦! and 𝑦! − 𝜇. Putting random plots of Y1 and Y2 on separate axes, 
total area of the rectangle is 𝜇! with probability density function of 1/  𝜇 throughout. 
In the case when only one variety exists the use of the variety will be determined by the level 
of Y1 and W1.  The proportion of land where Y1 ≥ W1 will determine the quantity of variety 
demanded. Given the uniform distribution of the land characteristic the single firm selling the 
variety will face a demand curve with a price intercept of 𝑦! and slope of  -  𝜇. It is assumed that 
W1 is low enough that all canola farmers buy the seed.  
When there are two varieties in the market the demand for each variety is dependent on its 
own yield, the other variety’s yield, and both variety prices. When Wi ≤ 𝑦! − 𝜇, i = 1, 2 it is 
possible to derive an exact demand curve for each variety. In this case farmers must chose which 
variety to use on each parcel of land.  The locus of the land parcels where famers are indifferent 
between the varieties is given by Y1 – W1 = Y2 –W2. In the (Y2, Y1) space the equation for the line 
of indifference is Y1 = W1-W2 – Y2. For all land parcels above the line the farmers will earn 
higher surplus from purchasing variety 1 and parcels below this line of indifference the growers 
will purchase variety 2. Given the uniform density of the square, the proportion of the area above 
the line represents the demand for X1. By dividing the area of variety 1’s market share to the 
total area of the rectangle, which is 𝜇!, demand for variety 1 is obtained as follows: 
(2.C.2)  
𝑋! = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! < 0                                                                                                                                      𝑋! = !!!!!!! !!!!   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑊! ≥ 𝑊!  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! ≥ 0                      𝑋! = 1 − !!!!!!! !!!!   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑊! ≤ 𝑊!  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! ≥ 0𝑋! = 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝜇−𝑊! +𝑊! < 0                                                                                                                                    
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As shown in equation 2.C.2, the exact demand curve consists of two quadratic functions that 
connect together where W1 is equal to W2. The second derivative of the demand curve is positive 
for 𝑊! ≥𝑊! and negative for 𝑊! ≤𝑊!. The average slope of this exact demand curve is - 2  𝜇. 
Also, by relaxing the 𝑦! = 𝑦! assumption, the price intercept of the exact demand curve for 
variety 1 is 𝑊! + 𝜇 + 𝑦! − 𝑦!. Figure 2.C.2 depicts the effect of an increase in price of variety 2 
(from 𝑊! to 𝑊!!) and a decrease in price of variety 2 (from 𝑊! to 𝑊!!!) on demand for variety 1.  
The exact demand equation presented in equation 2.C.2 is difficult to generalize to more than 
two varieties.20 However, the maximization of 2.5 results in an approximate demand curve that is 
depicted by the dashed downward sloping curve in Figure 2.C.2.  
The equation for the dashed downward sloping curve (i.e. the approximate demand curve) is 
as follows: 
(2.C.3) 𝑊! = 𝑊! + 𝜇 − (2𝜇)𝑋! for  𝑦! = 𝑦!   
By relaxing the 𝑦! = 𝑦! assumption, equation for the approximate demand curve becomes as 
follows: 
(2.C.4)  𝑊! = 𝑦! − 𝑦! +𝑊! + 𝜇 − (2𝜇)𝑋!    
It is easy to see that the approximate demand curve has the same intercept and slope as the exact 
demand curve in equation 2.C.2. The approximate demand curve also crosses the exact demand 
curve where W1 is equal to W2.21  
	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 With three varieties similar geometric approach can be employed using the volume within a three dimensional 
probability density cube to derive an exact demand curve. 
21 One could change the distribution of land characteristics in Panel i of Figure 2.C.1 to show that for any symmetric 
distribution (e.g. Normal) the exact and approximate demand curves cross where W1 is equal to W2.  
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Figure 2.C.2. Exact Non-Linear Demand for the Case of Independent Land Characteristics. 
It is shown in equation 2.8-a that the demand curves that are obtained from the first order 
conditions of equation 2.5 are the same as equation 2.C.4 for variety 1. Therefore, for the case of 
i.i.d uniform land characteristics, use of maximization of 2.5 results in a linear approximation of 
the non-linear demand curves. As it is shown for the case of two varieties, the resulting 
approximate demand curves have the same intercept and slope as the exact demand curve. 
Therefore, the approximate demand curves can be used in the seed producers’ profit 
maximization problem to find equilibrium price, quantity, and profit levels. Also, since the 
approximate demand curves are a function of yield potential and degree of specificity of the 
varieties, they can be used to explore the effect of changes in yield potential and degree of 
specificity on prices and other equilibrium conditions. Comparing the demand curves that result 
from the first order conditions of equation 2.5 and the exact demand curve in equation 2.C.2, it is 
easy to see that the approximation simplifies the demand relationships significantly while 
keeping the critical elements (i.e. the average slope and the intercept) intact. This simplicity 
becomes particularly important and very useful when equilibrium conditions are found for the 
case of n varieties.  
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Therefore, this study uses the maximization of 2.5 that results in linear approximation of 
demand curves that are non-linear. The maximization of 2.5 approximates how many parcels of 
land must be allocated to each variety in order to ensure that shadow value of the last parcel 
allocated to each variety is equal to the shadow value of the last parcel allocated to all the other 
varieties. 
It is worth noting that as land characteristics become more negatively correlated, the dots in 
Panel i of Figure 2.C.1 become more concentrated around a diagonal line perpendicular to the 
price line. As a results, the gap between the approximate and exact demand curves shrinks. In 
fact, with perfectly negatively correlated land characteristics, the linear demand curve is no 
longer an approximation, but the exact demand curve. The implications are interesting. In the 
mid part, the non-linear demand curve is more elastic than the linear demand curve. This implies 
that, in the mid part of the demand curve, as substitutability decreases (i.e. as correlation 
coefficient between two land characteristics approaches negative one), price increases. This is 
consistent with economic theory.  
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Chapter 3: Numerical Simulations 
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3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced a theoretical model that explains the incentives to create new 
characteristics for new production inputs. This model incorporates competition among n 
production inputs that embody differentiating characteristics. In this chapter, older production 
inputs are allowed to leave the market when their market share falls to the point where they are 
no longer viable. Some properties of the model were shown in propositions and algebraic proofs 
in Chapter 2. In this chapter, numerical simulations are performed to further investigate the 
validity of these propositions, and provide more insight into dynamic aspects of the model such 
as product cycles. 
While Chapter 2 assumes the rate of yield potential growth is exogenous, this chapter 
endogenizes this rate as a function of the seed producers’ investment levels. Investment levels, in 
turn, are chosen such that firms’ future profits are maximized. Optimum investment levels are 
found for various levels of exogenous variables and several cost structures. Results of numerical 
simulations imply that the degree of heterogeneity of seed buyers (i.e. degree of specificity of 
seed varieties), breeders’ investment productivity, which also represents firms’ economies of 
size, and fixed overhead or maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the market are important 
determinants of the optimum investment level and other equilibrium conditions such as price 
levels and number of products.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses some evidence of 
sequential innovation and product cycles in the seed industry and then presents some preliminary 
numerical simulations on the effect of rate of yield potential growth and degree of specificity on 
equilibrium steady states conditions. In section 3.3 the rate of yield potential growth is 
endogenized as a function of the seed producers’ investment levels. Numerical simulations are 
performed to find the effect of exogenous variables on equilibrium steady states conditions under 
the endogenous investment assumption. Last, section 3.4 presents the conclusion of this chapter.  
3.2. Numerical Simulations and Equilibrium Steady States 
In this section, numerical simulations are performed to provide a better understanding of the 
theoretical model. The theoretical model presented in the previous chapter is used to analyze 
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Schumpeterian product cycles, pricing strategies, and evolution path of industries characterized 
by sequential innovation.  
Product cycles: A drastic innovation (i.e. hybrid technology) is introduced through variety 1 
for the first time. Varieties 1 to n are sequentially introduced to the market. The model 
incorporates sequential innovation through two circuits: product improvement and new 
characteristics. This is consistent with the reality of many seed industries. The following table, 
for example, shows the evidence of vertical and horizontal differentiation for Canadian wheat 
varieties in 1972-2006 period. The third column of Table 3.1 shows the increase in yield 
potential of wheat varieties. The third to last rows of Table 3.1 show the traits that have been 
added to wheat varieties from 1972 to 2006.  
Table 3. 1. Yield Potential and Traits Added to Canadian Wheat Varieties 1972-2006.  
Year	   Name	   Yield	  
Potential	  %	  
of	  Manitou	  
	  	   	   Resistant	  to	  
1972	   Neepawa	   104	  	  	   Stem	  Rust	   Leaf	  Rust	   Loose	  Smut	   Root	  Rot	   	   	   	   	   	  
1986	   Katepwa	   107	  	  	   Stem	  Rust	   Leaf	  Rust	   Loose	  Smut	   Root	  Rot	   Bunt	   	   	   	   	  
1997	   AC	  Barrie	   121	   Stem	  Rust	   Leaf	  Rust	   Loose	  Smut	   Root	  Rot	   Bunt	   Leaf	  Spot	   Sprouting	   	   	  
1998	   AC	  Elsa	   121	  	  	   Stem	  Rust	   Leaf	  Rust	   Loose	  Smut	   Root	  Rot	   Bunt	   Leaf	  Spot	   Sprouting	   FHB	   	  
2006	   AC	  Superb	   132	  	  	   Stem	  Rust	   Leaf	  Rust	   Loose	  Smut	   Root	  Rot	   Bunt	   Leaf	  Spot	   Sprouting	   FHB	   Head	  Awnedness	  Source: Saskatchewan Seed Growers Association (Various years).  
As new and higher quality varieties are introduced to the market, market share of the older 
varieties drops. Older varieties, including the original innovation, will eventually be forced out of 
the market when they are no longer profitable. However, similar to product introduction, product 
elimination occurs in a sequential manner. As a result, each product has a life cycle. This 
sequential entry and exit pattern is similar to what is observed in many seed industries. 
Following figure shows this pattern for four canola varieties in Saskatchewan (2008-2012). It is 
shown, for example, how market share of 5020 decreases as 5440 and 45H28 become adopted. 
Similarly, 5440 continues its disadoption process when L150 is introduced.  
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Figure 3. 1. Adoption Rate of Four Canola Varieties in Saskatchewan (2008-2012). 
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation 
There has been a growing attention to sequential innovation in economics literature. Chapter 1 
procides a short review of studies performed by Scotchmer, O'Donoghue and others.  Grossman 
and Helpman (1991a) argue “almost every product exists on a quality ladder, with variants 
below, that may already have become obsolete, and others above, that have yet to be 
discovered.” They criticize the literature on patent races introduced by Loury (1979), Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980), and Lee and Wilde (1980) for having a “one-shot framework [that] fails to 
capture an essential aspect of quality competition.” Grossman and Helpman (1991a) refer to the 
works of Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1990) as “the beginning of a theory of 
repeated quality innovations.” In what follows sequential innovation is incorporated in the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2. This is to provide some insights into the relationship 
between quality improvement and product cycles, pricing strategies, and evolution path of 
industries characterized by sequential innovation.  
To incorporate sequential innovation through quality improvement, it is assumed that yield 
potential of new varieties improves over time with rate of k such that: 
(3.1)  𝑦! = 𝑦!!! + 𝑘          
where t represents time,  𝑦 yield potential, and k rate of yield potential growth.   
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To incorporate addition of new characteristics, it is assumed that each new variety has a 
distinguishing characteristic that differentiates it from other varieties. Thus, a new product not 
only features a new characteristic, but also has a higher yield potential. 
The market share of a variety at time t, obtained in the previous chapter, is as follows:  
(3.2) 𝑋! = !! 1+ (!!!) !!!!!!!!!!!!! !  ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.      
By substituting equation 3.1 into equation 3.2 it can be written as follows:  
(3.3)            𝑋! = !! 1 + (!!!)(!"! !)!!!!!!!!! !     ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.     
where 𝑋! is the market share of the variety introduced at time t and k is the rate of  yield potential 
growth rate. Table 3.2 presents the market shares of 10 sequentially introduced varieties, 
assuming 𝜇 = 0.5 and yield growth rate k=0.02. It is assumed that a variety is eliminated from 
the market when its market share drops under 5 percent. This percentage is an arbitrary number 
only to somehow incorporate the maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the market. This is 
modified to a zero profit condition and discussed in depth in the next section. 
After time 7, with introduction of each variety, one variety leaves the market and the number 
of products in the market remains constant at 8. This is an Equilibrium Steady State (ESS) with 8 
products in the market. The interesting feature of the ESS is the set of equilibrium market shares. 
The ESS is characterized by a vector of market shares, X=[0.06, 0.08, 0.10, 0.12, 0.13, 0.15, 
0.17, 0.19], that represents the market shares for the lowest to the highest quality variety in the 
ESS. This is shown in the highlighted column in Table 3.2. Products sequentially enter and leave 
the market but the vector of equilibrium market shares does not change; the highest and lowest 
quality products always obtain 19 and 6 percent market share, respectively. Consistent with 
proposition 3 in Chapter 2, there is higher market share for new varieties because they have 
higher yield potential.  
The market share of each variety decreases over time as new and higher quality varieties are 
introduced. In the ESS each variety will obtain 19 percent market share upon entrance; but this 
market share gradually drops to 6 percent as new and higher quality varieties enter the market. 
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This is shown in the highlighted row in Table 3.2. In the neighbourhood of equilibrium, a new 
(and highest quality) variety always obtains the largest market share upon introduction and then 
loses its market share as newer and higher quality products are introduced. This reduction in 
market share continues until the variety is completely out of the market.22 
 
Table 3. 1. Distribution of Market Shares for k=0.02 and 𝝁 = 0.5. 
        Time  
Variety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1 0.49 0.32 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.06 - - - - - - - - 
2  0.51 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 - - - - - - - 
3    0.35 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - - - - - - 
4    
 
0.28 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - - - - - 
5    
  
0.24 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - - - - 
6    
   
0.21 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - - - 
7    
    
0.20 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - - 
8    
     
0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 - 
9    
      
0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 
10    
       
0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 
11    
       
 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 
12    
       
  0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12 
13    
       
   0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 
14    
       
    0.19 0.17 0.15 
15    
       
     0.19 0.17 
16    
       
      0.19 
HHI    
       
      0.13 
 Source: Author’s estimations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Market shares in product cycles may seem counter intuitive as each variety starts off at the peak of its adoption 
curve upon entrance and then it goes through disadoption as newer varieties enter the market. This is inconsistent 
with S-shaped adoption curves described in many studies, particularly those of Rogers (1983) and Griliches (1957). 
The S-shaped adoption curves are based on the assumption that adoption occurs as adopters form expectations about 
the benefits of a new innovation. The literature on disadotion, however, is sparse (Dinar and Yaron, 1992). As a new 
variety is being adopted, an older variety must become disadopted (Dinar and Yaron, 1992).  
The current study focuses on the disadoption of older varieties as a result of entry of new varieties. Since this study 
solely focuses on the disadoption part of the adoption curves, it is assumed that buyers have perfect information and 
fully form their expectations about a new variety upon its entry so a new variety always starts at the peak of its 
adoption curve. Nevertheless, factors that form the adoption part of a product cycle do not seem to be the same as 
those that form the disadoption part of the product cycle. While expected profit is the main factor that forms the 
adoption part of a product cycle (Griliches, 1957), technological substitution is mainly responsible for disadoption 
(Fisher and Pry, 1971; Rogers, 1983; Cameron and Metcalfe, 1987). 
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Numerical simulations help find the factors that determine a product’s life cycle. The number 
of products and vector of equilibrium market shares are a function of the yield growth rate k and 
the degree of specificity 𝜇.  
The literature on optimal variety is very rich on the relationship between degree of 
heterogeneity of consumers, which is a parallel concept to the degree of specificity in this study, 
and prices, number of products, etc. The relationship between quality improvement, which is 
referred to as yield growth rate in this study, and equilibrium conditions may not have been 
explored as intensively. Chapter 1 and the beginning of this section provided a review of the 
literature on “the theory of repeated quality improvements” (Grossman and Helpman (1991a); 
Segerstrom et al. (1990); Aghion and Howitt (1990)). In addition to this literature, DeBrock 
(1985) highlights the importance of properly incorporating competition when modelling R&D 
and patent life. DeBrock 1985 argues that “Clearly, rivalry has effects on the R & D process; just 
as clearly, the R & D process affects rivalry.” As well, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) argue that 
market structure needs to be considered as an endogenous variable.  
The literature, although posing intriguing questions, does not explicitly discuss differentiated 
products. This provides an incentive to use the framework presented in Chapter 2, which 
incorporates differentiated seed varieties, to study the relationship between yield potential 
growth rate and equilibrium conditions.  
To illustrate the effect of a higher yield potential growth rate on product cycles, Table 3.3 
presents the simulated market shares with a higher yield growth rate compared to that of Table 
3.2. Simulations of Table 3.3 are performed assuming 𝜇 = 0.5, and yield growth rate k=0.05, 
which is higher than k=0.02 in Table 3.2.  
Comparing varieties life cycles in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 shows that when yield growth rate 
increases from k=0.02 to k=0.05, life cycles shorten. With k=0.02, varieties stay in the market for 
8 periods, whereas with k=0.05 they stay in the market for 6 periods. The faster the yield 
potential of new varieties improves, the faster older varieties have to leave the market and, 
therefore, their life cycle is shorter. A higher rate of yield growth rate and the resulting shorter 
cycles also lead to fewer varieties in the market.  
This insight is comparable to the result of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) study. They argue that 
a monopolist may use “fast research” as a means of preventing potential entry to the R&D 
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market (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). If this is the case, then one could also arguably claim that 
faster research, in the R&D market, results in fewer number of products in the product market, 
which is what the simulations in this chapter show.     
Table 3. 2. Distribution of Market Shares for k=0.05 and 𝝁 = 0.5. 
        Time  
Variety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 0.48 0.29 0.19 0.11 0.05 - - 
2  0.52 0.33 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.05 - 
3   0.37 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.05 
4    0.31 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.10 
5     0.29 0.23 0.19 0.14 
6      0.28 0.23 0.19 
7       0.28 0.23 
8        0.28 
HHI        0.20 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
As shown in the last rows of tables 3.2 and 3.3, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of market 
concentration increases from 0.13 to 0.20 as the rate of yield potential growth increases from 
0.02 to 0.05.  
A lower rate of yield potential improvement has the opposite effect of what is described 
above. With no yield potential improvement (i.e. k=0), however, the sequential exit no longer 
occurs. In such a case, varieties equally share the market and are equally priced. With entry of 
each new variety, market share and price of the all varieties drops. In case of no yield potential 
improvement entry stops when there is no above normal profit left in the market.  
Another factor affecting product cycles is the degree of specificity 𝜇. This represents how fast 
yield potential drops as area under cultivation of a variety increases. As the degree of specificity 𝜇 increases, one would expect more varieties to exist in each period of time. To avoid repetition, 
an in-depth discussion of the effect of the degree of specificity on market shares is left to section 
3.3.3.  
Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of the ESS market shares presented in tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
The blue curve is the baseline with k=0.02 and 𝜇 = 0.5. The red curve represents the disadoption 
associated with a higher rate of yield potential growth of k=0.05 compared to k=0.02. 
	   68	  	  
Comparison of the blue and the red curves indicates that a higher rate of yield potential growth 
results in a shorter but steeper disadoption curve. This, in turn, implies fewer products with 
shorter life cycles.  
	  
Figure 3. 2. Effect of Rate of Yield Potential Growth and Degree of Specificity on Length of 
Product Cycles.  
Price structure: Price of a new variety is a function of its own yield potential and yield 
potential of its rivals. It is also a function of the degree of specificity 𝜇 and number of existing 
varieties n. This is shown in the following equation from previous chapter:  
(3.4)   𝑊! = (!!!!!)!!!!!!!! + !!!!    ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.     
Assuming yield potential improves over time with the constant rate of k as in equation 3.1, the 
price of a variety introduced at time t can be formulated as follows:  
(3.5)              𝑊! = (!"! !)!!!!!!!!! + !!!!       ∀  1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ≠ 𝑖.     
Table 3.5 presents the simulated prices for 10 varieties released sequentially into the market 
place. Similar to the simulated market shares presented in table 3.2, the degree of specificity 𝜇 is 
assumed to be 0.5 and yield growth rate is assumed to be k=0.02. 
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As shown in table 3.4, variety 1 (i.e. the original innovation) follows a declining price path as 
new and higher quality varieties enter the market. Newer products follow a declining price path 
as well. As the number of varieties increases, competition gets fiercer and prices fall.  
 
Table 3. 3. Distribution of Prices for Linear Yield Growth Rates of k=0.02, and 𝝁 = 0.5.  
        Time  
Variety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 1 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 - - 
2  0.51 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 - 
3   0.26 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 
4    0.18 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 
5     0.15 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 
6      0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 
7       0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 
8        0.11 0.10 0.09 
9         0.11 0.10 
10          0.11 
Source: Author’s estimations.  
With the introduction of variety 9, variety 1 leaves the market. After time 8, with the 
introduction of each variety, one variety leaves the market and the number of products in the 
market remains constant at 8. This is an ESS with 8 products in the market. The interesting point 
of this equilibrium is the vector of equilibrium prices. The ESS is characterized by a vector of 
prices, W=[0.03, 0.04, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11]. Products sequentially enter and leave 
the market but the vector of equilibrium prices does not change; the highest and lowest quality 
products are always priced at 0.11 and 0.03, respectively.  
Both the number of equilibrium products and the vector of ESS prices are functions of the 
yield growth rate k and the degree of specificity 𝜇. Table 3.5 presents the simulated prices for 8 
varieties, assuming 𝜇 = 0.5 and yield growth rate k=0.05. 
Comparing tables 3.4 and 3.5 shows that a higher yield growth rate (k=0.05 compared to 
k=0.02) results in fewer products in the ESS. Also, on average prices are higher with yield 
growth rate of 0.05 compared to 0.02, which is consistent with proposition 5 of Chapter 2 
regarding the effect of rate of yield potential improvement on prices. A higher yield growth rate 
enables the seed producers to price their varieties higher. This occurs through two mechanisms, 
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direct and indirect. In the direct mechanism, a variety can be priced higher because it offers 
higher quality. In the indirect mechanism, a higher yield growth rate results in a smaller number 
of varieties and that provides the seed producers with more market power so they can price their 
varieties higher. 
Table 3. 4. Distribution of Prices for 𝝁 = 𝟎.𝟓, and k=0.05.  
        Time  
Variety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 0.48 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.03 - - 
2  0.52 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.03 - 
3   0.28 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.03 
4    0.21 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.06 
5     0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09 
6      0.17 0.14 0.11 
7       0.17 0.14 
8        0.17 
Source: Author’s estimations.  
Figure 3.3 provides an illustration of the ESS prices presented in tables 3.5 to 3.7. The blue 
curve is the baseline with k=0.02 and 𝜇 = 0.5. The red curve represents the price path associated 
with a higher rate of yield potential growth of k=0.05 compared to k=0.02. Comparison of the 
blue and the red curves indicates that with a higher rate of yield potential growth although 
varieties start with significantly higher prices, they go through a much faster decline in their 
prices as the disadoption process occurs faster.    
Both the number of equilibrium products and the vector of ESS prices are also functions of 
the degree of specificity 𝜇. To avoid repetition, an in-depth discussion of the effect of the degree 
of specificity on prices is left to section 3.3.3.  
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Figure 3. 3. Effect of Rate of Yield Potential Growth and Degree of Specificity on Prices 
throughout a Product’s Life Cycle.  
Equilibrium Steady States and Neighbourhood of Equilibrium: As shown in tables 3.2 to 3.5, 
number of varieties in the market is not random. Varieties are sequentially introduced into the 
market until their number reaches equilibrium. The number of varieties, a vector of prices and a 
vector of market shares characterize the ESS. The highest quality product will always have a 
specific price and market share. This holds for second highest quality variety, third highest 
quality variety, and so on. Since new products enter the equilibrium and old products exit, we 
call this a neighbourhood of equilibrium; the neighbourhood of equilibrium is constantly 
evolving.  
Number of varieties, vector of prices, and vector of market shares in the ESS are a function of 
market characteristics such as yield growth rate and degree of specificity. For example, as shown 
in Table 3.2 and Table 3.5, k=0.02 and 𝜇 = 0.5 result in a neighbourhood of equilibrium with 
n=8,  W=[0.03, 0.04, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11], and X=[0.06, 0.08, 0.10, 0.12, 0.13, 0.15, 
0.17, 0.19]. A higher yield growth rate results in an ESS with a smaller n, higher prices and 
larger market shares. A higher degree of specificity results in an ESS with a larger n, higher 
prices and smaller market shares. 
The concept of ESS introduced in this chapter is similar to the concept of neighbourhood of 
equilibrium introduced by Schumpeter (1939) in the sense that in both concepts as market 
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deviates from the old equilibrium it moves towards a new equilibrium. However, there is a 
difference between neighbourhood of equilibrium and the concept of “equilibrium” used in other 
hybrid models and the representative consumer models. In these models, equilibrium is described 
with a certain number of equally substitutable products. These products do not change over time. 
In fact, there is no place for time and, therefore, evolution of the industry in these models. The 
current model, however, allows for evolution and change in the industry through sequential 
innovation. In the current model, although the industry reaches equilibrium, products change 
over time. That is, older products will be forced out of the market as new products are introduced 
into the market. This evolution (i.e. elimination of older products and introduction of newer 
products), however, always occurs within the neighbourhood of equilibrium.  
3.3. Endogenized Rate of Yield Growth Potential  
In the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 it is assumed that the rate of yield potential 
growth is exogenous. The numerical simulations presented in the previous section assume an 
exogenous rate of yield potential growth as well. Rate of yield potential growth is determined by 
the amount of R&D investment. And as noted by Grossman and Helpman (1991), “research 
responds to profit incentives.” In this section, the rate of yield potential growth is endogenized as 
a function of the amount of initial investment that firms make. The firms’ investment level is 
assumed to be a function of expected future profits. The rate of yield potential growth, in turn, 
determines the prices, market shares, number of firms and, thereby, the profit levels. Thus, the 
goal is to find the investment level that maximizes the profit obtained from each variety.  
To find the profit-maximizing investment level and the subsequent rate of yield potential 
growth, prices, market shares, and number of firms, the following maximization problem is set 
up.  
(3.6-a) Max! 𝜋! = (𝑊!𝑋! − 𝐹𝑀𝐶!)− 𝐼!!!!        ;   1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.       
Subject to the constraints: 
(3.6-b)  𝑋! = !! 1+ (!!!)(!"! !)!!!!!!!!! !       ;   1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛. 
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(3.6-c)  𝑊! = (!"! !)!!!!!!!!! + !!!!       ;   1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛. 
(3.6-d)  𝑘 = 𝐼!     ;   0 < 𝛼 
(3.6-e)  𝑊!𝑋! > 𝐹𝑀𝐶!    ;   1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛 
(3.6-f)  𝑊!𝑋! < 𝐹𝑀𝐶!    ;  𝑡 ≥ 𝑛 + 1 
where 𝜋! is the profit that each variety i=1, 2, 3, …, n obtains throughout its life cycle, t=1, 2, 3, 
…, n.23 𝐹𝑀𝐶! is the fixed overhead or maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the market for 
another period t. I represents the initial investment cost that firms incur in order to create a 
variety. The initial investment is a one-time sunk cost that determines firms’ rate of yield growth 
potential. 𝑊!  and 𝑋!  are, respectively, price and market share of variety i at age t. These 
equations are obtained in the theoretical model in Chapter 2 and are represented in equations 3.6-
b and 3.6-c, respectively. 𝑊! and 𝑋! are a function of the degree of specificity, 𝜇, rate of yield 
potential growth, k, defined in 3.6-d, and number of firms, n. Degree of specificity is exogenous. 
Rate of yield potential growth, k, is a function of firms investment level, as defined in constraint 
3.6-d. The parameter 𝛼 in equation 3.6-d is exogenously determined. This parameter represents 
breeders’ investment productivity.  
Number of firms is determined through constraints 3.6-e and 3.6-f. Constraints 3.6-e and 3.6-f 
imply that a variety remains in the market as long as its revenue, 𝑊!𝑋!, is larger than its fixed 
maintenance cost. Given the symmetry, each variety can only remain in the market for n periods. 
For any t larger than n, the revenue generated from a variety is larger than its fixed maintenance 
cost and the variety will no longer be in the market.    
The above maximization problem is used to find the optimum investment levels for various 
levels of exogenous variables and several cost structures. Section 3.3.1 describes the assumptions 
used in order to perform the numerical simulations with endogenized rate of yield potential 
growth. Section 3.3.2 presents the equilibrium steady states conditions under the endogenized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The sequences for both i and t end with n due to a symmetry between number of firms and length of product 
cycles; with n varieties in the market, each variety stays in the market for n periods. This symmetry is the result of 
the assumption that all varieties have the same degree of specificity and rate of yield potential growth.   
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rate of yield potential growth assumption. Section 3.3.3 presents some comparative statics of the 
exogenous variables.  
3.3.1. Assumptions 
Cost structure: It is assumed that seed producers incur two types of cost; an initial investment 
cost (I) and a fixed overhead or maintenance cost (FMC). The initial investment is a one-time 
sunk cost that determines firms’ rate of yield growth potential. The fixed overhead or 
maintenance cost is the cost of keeping a variety in the market for another period. It is also 
assumed that firms have similar cost structures. That is, fixed maintenance cost and initial 
investment are equal for all firms. The initial investment, however, creates a unique rate of yield 
potential growth that determines each variety’s yield potential level.  
Equilibrium: Initial investment determines the rate of yield potential growth. Rate of yield 
potential growth determines profit levels. Therefore, numerical simulations find the optimal 
investment level such that each firm’s total profit throughout the periods that its variety is in the 
market is maximized. Results represent Nash equilibrium in prices. Investment levels, however, 
are not Nash because it is assumed that all firms have the same investment level and the same 
rate of yield potential growth. Nevertheless, each firm behaves in accordance with its best 
response function assuming all firms follow the same rate of yield potential growth.24  
Exogenous factors: There are three exogenous factors that affect this “investment-rate of yield 
growth potential- profit” relationship: 1) The relationship between investment and rate of yield 
potential growth, which refers to the seed producers’ or breeders’ investment productivity; 2) 
Degree of specificity of products, which could also be interpreted as the degree of heterogeneity 
of buyers; 3) Fixed maintenance cost. The relationship between investment and rate of yield 
potential growth determines how much rate of yield potential growth the industry can obtain for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Although it is possible to allow each firm to decide on their yield potential levels without the assumption of fixed 
rate of yield potential growth, this does not contribute to this chapter significantly. This chapter is interested in effect 
of an increase or decrease in rate of yield potential growth and some exogenous factors on equilibrium prices, 
market shares, and number of firms. This is to understand how an industry characterized by sequential innovation 
evolves over time. Weather all firms follow the same rate of yield potential growth or are allowed to have different 
rates does not seem to be important for the purpose of this chapter. More importantly, if firms are allowed to have 
different rates of yield potential growth, then one needs to consider the possibility of an “innovation race” in which 
firms may not only invest more but also constantly change their cost structure in order to improve their investment 
productivity. These issues are not in the scope of this dissertation.     
	   75	  	  
every investment dollar. A higher rate of yield potential growth per investment dollar implies a 
higher level of investment productivity.  
3.3.2. Equilibrium Steady States 
Numerical simulations are performed to find the optimal investment level, rate of yield potential 
growth, market shares, prices, and profit levels at equilibrium steady states (ESS). It is assumed 
that degree of specificity 𝜇 , fixed maintenance cost (FMC), and the relationship between 
investment I and rate of yield potential growth k are exogenous, where  𝑘 = 𝐼!  . The Solver 
function in Microsoft Excel is used to find the investment level that maximizes the total profit for 
each variety over the ESS. That is, profit maximization is not performed for the transition period 
before the ESS but only for the ESS. Given the symmetry between varieties at ESS, optimal 
investment level for all varieties is exactly the same.  
Tables 3.6 to 3.8 below present the market shares, prices, and profit levels at the ESS for 𝜇 
=14, FMC=0.01, and k=I 0.5. This level of exogenous variables results in an optimum investment 
level of I*=0.73 and a yield growth potential of k=0.86. For this set of exogenous variables and 
optimal investment level, the market reaches the ESS with 7 varieties. That is, with the 
introduction of variety 8 variety 1 leaves the market, with the introduction of variety 9 variety 2 
will leave the market, and so on. This is because with the introduction of newer varieties with 
new characteristics and higher yield potential levels the older varieties will have to be priced so 
low and obtain so little market share that their profit levels can no longer cover the fixed 
overhead or maintenance cost (FMC) of keeping them in the market.  
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Table 3. 5. Distribution of Market Shares for k=I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.73).  
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 6. Distribution of Prices for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.73).  
        Time  
Variety   1 … 7 8 9 
1   0.95 - - 
2   1.41 0.95 - 
3   1.87 1.41 0.95 
4   2.33 1.87 1.41 
5   2.79 2.33 1.87 
6   3.26 2.79 2.33 
7   3.72 3.26 2.79 
8    3.72 3.26 
9     3.72 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Table 3. 7. Distribution of Profit Levels for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.73). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 7 8 9 
1   0.06 - - 
2   0.09 0.06 - 
3   0.11 0.09 0.06 
4   0.14 0.11 0.09 
5   0.17 0.14 0.11 
6   0.20 0.17 0.14 
7   0.23 0.20 0.17 
8    0.23 0.20 
9     0.23 
HHI     0.16 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 7 8 9 
1   0.05 - - 
2   0.11 0.05 - 
3   0.20 0.11 0.05 
4   0.32 0.20 0.11 
5   0.47 0.32 0.20 
6   0.64 0.47 0.32 
7   0.84 0.64 0.47 
8    0.84 0.64 
9     0.84 
Net Revenue (NR)     2.62 
Total Profit (NR-I*)    1.89 
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As shown in Table 3.8, profits are non-zero. This may seem counter-intuitive, as one would 
expect a zero-profit condition to hold in the ESS. The zero-profit condition is well-stablished in 
the economics literature. DeBrock (1985), for example, claims that, in an R&D market, “the 
number of firms entering the race for the patent will increase until the present value of expected 
profit is driven to zero.”  The current study, however, provides an interesting point regarding the 
zero-profit condition in monopolistic competition markets. The profit levels that are reported in 
Table 3.8 and other tables in the remaining of this chapter are the profit levels that firms can 
obtain without encouraging entry of a new product. Firms do this through underinvestment. That 
is, firms could investment more to derive profit levels to zero with the same number of firms but 
they slightly underinvest to make small amount of profit that is not large enough to encourage 
entry. That is, the profit levels reported in Table 3.8 are slightly above normal but they are not 
enough to pay for initial investment and fixed maintenance cost of a new product.  
3.3.3. Comparative Statics 
Degree of specificity: One of the important exogenous determinants of optimal investment, 
number of equilibrium varieties, and other equilibrium conditions is the degree of specificity of 
varieties. As degree of specificity decreases varieties become more similar and number of 
equilibrium varieties decreases. This section seeks to explore how a higher or a lower degree of 
specificity and the resulted change in the ESS number of varieties affects the optimal level of 
investment.  
Tables 3.9 to 3.11 below repeat the simulations presented in tables 3.6 to 3.8 with a lower 
degree of specificity of 𝜇 = 7 rather than 𝜇 = 14. Results indicate a decrease in the ESS number 
of varieties (from 7 to 5) and an increase in HHI for market concentration (from 0.16 to 0.23). 
Also, as shown in figures 3.5 and 3.6, with 𝜇 = 7 prices and profit levels are significantly lower 
than the case of 𝜇 = 14. This is due to the fact that competition increases as the degree of 
specificity decreases. The increased competition and lower profit levels result in a lower optimal 
investment level of I*=0.66 compared to I*=0.73 with 𝜇 = 14. A lower optimal investment level, 
of course, results in a lower rate of yield potential growth of k=0.81 compared to k=0.86.    
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Table 3. 8. Distribution of Market Shares for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 7, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.66). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 9. Distribution of Prices for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 7, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.66).  
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 10. Distribution of Profit Levels for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 7, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.66). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Figures 3.4 to 3.6 compare the ESS market shares, prices, and profit levels presented in tables 
3.8 to 3.10 to the ones presented in tables 3.9 to 3.11, 3.13 to 3.15, and 3.16 to 3.18. In figures 
3.4 to 3.6 the blue curve is the baseline with k= I 0.5, 𝜇=14, and FMC=0.01, the red curve 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   0.10 - - 
2   0.15 0.10 - 
3   0.20 0.15 0.10 
4   0.25 0.20 0.15 
5   0.30 0.25 0.20 
6    0.30 0.25 
7     0.30 
HHI     0.23 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   0.85 - - 
2   1.30 0.85 - 
3   1.75 1.30 0.85 
4   2.20 1.75 1.30 
5   2.65 2.20 1.75 
6    2.65 2.20 
7     2.65 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   0.07 - - 
2   0.18 0.07 - 
3   0.34 0.18 0.07 
4   0.54 0.34 0.18 
5   0.80 0.54 0.34 
6    0.80 0.54 
7     0.80 
Net Revenue (NR)    1.93 
Total Profit (NR-I*)    1.27 
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represents a lower degree of specificity 𝜇=7, the green curve represents higher investment 
productivity (k= I 0.9), and the purple curve  presents a higher fixed maintenance cost 
(FMC=0.05) compared to the baseline.   
Comparison of the blue and the red curves in figures 3.4 to 3.6 indicates that a lower degree 
of specificity results in a shorter but steeper disadoption curve, lower prices, and lower profit 
levels. Shorter but steeper disadoption curves also imply fewer products. These findings provide 
reassuring insight into why firms seek to differentiate their products (i.e. increase the degree of 
specificity of their products).   
	  
Figure 3. 4. Effect of Degree of Specificity and Investment Productivity on Length of 
Product Cycles. 
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Figure 3. 5. Effect of Degree of Specificity and Investment Productivity on Prices. 
	  
Figure 3. 6. Effect of Degree of Specificity and Investment Productivity on Profit Levels. 
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However, effect of degree of specificity on number of varieties and optimal investment, is not 
as straightforward as depicted above. In general, an increase in degree of specificity implies 
more varieties in the market and an increase in optimal investment level. The change in number 
of firms as a result of an increase in degree of specificity, however, is not continuous. That is, the 
increase in degree of specificity must be large enough to allow for entry of a new variety. 
Otherwise, the existing varieties adapt to the new levels of degree of specificity. Table 3.12 
provides an example. As degree of specificity increases from 0.5 to 2, number of varieties at ESS 
remains 3. This is because the increase in degree of specificity is not large enough to allow for 
entry of the third variety. For a given number of varieties, say 3 in the following table, as degree 
of specificity increases varieties become more differentiated and have greater incentives to invest 
more in the improvement of their varieties. Therefore, optimal investment increases as degree of 
specificity increases, as long as entry does not occur. In the following table, for example, as 
degree of specificity increase from 0.5 to 2, number of varieties remains at 3, optimal investment 
level increases from 0.01 to 0.34 while total future profit for each variety increases from 0.22 to 
0.71. However, as soon as entry occurs, firms lose their incentive to invest and optimal 
investment level drops.  
Table 3. 11. Effect of Degree of Specificity on Number of Firms, Optimal Investment, and 
Profit. 
Mu Optimal Investment K Total Profit per Firm Number of firms at ESS 
0.3 - - - 1 
0.4 0.04 0.204 0.35 2 
0.5 0.01 0.10 0.22 3 
0.6 0.016 0.13 0.27 3 
0.7 0.02 0.16 0.31 3 
0.8 0.04 0.19 0.35 3 
0.9 0.05 0.22 0.40 3 
1 0.06 0.25 0.43 3 
2 0.34 0.59 0.71 3 
3 0.25 0.50 0.81 4 
4 0.49 0.70 0.95 4 
6 0.46 0.68 1.17 5 
8 0.89 0.95 1.33 5 
10 0.67 0.82 1.56 6 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
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This finding provides additional insights into why firms prefer to differentiate their products. 
With more differentiated products, higher profit levels can be accommodated. However, after a 
certain threshold, entry occurs and firms must share the market and profits with the new entrant. 
To compensate for this effect, firms can increase the level of differentiation (i.e. degree of 
specificity) of their products.  
Breeder investment productivity: This section is concerned with the effect of breeders’ 
investment productivity on optimal investment level. The relationship between investment and 
rate of yield potential growth determines how much yield potential growth the industry can 
obtain for every investment dollar. This relationship also represents the seed producers’ 
economies of size as a higher rate of yield potential growth per investment dollar implies a lower 
average cost level for any given level of yield potential growth. 
In order to show the effect of investment productivity on optimal investment, two different 
levels of investment productivity are compared. k= I 0.9 represents a higher level of investment 
productivity than k= I 0.5. Tables 3.13 to 3.15 below repeat the simulations presented in tables 3.6 
to 3.8 with k= I 0.9 rather that k= I 0.5. Comparison of tables 3.13 to 3.15 and tables 3.6 to 3.8 
indicates that with higher breeder productivity number of firms decreases from 7 to 5, 
competition decreases, and firms have an incentive to invest more. Therefore, the optimal 
investment level increases. In the following example, k= I 0.9 implies an optimal investment level 
of I*=1.86 and a rate of yield growth of k=1.75, whereas in case of k= I 0.5 optimal investment 
level is I*=0.86 and rate of yield growth is k=0.73.    
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Table 3. 12. Distribution of Market Shares for k= I 0.9, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=1.86). 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   0.09 - - 
2   0.14 0.09 - 
3   0.20 0.14 0.09 
4   0.26 0.20 0.14 
5   0.31 0.26 0.20 
6    0.31 0.26 
7     0.31 
HHI     0.23 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 13. Distribution of Prices for k= I 0.9, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=1.86). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 14. Distribution of Profit Levels for k= I 0.9, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=1.86) 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Also, comparison of the blue and the green curves in figures 3.4 to 3.6 reveals that higher 
breeder productivity results in a shorter but steeper disadoption curve, higher average price and 
profit levels with a steeper path. A shorter but steeper disadoption curve also implies fewer 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   1.55 - - 
2   2.53 1.55 - 
3   3.50 2.53 1.55 
4   4.47 3.50 2.53 
5   5.45 4.47 3.50 
6    5.45 4.47 
7     5.45 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 5 6 7 
1   0.13 - - 
2   0.35 0.13 - 
3   0.69 0.35 0.13 
4   1.13 0.69 0.35 
5   1.69 1.13 0.69 
6    1.69 1.13 
7     1.69 
Net Revenue (NR)    3.99 
Total Profit (NR-I*)    2.13 
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products and, consequently, an increase in the HHI of market concentration from 0.16 to 0.23. 
These findings also show how greater economies of size may accommodate higher profit levels 
for firms.    
Similar to the effect of degree of specificity, the change in number of varieties as a result of a 
change in investment productivity is not continuous. The change in investment productivity must 
be large enough to allow for entry or exit of a variety. Otherwise, same number of varieties adapt 
to the change by changing their prices and investment levels that results in a change in their 
market shares and profit levels.  
Fixed Maintenance Cost: fixed overhead or maintenance cost is the cost of keeping a variety 
in the market for another period. As long as a variety is in production the producer has to allocate 
some of their resources to that variety. This includes but is not limited to marketing and 
advertisement costs, reproduction costs, and storage costs. This section explores the effect of a 
change in the fixed maintenance cost on ESS number of varieties and optimal level of 
investment. 
Tables 3.16 to 3.18 below repeat the simulations presented in tables 3.6 to 3.8 with a higher 
FMC of 0.05 rather than 0.01. Results show a decrease in ESS number of varieties (from 7 to 6) 
and an increase in HHI for market concentration (from 0.16 to 0.18). With a higher fixed 
maintenance cost, firms must discontinue their varieties sooner than they would with a lower 
fixed maintenance cost. As shown in figures 3.5 and 3.6, a higher FMC results in a shorter 
product cycle. Also, existence of fewer varieties in the market results in higher prices and profit 
levels.  
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Table 3. 15. Distribution of Market Shares for k=I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.05 (I*=0.78). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 16. Distribution of Prices for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.78). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Table 3. 17. Distribution of Profit Levels for k= I 0.5, 𝝁 = 14, and FMC=0.01 (I*=0.78). 
 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 6 7 8 
1   0.09 - - 
2   0.12 0.09 - 
3   0.15 0.12 0.09 
4   0.18 0.15 0.12 
5   0.21 0.18 0.15 
6   0.24 0.21 0.18 
7    0.24 0.21 
8     0.24 
HHI     0.18 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 6 7 8 
1   1.59 - - 
2   2.08 1.59 - 
3   2.56 2.08 1.59 
4   3.04 2.56 2.08 
5   3.52 3.04 2.56 
6   4.01 3.52 3.04 
7    4.01 3.52 
8     4.01 
        Time  
Variety   1 … 6 7 8 
1   0.10 - - 
2   0.21 0.10 - 
3   0.34 0.21 0.10 
4   0.50 0.34 0.21 
5   0.69 0.50 0.34 
6   0.91 0.69 0.50 
7    0.91 0.69 
8     0.91 
Net Revenue (NR)     2.74 
Total Profit (NR-I*)     1.96 
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With higher fixed maintenance cost firms also have a higher optimal investment level of I*=0.78 
compared to I*=0.73 and higher rate of yield potential growth of k=0.88 compared to k=0.86. 
This is because a higher fixed maintenance cost reduces the number of varieties in the market 
and, thereby, competition. The reduced competition enables the firms to invest more, charge 
higher prices, obtain larger market shares, and attain higher profit levels. 
Similar to the effect of degree of specificity and breeders’ investment productivity the change in 
number of varieties as a result of a change in the fixed maintenance cost level is not continuous. 
If the change is not large enough to allow for entry or exit of a variety, same number of varieties 
adapt to the change by changing their prices and investment levels that results in a change in 
their market shares and profit levels. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter provides valuable insights into important policy issues such as why some industries 
consist of fewer firms than others, why investment levels are higher in some industries than 
others, why some products have longer life cycles while others leave the market faster. While 
these issues may have been explored from different perspectives in the literature, this study looks 
at these issues from the perspective of sequential innovation. 25   
Chapter 2 introduces a theoretical model that incorporates sequential entry of new production 
inputs that embody new characteristics while allowing older products to leave the market. Some 
properties of the model are shown in propositions and their algebraic proofs. Numerical 
simulations performed in this chapter provide further evidence to the validity of these 
propositions. Also, some of the key factors in the length and other characteristics of product 
cycles are investigated.  
While Chapter 2 hypothesizes that rate of yield potential growth is an important determinant 
of market consolidation, this chapter provides more insight into this relationship. This chapter 
endogenizes the rate of yield potential growth as a function of firms’ initial investment. Profit-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) explore the effect of uncertainty on number of firms involved in 
R&D. DeBrock (1985) explores the issue of optimal patent life from the perspective of competition in R&D market. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) explore the role of quality ladder in the theory of growth.  
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maximizing investment levels are found for firms. Finally, comparative statics are used to 
explore the effect of three exogenous variables on number of firms at the equilibrium steady 
states, optimal investment, and other equilibrium conditions. The exogenous variables include 
degree of specificity of seed varieties, breeders’ investment productivity, and the fixed overhead 
or maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the market.  
The current study provides some insights into the nature of product or business cycles. It is 
shown that products and market characteristics such as yield growth rate and degree of 
specificity of products determine the length and other characteristics of product cycles. For 
example, with a higher yield growth rate, product cycles become shorter but market shares at any 
given period are higher. In other words, the higher the quality of the imitators’ products is, the 
shorter the products stay in the market and the larger their market shares are. This also implies a 
more concentrated market structure. This insight is comparable to the result of Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) study. They argue that a monopolist may use “fast research” as a means of 
preventing potential entry to the R&D market (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). However, factors 
determining the introduction of an original drastic innovation (e.g. the hybrid technology) and 
the length of the main wave (e.g. how long the hybrid technology in the seed industry remains in 
the market) are still unexplored.  
Degree of specificity, breeders’ investment productivity, and the fixed overhead cost of 
keeping a variety in the market are important determinant of optimal investment level, number of 
varieties, prices, market shares at the equilibrium steady states and consolidation. More specific 
varieties imply more varieties in the market, higher prices, and an increase in optimal investment 
level. Greater investment productivity implies fewer varieties in the market, higher prices, higher 
profit levels, higher optimal investment, and higher consolidation. A higher FMC results in a 
shorter product cycle, fewer varieties in the market, higher prices and profits, higher optimal 
investment, and higher consolidation.   
In short, degree of specificity of products, which also represents the degree of heterogeneity 
of consumers, as well as firms’ cost structure, particularly investment productivity, which 
represents economies of size, seem to have a key role in determining an industry’s number of 
firms, length of product cycles, prices, profits, investment levels, rate of growth, and 
consolidation level.  
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Last but not least, results of this study provide very interesting insights into the impact of 
differentiation on equilibrium conditions. While the common belief is that differentiation can 
increase a firm’s profit, the numerical simulations show that this relationship is not as 
straightforward. It is shown that increased differentiation, if followed by the rivals, will certainly 
result in increased profit as long as it is not followed by entry of new firms. However, if 
increased differentiation creates enough space in the market for a new entrant, then entry of a 
new rival will increase competition and may result in a decrease in the incumbents’ profit.   
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Chapter 4: Empirical Estimations 
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4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced a new theoretical model that explains the incentives to create new 
characteristics for new production inputs. This model incorporates sequential entry of new 
production inputs that embody new characteristics, while allowing older production inputs to 
leave the market when their market share falls to the point where they are no longer viable. In 
Chapter 2 properties of the model were also shown in form of propositions and algebraic proofs. 
In chapter 3, numerical simulations were performed to further investigate the validity of these 
propositions, and provide more insight into dynamic aspects of the model, such as product 
cycles.  
The current chapter uses data from Canadian canola industry to empirically test some of the 
propositions discussed in chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter tests propositions 2 and 4.  
Proposition 2 states that market share of a variety increases as its degree of specificity decreases, 
ceteris paribus. Proposition 4 indicates that a higher rate of yield potential improvement results 
in a higher market share for the variety with highest yield potential level, ceteris paribus.  
This chapter tests the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on market shares of 
Canadian canola seed varieties. While price data for individual canola varieties in Canada are 
unavailable, time series of market shares for each variety in various locations are available. 
Therefore, this chapter merely focuses on empirical test of the propositions that hypothesize the 
effect of different parameters on market share.  
While the literature on adoption of seed varieties has explored many determinants of crop 
adoption, less attention has been paid to propositions 2 and 4 that discuss the effect of yield 
potential and degree of specificity on adoption of seed varieties. Most previous studies have used 
average actual yield and some have also used yield variance in order to measure the effect of 
yield on adoption. This study uses yield potential and degree of specificity to explore the effect 
of yield on adoption. Yield potential and degree of specificity refer to a variety’s yield at the top 
yielding location and the degree by which the variety’s yield decreases as its area expands, 
respectively. It is shown later in this chapter that yield potential and degree of specificity, 
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together, are likely to provide a more accurate measure of a variety’s performance over 
numerous locations than average and variance yield.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of yield potential 
and degree of specificity on adoption of seed varieties. In addition, this chapter provides 
empirical evidence as to why it is important to incorporate both seed and location characteristics 
when constructing a demand model for the seed industry. 
In order to empirically test the validity of propositions 2 and 4, the effect of yield potential 
and degree of specificity is estimated on market shares of Canadian canola seed varieties using 
regression analyses. This is done in two steps. First, yield potential and degree of specificity of 
canola seed varieties is estimated in a way consistent with the theoretical model. Second, the 
effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on market shares of these varieties is estimated 
using a panel regression model.  
The next section describes the dataset. In section 4.3 yield potential and degree of specificity 
of canola seed varieties is estimated. Section 4.4 discusses the choice of functional form and 
explanatory variables and then presents estimation results. Further discussion of the results is 
presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides a conclusion of the empirical study.  
4.2. Dataset 
This study uses two datasets, one from Manitoba and one from Saskatchewan for comparison 
purposes. Appendices G and H present the data used in this chapter.  
The Manitoba dataset goes from 2004 to 2013 and includes 42 varieties. Appendix B of this 
chapter presents number of years, test locations, varieties with consistent data, potential 
observations. As presented in Table 4.B2, Manitoba datasets consist of 420 potential 
observations. Manitoba data on both area and yield levels in various locations is obtained from 
Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation. 
The Saskatchewan dataset only includes 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. As presented 
in Table 4.B1, the number of varieties that have been tested in trails each year is different. The 
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Saskatchewan dataset consists of only 17 varieties with consistent data for at least 2 years (see 
Table 4.B2). The majority of Saskatchewan data is obtained from two sources. Data on canola 
varieties’ area is obtained from Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation reports. Yield data for 
Saskatchewan varieties is obtained from Canola Performance Trial Reports and Prairie Canola 
Variety Trials Test Results. Appendices G and H present Manitoba and Saskatchewan datasets, 
respectively.  
Exploring the information in canola trial reports reveals some interesting facts about factors 
that influence yield variations. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the yield of canola seed varieties at 
different locations in 2011 and 2012. Looking at each of these two figures reveals that: 1. Each 
variety yields differently at different locations (variety effect), 2. At each location, different 
varieties yield differently (location effect). Comparing the two figures reveals the third 
interesting fact: 3. Top-yielding locations are not the same every year. For example, in 2011 
Dawson Creek and Westlock are the top-yielding locations while in 2012 Fort Saskatchewan and 
Saskatoon are the top-yielding locations. This effect could be attributed to changes in weather 
conditions from year to year, which influences the yield levels at different locations differently 
(weather or year effect). To summarize, variations in yield levels depicted in the following 
figures can be attributed to variety effects, location effects, and weather (year) effects. It is worth 
noting that although not presented in this chapter, yield levels of canola varieties in other years 
(2007 to 2010) follow similar patterns as those depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 emphasizing the 
importance of variety, location, and weather effects.  
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Figure 4. 1. Yield of Canola Seed Varieties in Different Locations in 2011 (bu/acre). 
Source: Canola Council of Canada, Canola Performance Trials report, 2011. 
	  
Figure 4. 2. Yield of Canola Seed Varieties in Different Locations in 2012 (bu/acre). 
Source: Canola Council of Canada, Canola Performance Trials report, 2012. 
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 emphasize the importance of incorporating both variety and location 
characteristics when constructing a demand model for the seed industry. However, statistical 
tests need to be performed in order to estimate the role that each of variety, location, and weather 
(year) effects and their interactions play in yield variations.   
UNIANOVA tests are performed to find the sources of yield variations and their relative 
magnitude. Several specifications have been tried to find the model that provides the most 
consistent intuitions and also fits the data well.  
The model presented in Table 4.1 indicates that variety, location, year, and their two-way 
interactions explain 97% of the variations in yield. Location has the largest “effect size” with 
partial eta squared of 0.88. Interestingly, weather has the lowest effect size of 0.27. However, 
interaction of location and weather has a relatively large effect size. This means weather mainly 
influences yield through location. Interaction of location and variety effects is also highly 
significant with a relatively large partial eta squared. This reemphasizes the importance of 
interaction between genetics and environment (Haldane, 1946).  Therefore, it is important 
incorporate variety and location effects in the theoretical model in chapter 2.  
Table 4. 1. Three-Way ANOVA (UNIANOVA) with 6 Fixed Factors. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:  Yield  
Source 
Type III  
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Significance 
Effect Size 
(Partial Eta Squared) 
Corrected Model 2339746a 3622 646 9.66 0.00 0.97 
Intercept 6811117 1 6811117 101887 0.00 0.99 
Location 505398 56 9025 135 0.00 0.88 
Variety 314471 114 2758 41 0.00 0.82 
Weather 25060 4 6265 94 0.00 0.27 
Location*Weather 317658 77 4125 62 0.00 0.82 
Location*Variety 330507 3316 100 1.49 0.00 0.83 
Variety * Weather 46937 55 853 12.76 0.00 0.41 
Error 67318 1007 67 
   Total 15761459 4630 
    Corrected Total 2407063 4629 
    a. R Squared = .972 (Adjusted R Squared = .871) 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
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4.3. Estimation of yield potential and degree of specificity 
Assuming that land is uniformly distributed between the best-suited and worst-suited parcels, 
and that land parcels are arbitrarily small, then the decline in yield of each variety will be a 
continuous linear function of the amount of land allocated to that variety. Chapter 2 defines the 
relationship between yield and area of variety i as follows:  
𝑌! = 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋!      
where 𝑌! is yield of variety i per acre, 𝑦!   potential yield of variety i per acre (i.e. yield at the best-
suited parcel), 𝑋! area or number of parcels allocated to variety i, and 𝜇!   is the yield decrease of 
variety i as its area expands by one unit. The above equation indicates that each variety i yields 
most at a particular parcel of land (i.e. yield potential) and its yield drops in a linear fashion by 
the rate of 𝜇!   as area 𝑋! allocated to variety i expands.26 In other words, 𝜇! reflects the degree of 
specificity of variety i for different parcels of land. A larger 𝜇! means yield of variety i drops 
faster as area expands and this implies variety i is well-suited to specific parcels of land and vice 
versa.      
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 With non-uniform distribution of parcels of land the relationship between yield and area of variety i (equation 4.1) 
becomes non nonlinear, and with parcels of land that are not arbitrarily small the continuous linear function turns 
into a step function. 
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Table 4. 2. Yield Levels of Canola Seed Varieties at 4 Trial Locations in 2012.  	  	   	  	   Boissevain, MB Dauphin, MB Melita, MB Portage, MB 
ClearField 
5525 CL 38 35 34 58 
5535 CL 41 30 39 53 
VR 9560 CL 44 39 34 58 
Liberty Link 
5440 34 39 37 57 
L120 40 31 26 53 
L130 46 35 32 57 
L150 39 36 31 58 
L154 40 40 36 58 
L159 42 32 36 60 
Roundup 
Ready 
72-65 RR 41 31 33 48 
6050 RR 44 29 34 49 
6060 RR 32 32 33 54 
73-45 RR 44 31 37 59 
73-75 RR 46 38 41 55 
74-44 BL 39 33 32 55 
94H04 40 33 30 52 
V12-1* 42 34 35 51 
VR 9559 G 41 39 37 55 
VT 520 G 35 36 33 52 
1990 29 34 36 54 
1970 36 31 25 54 
1999 48 39 38 55 
74-47 CR - - - - 
73-15 RR - - - - 
Source: Canola Council of Canada, Canola Performance Trials report, 2012. 
In order to empirically estimate the yield potential and degree of specificity of canola seed 
varieties the following steps have been followed: 
1. Yield levels of all the available varieties at all the reported locations are identified. 
In Saskatchewan this is limited to tested varieties at test locations whereas in 
Manitoba the dataset includes all the varieties above the minimum tolerance of 500 
acres or 3 farms in a rural municipality. Table 4.2 shows a part of the dataset for all 
the tested varieties at 4 trials in 2012.   
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2. Yield for each variety is ranked from the highest yielding location to the lowest 
yielding location. Thus, for each variety there are several data points ranked in 
descending order. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3 show the yield levels for four canola 
varieties at 23 test locations in 2012 ranked in descending order. 
3. For each variety a regression line that fits the data points best is estimated using 
OLS. Intercept and slope of this line are yield potential and degree of specificity for 
each variety. These measures are presented for the four varieties in Table 4.3 and 
Figure 4.3. 
Table 4. 3. Yield Levels of Four Canola Varieties at 23 Test Locations in 2012. 	  	   Varieties 
Location 5525 CL 5535 
CL 
VR 9560 
CL 
5440 
1 63 64 71 82 
2 63 59 70 73 
3 62 59 66 65 
4 62 56 64 64 
5 62 54 62 61 
6 61 53 58 61 
7 58 53 56 59 
8 57 50 56 57 
9 51 49 56 57 
10 49 48 55 56 
11 48 48 52 55 
12 46 45 51 53 
13 46 45 48 52 
14 45 41 47 49 
15 45 41 46 49 
16 40 40 44 43 
17 38 39 43 40 
18 38 38 41 39 
19 35 38 39 39 
20 34 30 37 37 
21 34 29 35 34 
22 34 27 34 32 
23 25 24 27 25 
Slope (degree of 
specificity) -1.7 -1.6 -1.7 -2 
Intercept (Yield 
Potential) 
67.9 63.6 71.3 75.2 
Source: Canola Council of Canada, Canola Performance Trials report, 2012, and author’s calculations.  
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It is important to point out that 𝜇! measures how fast yield of variety i drops from its 
highest to its lowest yielding location. As emphasized in Chapter 2, degree of specificity, 𝜇, is determined by the interaction of seed and land characteristics over a spectrum of 
locations, not the distance between those locations. By definition, degree of specificity 
shows whether a variety can be planted in many different locations or is very specific to a 
certain cluster of locations, regardless of the distance between the locations. Therefore, 
the effect of actual physical distance between the locations must not influence the degree 
of specificity. This is why, as shown in Figure 4.3, in estimation of 𝜇 the locations are 
assumed equally distanced for all varieties in all years.   
	  
Figure 4. 3. Yield Levels of Four Canola Varieties at 23 Test Locations in 2012. 
Source: Canola Council of Canada, Canola Performance Trials report, 2012, and author’s estimations.  
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is to add yield potential and degree of specificity of varieties as determinants of crop adoption. 
Results show that these two are important determinants of market shares of seed varieties.  
4.4.2. Regression model 
Simple pooled regressions have been used in most of the studies that estimate the adoption 
curves of seed varieties (Barkley and Porter, 1996; Covey, 2012; Dahl et al., 1999; Gambrell, 
2004). The implicit assumption in a pooled model is that variations in market shares of all the 
varieties follow a similar pattern. However, as shown in the UNIANOVA results in Table 4.1, 
different varieties behave differently at different locations and under different weather 
conditions. In other words, empirical evidence shows that there is something intrinsic to each 
variety that differentiates it from other varieties. One of the basic assumptions of the theoretical 
model presented in chapter 2 is that each variety in the market is differentiated from all the other 
varieties. Therefore, it is possible that different varieties have different adoption patterns. 
Barkley and Porter (1996), Covey (2012), Dahl et al. (1999), and Gambrell (2004) partially 
capture this differentiation by incorporating independent variables for seed characteristics in 
their models. However, it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate all of the 
differentiating characteristics, especially because some seed traits may be unobservable and/or 
non-quantifiable for econometricians. In such a case, the least squares estimator in the pooled 
regression omits the heterogeneity of varieties (i.e. cross-sections). Greene (2012, p350) suggests 
“omitting (or ignoring) the heterogeneity when the fixed effects model is appropriate renders the 
least squares estimator inconsistent—sometimes wildly so.” Assuming it were possible to 
observe, quantify, and incorporate all the differentiating characteristics of all the varieties, the 
model would still be likely to suffer from very low degree of freedom when time series are short.  
Therefore, instead of a pooled regression, this study uses a panel regression with varieties as 
fixed effects to take into account the fact that each variety is differentiated from all the other 
varieties. A poolability F-test is performed to show that the fixed effect panel regression is 
preferred to a pooled regression. The procedure and results of the poolability test are presented in 
Appendix C. With this innovation, the fact that all the varieties are differentiated from one 
another without running into low degree of freedom problem is incorporated. Results of both 
panel and pooled regressions are presented in Table 4.4 for comparison. Using a panel model 
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with variety fixed effects is another contribution of this study to the literature on adoption of seed 
varieties.  
The fixed effects model is also preferable to a random effects model because: 1. This study is 
concerned with a specific set of N varieties (Baltagi, 2005;p11); 2. The variety (fixed) effects are 
not assumed to be independent of the set of explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2005;p19). For 
example, variety (fixed) effects, which basically represent characteristics intrinsic to each 
variety, are very likely to have an effect on explanatory variables such as yield potential and 
degree of specificity.   
The following equation represents the fixed effects panel regression model that is estimated in 
this study:  
(4.1) 𝑌!" = 𝛼 + 𝑋!"𝛽 + 𝑢!"              𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,… ,𝑇    
with i denoting seed varieties, t denoting time, 𝑌!" representing market share of variety i in 
year t, and 𝑋!" representing the set of explanatory variables. 𝛼 is a scalar and 𝛽 is the set of 
parameters to be estimated (Baltagi, 2005;p11). Baltagi (2005; p11-12) defines the one-way error 
component 𝑢!" for the fixed effects model as follows:   
(4.2) 𝑢!" = 𝑍!𝜇! + 𝑣!"        
where 𝑍! is the set of individual (variety) dummies, 𝜇! is the set of fixed parameters to be 
estimated. These parameters denote the unobservable variety-specific effects. 𝑣!" captures the 
remainder stochastic disturbances. 𝑣!" is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎!!)  (Baltagi, 2005;p11-12). In this study, individual (variety) dummies capture 
observable and unobservable seed characteristic such as brand, technology, and traits. As 
mentioned earlier, previous studies such as those of Barkley and Porter (1996), Covey (2012), 
Dahl et al. (1999), and Gambrell (2004) partially capture the observable characteristics that are 
intrinsic to each variety by incorporating independent variables for seed characteristics in a 
pooled regression model.  
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Dependent variable 𝑌!" used in equation 4.2 is the share of variety i in the total area of canola 
in Saskatchewan/Manitoba in year t. This variable is in percentage and represented with Market 
Share in the estimation results.  
The set of explanatory variables 𝑋!" in equation 4.1 includes:  
1. Lagged degree of specificity (Lag Mu); 
2. Lagged yield potential (Lag YP); 
3. Number of months a variety has been in the market as polynomial of the third degree (T, 𝑇!, and 𝑇!).  
The logic behind selecting the above explanatory variables is provided below.  
Degree of specificity: As stated in proposition 4, as a variety becomes more specific its market 
share decreases, ceteris paribus. The impact of degree of specificity on market share has not 
been explored in the literature. Similar measures such as yield variance have been used in 
adoption models (Barkley and Porter, 1996). The theoretical framework in this study, however, 
shows that it is the combination of yield potential and degree of specificity that determine seed 
varieties’ market shares. This study argues that yield potential and degree of specificity, together, 
are likely to provide a more accurate measure of a variety’s performance over numerous 
locations than average and variance yield. The argument is based on the fact that average and 
variance (first and second moments) of yield do not provide a comprehensive measure of 
adaptability. Previous studies presume that a variety with higher yield variance level is less 
adaptable than one with the same average yield but lower variance. Here, a counterexample is 
provided to show how two varieties with very different degrees of adaptability may have the 
same average and variance yield. Assume canola variety A can be seeded in 10 locations while 
canola variety B can be seeded in 20 locations. This is simply because variety B is more 
adaptable. Also assume that each location is one acre. Figure 4.4 below shows varieties A and B 
with the same average and variance yield but different adaptability levels.  
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Figure 4. 4. Yield Levels of Four Canola Varieties at 23 Test Locations in 2012. 
Source: Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.4 above, based on measures of first and second moment one could come 
to the conclusion that varieties A and B are very much the same, regardless of the fact that 
variety A is less adaptable and can be used in only 10 locations and offers a total production of 
55 bushels in 10 locations while variety B is more adaptable, can be in 20 locations, and offers a 
total production of 110 bushels in 20 locations. That is, variance may fail to distinguish varieties 
with respect to their adaptability levels. However, measures of yield potential (i.e. intercept or 
yield at the top yielding location) and degree of specificity (i.e. slope or the degree by which a 
variety’s yield drops as area expands), not only provide a good proxy of how much total output 
each variety offers in a region but also are capable of distinguishing varieties with respect to their 
adaptability levels. In other words, variance can be a misleading measure of adaptability.   
In addition, it is shown in the Discussion section that degree of specificity can be used along 
with yield potential to measure gross revenue of a seed variety in a straightforward fashion.  
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This study assumes that farmers use previous year’s information to select their canola variety 
each year. Therefore, lagged degree of specificity of each variety is used as an explanatory 
variable. A negative sign for this variable is expected to confirm proposition 2.27  
In order to explore the importance of this new variable, absolute values of the degrees of 
specificities of different varieties are used in the regression model. However, regression analysis 
is also performed using relative values of degree of specificity. Procedures for calculation of 
relative degrees of specificity and regression results are presented in Appendix E.  
Yield potential: A variety’s yield is thought to have a key role in farmers’ adoption decisions. 
Relative yield has been repeatedly used in seed adoption models such as those of Barkley and 
Porter (1996), Covey (2012), Dahl et al. (1999), and Gambrell (2004). The theoretical model of 
this study, on the other hand, recognizes yield potential to be one of the most important 
determinants of a variety’s adoption. Also, as mentioned earlier, measures of yield potential (i.e. 
intercept or yield at the top yielding location) and degree of specificity (i.e. slope or the degree 
by which a variety’s yield drops as area expands) work together to provide a proxy of how much 
total output each variety offers in a region. Therefore, this study uses yield potential instead of 
actual yield in order to test the propositions from the theoretical model.  
It is also assumed that farmers use the yield potential information from the previous crop year 
to select their canola variety each year. Therefore, the regression analyses use lagged values of 
yield potential and relative yield potential instead of current values.  
In order to explore the importance of this new variable absolute values of the yield potential 
are used in the regression model. Nevertheless, regression analysis is also performed using 
relative yield potential levels. Procedures for calculation of relative Yield Potential and 
regression results are presented in Appendix E.  
Varieties’ age: Many studies have recognized the length of time that a variety has been in the 
market to be an important determinant of the variety’s market share (Covey, 2012; Dahl et al., 
1999; Gambrell, 2004). More importantly, age of a variety is an important determinant of which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Note that variety trial reports were not published in 2010 for Saskatchewan. It is assumed that in 2011 
Saskatchewan farmers looked at the 2009 trial results.  
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stage of its life cycle the variety is at. Following the previous studies (Covey, 2012; Dahl et al., 
1999; Gambrell, 2004) a polynomial of the third degree is used to capture the effect of age on a 
variety’s life cycle.  
There are a number of explanatory variables used in the previous studies that are not fitted in 
this study’s set of independent variables. These variables include number of available varieties, 
dummies for producers of seed varieties, and seed varieties’ prices. There have not been many 
variations in the number of available varieties in the study period so this variable is not used in 
the regression models. The variety fixed effect dummies can capture the effect of dummies for 
producers of seed varieties. As a result, the attempt to include dummy variables for important 
seed producers including Bayer, Monsanto, Pioneer, and Dow resulted in perfect 
multicollinearity. Nevertheless, effect of these variables on the dependent variable is estimated in 
a panel model with no cross-section fixed effects. Results of the estimations, which are presented 
in Appendix F, indicate that the dummy for Bayer has a positive and statistically significant sign.  
As for seed varieties price, the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 endogenizes the 
effect of seed prices on market share in exogenous variables. As shown in equation 10 of chapter 
2, variety prices are a function of exogenous variables including yield potential levels and degree 
of specificity. Equation 11 in chapter 2 shows that equilibrium market share for each variety is a 
function of the same set of exogenous variables. As such, it is redundant to include the variety 
seed prices variable in a regression model that estimates market shares of seed varieties and 
already includes yield potential levels and degree of specificity as explanatory variables. More 
importantly, in the seed industry market share of a variety may affect its price (e.g. a successful 
variety may be priced higher). In such a case including seed prices in the set of explanatory 
variables introduces endogeneity.  
Effect of the degree of specificity on length of product cycles is another interesting issue that 
has not been explored in this study. It is not possible to use the interaction of the degree of 
specificity and variety’s age as an explanatory variable. This is because in each year the variable 
variety’s age represents how many months a variety has been in the market for up to the start of 
the crop season of that year. Therefore, the two variables are completely independent. In order to 
explore the effect of degree of specificity on the length of product cycles one needs to regress the 
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total number of years that varieties have been in the market on the degrees of specificity and 
other exogenous variables. For this purpose only those varieties that have completed their life 
cycles can be used. Also, for each variety there will be only one observation. To do such an 
analysis even the Manitoba dataset with 42 varieties is reduced in size to only 22 available 
observations. This sample size is not large enough to include all the relevant explanatory 
variables in the regression model. Moreover, one needs to use the average of the variety’s 
degrees of specificity over their life cycles. This makes the interpretation of the results difficult. 
4.4.3. Descriptive Statics 
The Saskatchewan data set includes years 2007 to 2012. The 17 varieties (cross-sections) with at 
least two years of data are used from the Variety Performance Trial Report. The dataset has 102 
potential observations. However, a trial report was not issued in 2010. It is assumed that 
Saskatchewan farmers used the information in 2009 Trial Reports for the 2011 crop year. Also, 
there is no data for some varieties in the 2011 and 2012 Variety Performance Trial Reports. After 
adjustments for the missing observations and lags the estimations are run as unbalanced panel 
with 72 observations.  
The Manitoba dataset is for the 2004-2013 period with 42 varieties (cross-sections). 
Therefore, this dataset has 420 potential observations. After adjustments for only one missing 
observation and lags the estimations are run as unbalanced panel with 377 observations.  
Descriptive statics of the variables used in the regression model are presented in Table 4.4. 
Average yield potential levels are higher in Saskatchewan as they are the trial report results, 
whereas yield potential levels in Manitoba are realized farm level yield levels. Similarly, average 
degree of specificity levels are higher in Saskatchewan as Saskatchewan data in limited to test 
locations. Average variety age increases from 6 months to 51 months in Saskatchewan in the 
study period. This variable ranges between 24 and 42 months in Manitoba. Area ranges from 
110000 acres to 152000 acres in Saskatchewan. In Manitoba, this variable ranges between 
120000 and 192000 acres.  
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Table 4. 4. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables.  
Variables Year SK MB Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Yield Potential (bushels/acre) 
2004 - - 45.60 5.34 
2005 - - 45.06 4.71 
2006 - - 44.33 2.91 
2007 80.40 7.28 36.94 2.71 
2008 106.84 6.68 50.29 2.67 
2009 93.65 19.49 51.86 3.13 
2010 95.51 19.38 49.65 4.30 
2011 93.33 4.49 40.89 3.28 
2012 71.64 5.70 37.27 1.70 
2013 
  
54.85 3.29 
Area (acre) 
2004 - - 163484 80558 
2005 - - 148294 96277 
2006 - - 120070 134184 
2007 - - 157330 170368 
2008 121258 152072 181484 123143 
2009 152006 204937 160727 213612 
2010 110659 187371 169306 244987 
2011 137490 219054 137388 223642 
2012 130063 261172 192182 254549 
2013 - - 161979 166001 
Variety's Age (month) 
2004 - - 28 18 
2005 - - 37 18 
2006 - - 42 22 
2007 6 14 33 18 
2008 21 21 39 22 
2009 29 20 34 24 
2010 32 24 34 22 
2011 41 26 32 25 
2012 51 26 24 17 
2013 - - 29 16 
Degree of specificity 
2004 - - 0.41 0.14 
2005 - - 0.71 0.30 
2006 - - 0.56 0.30 
2007 1.68 0.14 0.44 0.31 
2008 2.96 0.19 0.44 0.38 
2009 2.25 0.36 0.47 0.17 
2010 2.26 0.43 0.82 0.38 
2011 2.17 0.13 0.88 0.52 
2012 1.89 0.25 0.53 0.34 
2013 - - 0.64 0.41 
Source: Prairie Canola Variety Trials (2007-2009), Canola Performance Trials (2011-12, Manitoba Agricultural 
Services Corporation, Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation, Canola Council of Canada, and author’s 
calculations. 
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4.4.4. Estimation results 
Estimation results are reported in Table 4.5. The model is estimated using Panel Estimated 
Generalized Least Square (EGLS) with cross-section weights for varieties. Differential effect of 
varieties on market shares creates heteroskedasticity. This issue is resolved using the EGLS 
method developed by Roy (2002) and a White cross-section standard errors and covariance 
matrix. 28 
The regression model is set up such that it allows for a variety’s age to affect the variety’s 
market share. This is common in the literature. The purpose is to find the shape of the product 
cycles. However, one may argue that a higher (lower) market share may result in an increase 
(decrease) in a variety’s age as successful varieties may be kept in the market longer than 
unsuccessful varieties. This could potentially result in an endogeneity problem. However, the 
length of the time a variety is in the market is at least to some extent determined by the seed 
producer, independent of the success of the variety. That is, when a variety is introduced the seed 
producer keeps the variety keeps the variety in the market for a number of years, regardless of 
the variety’s success. Also, as shown in Chapter 3, length of the product cycles and market 
shares are both determined by yield potential and degree of specificity. Therefore, it is more 
likely that length of the product cycles is determined by yield potential and degree of specificity 
rather than market shares. Nevertheless, it is still possible that in the case of exceptionally 
successful varieties such as InVigor 5440 really high market share has influenced the seed 
producers’ decision and, thus, caused a lengthening of the product cycle. However, in the 
datasets that are used in this study the only varieties with exceptionally long product cycles are 
1841 with a seven-year life cycle and 5440, which is still in the market. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that the variable variety’s age causes endogeneity in the regression model.   
The panel regressions for both Manitoba and Saskatchewan offer a much higher explanatory 
power compared to the pooled regressions presented in Appendix D and also compared to those 
of Barkley and Porter (1996) (80 percent), Covey (2012) (31 percent), Dahl et al. (1999) (49 
percent), and Gambrell (2004) (81 percent). As shown in Table 4.5, the independent variables in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For more information about EGLS and other methods of dealing with heteroskedasticity in panel models please 
see Baltagi (2005, p 81-82).  
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the panel regression models with variety fixed effects explain 91 and 89 percent of the variations 
in market share of canola seed varieties in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, respectively.  
The panel regressions also provide plausible signs and high significance level for the 
regressors. All the independent variables in both regression models have plausible signs. Also, 
all of the explanatory variables except 𝑇! in the Saskatchewan model are statistically significant 
at 0.1 percent or 1 percent significance level.  
Number of months a variety has been in the market is another important determinant of a 
variety’s adoption curve. Each variety goes through both adoption and disadoption phases 
implying a hill-shaped adoption curve. The literature suggests a polynomial of the third degree 
for this variable (Barkley and Porter, 1996; Covey, 2012; Dahl et al.,1999; Gambrell, 2004). As 
shown in Table 4.5, for Saskatchewan the linear and the quadratic terms of this variable are 
statistically significant with positive and negative signs, respectively. The cubic term, however, 
is estimated to be insignificant in this study. This is not unexpected considering the shape of 
canola seed varieties’ life cycles in Saskatchewan and short time series (2007 to 2012) in the 
Saskatchewan dataset. 29 This indicates a concave or hill-shaped adoption curve, which means a 
variety’s market share has an increasing trend upon entrance but after a certain point it starts to 
fall. That is consistent with theory and literature on adoption curves. For Manitoba, the linear, 
the quadratic, and the cubic terms are significant at 0.1 percent level and have plausible signs. 
Considering the length of the time series in the Manitoba dataset (from 2004 to 2013) a 
polynomial of the third degree is justifiable. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the parameters on 
the linear, the quadratic, and the cubic terms are very close for Manitoba and Saskatchewan.  
As stated in proposition 4, as a variety becomes more specific its market share decreases. The 
negative sign for Lag Mu for both Manitoba and Saskatchewan in Table 4.5 confirms the validity 
of proposition 4. Magnitude of the parameter estimated for this variable is -0.0358 for Manitoba 
and -0.0086 for Saskatchewan. The difference in the magnitude of the parameter for the two 
provinces could be attributed to the fact that degree of specificity for Manitoba is estimated using 
actual yield data while for Saskatchewan the yield data is obtained from Variety Trial Reports. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For example, adoption curve of InVigor 5440 presented in Figure 4.5 resembles a polynomial of the second 
degree rather than a third degree.  
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This implies that farmers are likely to give more weight to actual yield information than 
information presented in Variety Trial Reports when making adoption decisions. The Lag Mu 
parameter for Manitoba means that 1 unit increase in degree of specificity of a variety decreases 
its market share by 3.6 percent. 
Table 4. 5. Estimation results for Manitoba and Saskatchewan. 
Province Manitoba Saskatchewan 
Dependent Variable: Market share (%) Market share (%) 
 Estimation Method: Panel (EGLS) Panel (EGLS) 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
Standard  
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.0078 0.0006*** 0.0448 0.0011*** 
T 0.0038 0.0002*** 0.0035 0.0005*** 
T2 -0.0001 0.00001*** -0.0001 0.00002*** 
T3 0.0000005 0.0000001*** 0.0000003 0.0000002 
Lag Mu -0.0358 0.0129*** -0.0086 0.0024*** 
Lag YP 0.0009 0.0003*** 0.0003 0.0001** 
R-squared 0.83 
 
0.89 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.80 
 
0.85 
 F-Statistic 35.75*** 
 
19.52*** 
 Number of Cross-Sections: 42 
 
17 
 Number of Periods: 9 
 
5 
 Observations after adjustment: 377 
 
72 
 Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the10% (*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels.  
Farmers are likely to look at yield potential of a variety when deciding which varieties of 
canola to grow. As shown in Table 4.5, lag of yield potential  (Lag YP) is highly significant with 
a positive sign for both Manitoba and Saskatchewan models. Similar to the degree of specificity, 
however, magnitude of the parameter on this variable is larger for Manitoba than Saskatchewan. 
Similar to the parameters of degree of specificity explained above, this could be attributed to the 
fact that yield potential for Manitoba is estimated using actual yield data while for Saskatchewan 
the yield data is obtained from trial reports, implying that farmers’ adoption decisions are likely 
to be more influenced by actual yield information than information presented in the trial reports. 
The estimated parameters for Lag YP for Manitoba suggests that 1 bushel increase in a 
variety’s yield potential per acre results in 0.09 percent increase in its market share. For 
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Saskatchewan, 1 bushel increase in a variety’s reported yield potential per acre results in 0.03 
percent increase in its market share.  
Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEDV) is reported in Table 4.6. These time invariant 
fixed or individual effects represent the effect of variety characteristics that are not included in 
the set of explanatory variables.  
As shown in Table 4.6, the fixed effects vary from -7.2 percent to 20.5 percent in 
Saskatchewan and from -1.9 to 14.8 percent in Manitoba. This highlights the importance of 
heterogeneity of varieties in the canola seed industry. Also, some of the successful varieties such 
as 5440, 5020, and 5030 have very high fixed effects compared to other varieties in both 
provinces. This stresses the role of variety characteristics that are not included in the set of 
explanatory variables in market share of these varieties. Such characteristics may include oil 
profile, lodging quality, and the technology intrinsic to each category of seed. 
The t-test results presented in the bottom part of Table 4.6 reveal that Liberty Link varieties 
with InVigor technology such as 5440, 5020, and 5030 have significantly higher fixed effects 
than Roundup Ready varieties in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. This provides more insight into 
the success of the varieties with InVigor technology. Further discussion on why some varieties 
have been more successful than others is provided in the next section. 
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Table 4. 6. Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition for Variety Effects on Market Shares. 
Province Manitoba Saskatchewan 
Dependent 
Variable: Market share (%) Market share (%) 
 Estimation 
Method: Panel (EGLS) Panel (EGLS) 
Seed Technology Variety Effect Variety Effect Variety Effect 
Liberty Link(LL) 
5440  0.148 L120 -0.012 5440  0.198 
5020  0.056 L154 -0.009 5020  0.205 
5030  0.062 L159 -0.008 5030  0.156 
8440 -0.002 5070  0.049 8440  0.006 
5770 -0.002 5108 -0.009 5770 -0.051 
L130  0.019 1145 -0.012 L130 -0.015 
L150  0.039 2573 -0.007 L150  0.009 
9590 -0.014 2663 -0.008     
Roundup 
Ready(RR) 
9553 -0.019 V1030 -0.011 9553 -0.040 
45H28 -0.014 V1037 -0.015 45H28 -0.026 
1012  0.012 v2045 -0.010 4414 -0.072 
6060 -0.015 45H21 -0.002 997RR -0.067 
71-45 -0.008 45H25 -0.012 6040 -0.051 
72-55 -0.014 45H26 -0.016 45H73 -0.038 
72-65 -0.014 45H29 -0.015 43 E 01 -0.063 
73-45 -0.018 34-55 -0.002 D3151  -0.063 
73-65 -0.008 34-65 -0.017 
  73-75 -0.005 9550 -0.015 
  1841 -0.012 NX4 105 -0.019     
Clearfield(CF) 
2012CL -0.011 46H75 (ST) -0.012 5525 -0.065 
NEX 845CL -0.008 	  	   	  	   5535 -0.060 
Averages 
Manitoba Saskatchewan 
LL RR CF LL RR CF 
-0.008 -0.012 -0.010 0.072 -0.053 -0.063 
T-Test Probability 
LL-RR 0.021**  LL-RR 0.023**  
LL-CF 0.281  LL-CF 0.017**  
RR-CF 0.243  RR-CF 0.159  
Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the10% (*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels.  
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4.5. Discussion 
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 determines yield potential and degree of 
specificity of seed varieties have an important role in adoption pattern. These findings are proven 
algebraically in Chapter 2 and via numerical simulations in Chapter 3. This chapter empirically 
tested the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on market shares of canola seed 
varieties in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Estimations show that higher yield potential results in 
higher market share and higher degree of specificity results in lower market share for Canadian 
canola seed varieties.  
These findings reveal at least two interesting facts about the industry. First, looking at the 
combination of yield potential and degree of specificity of canola seed varieties, it is now clear 
why some varieties such as InVigor 5440 are more successful than other varieties. Second, seed 
industries’ recent attempts to introduce bundled traits can be attributed to lower degree of 
specificity which results in higher market share for varieties with bundled traits. 
An examination of InVigor 5440 provides further empirical evidence on the importance of 
yield potential and degree of specificity in success of a variety. InVigor 5440 was released in 
2007 and has been one of the most successful varieties ever since. Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 show 
the acreage of the top canola seed varieties in Saskatchewan. As shown in the figure and the 
graph below, InVigor 5440 has significantly higher acreage compared to other top varieties. This 
variety has been very successful in Manitoba as well. This raises the question as to why InVigor 
5440 is more successful than other canola varieties.  
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Table 4. 7. Area under Cultivation and Release Year of Main Canola Varieties in 
Saskatchewan 2008-2012.  
Variety Release year 
Area under cultivation in Saskatchewan (acres) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
5020 INVIGOR 2003 444,318 249,017 116,731 41,641 5,914 857,621 
5030 INVIGOR 2003 255,266 174,638 81,631 68,391 18,238 598,164 
5440 INVIGOR 2007 196,302 708,076 747,316 882,899 537,337 3,071,930 
8440 INVIGOR 2007 119,407 192,487 202,130 135,744 13,969 663,737 
9553 2008 1,625 88,342 116,093 132,076 37,248 375,384 
L130 2010 
   
239,465 541,241 780,706 
L150 2010       339,703 889,087 1,228,790 
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation. 
 
	  
Figure 4. 5. Market Shares (%) of Main Canola Varieties in Saskatchewan 2008-2012. 
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation. 
Success of InVigor 5440, to a great extent, can be attributed to its high yield potential and low 
degree of specificity. As shown in Equation 4 of Chapter 2, gross revenue from variety i is a 
function of its yield potential and degree of specificity as follows:  
(4.3) Gross revenue of variety i= 𝑃 𝑦! − 𝜇!𝑋! 𝑑𝑋!!!      
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where P is output price, 𝑦!, 𝜇!, and 𝑋! are yield potential, degree of specificity, and area of 
variety i , respectively. Assuming 𝑃 = 1 and 𝑋! = 1  for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛 we have:  
(4.4) Gross revenue of variety i= 𝑦! − 𝜇𝑖2       
Using this simple equation gross revenue of all canola varieties is calculated for 2007-2012. 
Table 4.8 shows Saskatchewan’s top-three canola seed varieties for 2007-2012 in terms of their 
gross revenue calculated using equation 4.4. As shown in Table 4.8, InVigor 5440 has the 
highest gross revenue in 3 out of 5 years. In two out of five years 5440 is the second-best variety 
in terms of gross revenue. Comparing 5440 with 5770 and other canola varieties shows other 
varieties do not offer such consistently high gross revenues as 5440. Precisely, InVigor 5440 
offers consistently high gross revenue under various weather and location effects. This reveals 
why 5440 has been more successful than other canola seed varieties in terms of market share. 
Consistently high yield potential and low degree of specificity of 5440 under various weather 
and location effects that results in high gross revenue draws farmers’ demand.   
Table 4. 8. Top Canola Varieties in Saskatchewan, 2007-2012.  
Rank Top Varieties 
2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 
First 5440(86.97)* 5440(113.34) 5770(108.73) 5440(95.87) L150(76.36) 
Second 5030(86.95) 8440(111.33) 5440(107.21) L150(95.55) 5440(74.23) 
Third 8440(81.24) 5030(110.56) 6040(103.89) L130(92.82) L130(72.95) 
Note: *Numbers in the parentheses show average gross revenue ($/acre) calculated using equation 4.4.   
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that yield potential and degree of specificity cannot solely 
explain consistently high market shares. As mentioned before, there are observable and 
unobservable characteristics intrinsic to each variety that differentiate it from other varieties. 
These characteristics have an important role in each variety’s gross revenue and market share. As 
shown in Table 4.6, successful varieties such as 5440, 5020, and 5030 also have very high fixed 
or time invariant effects compared to other varieties. For example, the fixed effect for 5440 
suggests that on average characteristics intrinsic to this variety that are not included in the 
regression models, improve its average market share by 19.8 percent in Saskatchewan and 14.8 
percent in Manitoba compared to the average of all the existing varieties, ceteris paribus.   
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4.6. Conclusion 
Chapter 2 introduced a new theoretical model that explains the incentives to create new 
characteristics for new production inputs. Some properties of the model were shown in 
propositions and their algebraic proof. These propositions were further investigated through 
numerical simulations in chapter 3. The current chapter uses data from the Canadian canola 
industry to empirically test the propositions discussed in chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter 
provides empirical evidence on the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on demand 
and price of seed varieties. In addition, this chapter provides empirical evidence as to why it is 
important to incorporate both seed and location characteristics when constructing a demand 
model for the seed industry. 
Exploring the information from Canola Performance Trial Reports and Prairie Canola Variety 
Trials Test Results reveals that variations in yield levels of different varieties at different 
locations in different years can be attributed to variety, location, and weather (year) effects. It is 
shown through UNIANOVA that effect of weather on variety yield, to a great extent, occurs 
through locations. This further stresses the importance of incorporating both variety and location 
effects when constructing a demand model for a seed industry.  
Using a panel model with variety fixed effects to capture the observable and unobservable 
seed characteristics that are not included in the set of explanatory variables is one of the 
contributions of this study to the literature on adoption of seed varieties. Another contribution of 
this study is to test the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on market share of seed 
varieties. Results of the fixed effects panel regressions confirm proposition 2; as a variety 
becomes more specific its market share decreases. It is also shown that degree of specificity is a 
good measure of adaptability for seed varieties as it provides high explanatory power in the 
regression models and also can be used to make direct economic interpretation since it is easily 
translatable to measures of gross revenue. It is also shown that higher yield potential levels result 
in proportionately higher adoption rates. Moreover, the role of observable and unobservable seed 
characteristics that are not included in the set of explanatory variables is not negligible. These 
empirical results further stress the role of degree of specificity, yield potential, and other 
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observable and unobservable characteristics such as the technology embodied in each type of 
seed in adoption of new and existing seed varieties.  
These findings reveal at least two interesting facts about the industry. First, looking at the 
combination of yield potential and degree of specificity of canola seed varieties, it is now clear 
why some varieties such as InVigor 5440 are more successful than other varieties. InVigor 5440 
offers consistently high gross revenue under various weather and location effects. This reveals 
why 5440 has been more successful than other canola seed varieties in terms of market share. 
Consistently high yield potential and low degree of specificity of 5440 under various weather 
and location effects, that result in high gross revenue, draws farmers’ demand. Second, seed 
industries’ recent attempts to introduce bundled traits can be attributed to lower degree of 
specificity which results in higher market share for varieties with bundled traits. 
This study does not test the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on seed prices. 
However, since both equilibrium price and market share equations in the theoretical model are 
obtained from the same profit maximization problem, estimation results from the market share 
regression model in this chapter can be generalized to argue that higher yield potential levels and 
higher degrees of specificity result in higher prices. Nevertheless, an empirical estimation of the 
effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on seed prices is suggested for future studies. 
This will provide more insight into the relative importance of different variables in seed pricing.  
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Appendix 4.A: Area of Canola Seed Varieties in Saskatchewan 2008-2012. 
 
Table 4.A1. Area of Canola Seed Varieties in Saskatchewan 2008-2012. 
 
Area (acre) 
Variety 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1818 26,004 36,202 32,080 30,751 6,180 
1918   
  
6,008 10,222 
1990 CANTERRA   
   
30,289 
1970   
  
13,715 23,835 
3151 D   18,393 50,837 55,750 11,497 
3153 D   
   
45,498 
34-65 45,320 47,818 28,987 16,494 8,708 
43 E 01   3,474 5,941 16,612 8,180 
4414 RR 16,482 6,810 12,409 12,577 5,501 
45H28 4,559 183,896 171,884 49,722 10,857 
45H29   
 
43,840 295,612 255,610 
45H31   
   
56,716 
45H73 37,797 30,669 26,943 18,970 15,746 
45H75   
   
9,602 
45S52   
  
22,646 81,545 
45S53   
   
8,259 
46A76 23,088 21,479 9,736 11,065 10,327 
46H75   
   
15,025 
46S53   
   
17,428 
500 VT   
  
89,508 200,507 
5020 INVIGOR 444,318 249,017 116,731 41,641 5,914 
5030 INVIGOR 255,266 174,638 81,631 68,391 18,238 
5440 INVIGOR 196,302 708,076 747,316 882,899 537,337 
5525 CL   
 
15,455 36,732 25,466 
5535 CL   
   
10,023 
5770 INVIGOR   
 
92,618 139,695 56,785 
6020   
   
7,510 
6040   
 
6,228 16,323 12,610 
6060   
  
29,182 102,755 
72-65   9,588 104,302 159,661 75,578 
73-15 RR   
   
9,113 
73-45   
 
4,610 141,728 237,411 
73-55   
 
3,583 39,032 24,584 
73-65   
 
2,775 26,452 6,440 
73-75 RR   
   
75,033 
8440 INVIGOR 119,407 192,487 202,130 135,744 13,969 
94H04   
   
8,976 
9553 1,625 88,342 116,093 132,076 37,248 
9557S   
 
2,686 10,736 5,956 
9559 PROVEN VR   
   
52,148 
9560 CL   
   
19,039 
9590 140,388 137,067 124,828 42,304 10,435 
997 RR 15,562 16,263 13,664 13,533 11,376 
BARRIER VT   
  
42,172 26,975 
L120   
   
87,285 
L130   
  
239,465 541,241 
L150   
  
339,703 889,087 
L154   
   
20,397 
L159   
   
22,383 
REMARKABLE VT   
  
53,035 36,789 
TOTAL 1,326,118 1,924,219 2,017,307 3,229,934 3,819,633 
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation. 
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Appendix 4.B: Descriptive Statics 
Table 4.B1. Number of Varieties and Trials across the Prairies, 2007- 2012. 
Year Total Number of Varieties Number of Trials  
2007 47 33 
2008 40 27 
2009 37 32 
2010 Data Unavailable Data Unavailable 
2011 25 23 
2012 24 23 
Source: Prairie Canola Variety Trials (2007-2009), Canola Performance Trials (2011-12). 
 
Table 4.B2. Number of Years, Varieties, and Potential Observations in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan Datasets. 
  Saskatchewan Manitoba 
Years 2007-2012 2004-2013 
Varieties with Consistent Data 17 42 
Number of Potential Observations 102 420 
Source: Prairie Canola Variety Trials (2007-2009), Canola Performance Trials (2011-12), Manitoba Agricultural 
Services Corporation, and author’s calculations.  
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Appendix 4.C: Poolability test 
Greene (2012, p363) proposes the following F-test for poolability a data. Under the null 
hypothesis constant terms for all the cross-sections are equal and pooled least squares is the 
preferred regression model. The test statistic is as follows: 
𝐹 𝑛 − 1,𝑛𝑇− 𝑛 − 𝐾 = (𝑅!"#$! − 𝑅!""#$%! ) (𝑛 − 1)(1− 𝑅!"#$! ) (𝑛𝑇 − 𝑛 − 𝐾) 
where 𝑅!"#$!  is the R-squared from the panel regression with dummies for fixed effects, 𝑅!""#$%!  is the R-squared from the pooled regression, n is the number of cross-sections, T is the 
number years for each cross-section, and K is the number of explanatory variables not including 
the dummies in the panel regression.  
Using the R-squared measures from the panel regressions reported in Table 4.4 and the pooled 
regressions presented in Table 4.D1 in Appendix 4.D, the F ratios for the two provinces are 
calculated as follows: 
Saskatchewan:   𝐹 16,62 = (!.!"!!.!")/(!"!!)(!!!.!")/(!"×!!!"!!) = 23.25 
Manitoba:    𝐹 41,330 = (!.!"!!.!")/(!"!!)(!!!.!")/(!×!"!!"!!) = 18.94 
The critical value for 𝐹 16,62,𝛼 = 0.05  is 1.81 suggesting that the null hypothesis is 
rejected for Saskatchewan model. Similarly, for Manitoba, the critical value for 𝐹 41,330,𝛼 =0.05  is 1.43 rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, the panel model is preferred to the pooled 
model in both provinces. It is worth noting that the large F ratio is mainly attributable to the 
large gap between the explanatory power of the panel regression and the pooled regression 
models suggesting that heterogeneity of cross-sections (varieties) plays a key role in explaining 
the within and between variations of canola seed varieties’ adoption.  
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Appendix 4.D: Pooled Regression Results 
Following table shows the results of the pooled regression models. This is for the purpose of 
comparison with Fixed Effects Panel models presented in Table 4.4. Pooled regressions provide 
much lower explanatory power compared to the Fixed Effects Panel models presented in Table 
4.4 in both Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In addition, number of statistically significant variables 
and levels of significance seem to be higher in the Fixed Effects models compared to the pooled 
models.  
Table 4.D1. Pooled Regression Results for Manitoba and Saskatchewan. 
Province Manitoba Saskatchewan 
Dependent Variable: Market share (%) Market share (%) 
 Estimation Method: Pooled Pooled 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
Standard Error 
(White) Coefficient 
Standard Error 
(White) 
Constant 0.0001 0.0009 0.0054 0.0071 
T 0.0042 0.0007*** -0.0011 0.0015 
T2 -0.00009 0.00003*** 0.00008 0.0000006 
T3 0.0000005 0.0000002** -0.0000008 0.0000005 
Lag Mu -0.089 0.013*** -0.0538 0.0217* 
Lag YP 0.002 0.0003*** 0.0019 0.0006** 
R-squared 0.47 
 
0.23 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.46 
 
0.18 
 F-Statistic 65.83*** 
 
4.04** 
 Number of Cross-Sections: 42 
 
17 
 Number of Periods: 9 
 
5 
 Observations after adjustment: 378 
 
72 
 Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the10% (*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels.  
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Appendix 4.E: Estimation Results with Relative Yield Potential  
Table 4.E1 shows the results of the regression models when Relative Yield Potential is used 
instead of absolute values of Yield Potential as explanatory variables. Relative Yield Potential is 
the ratio of a variety’s yield potential to the highest yield potential level in that year.  
As shown in Table 4.E1, all the explanatory variables have plausible signs when relative 
values of Yield Potential is used. However, Relative Mu is not statistically significant for 
Saskatchewan. This may be due to small number of observations and limited variations in the 
Saskatchewan dataset. The estimation results indicate that when a variety becomes more specific 
relative to other varieties it obtains lower market share, ceteris paribus. Similarly, when a variety 
has higher yield potential relative to other varieties it receives higher market share, ceteris 
paribus.  
Table 4.E1. Estimation Results with Relative Yield Potential. 
Province Manitoba Saskatchewan 
Dependent Variable: Market share (%) Market share (%) 
 Estimation Method: Panel (EGLS) Panel (EGLS) 
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.009 0.0006*** 0.0432 0.0009*** 
T 0.0029 0.0002*** 0.0039 0.0003*** 
T2 -0.00006 0.00001*** -0.0001 0.00002*** 
T3 0.0000002 0.0000001 0.0000003 0.0000002* 
Lag Relative Mu -0.039 0.0103** -0.0023 0.0015 
Lag Relative YP 0.036 0.0086*** 0.0152 0.0045*** 
R-squared 0.75  0.89 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.72  0.84 
 F-Statistic 21.85***  9.73*** 
 Number of Cross-Sections: 42 
 
17 
 Number of Periods: 9 
 
5 
 Observations after 
adjustment: 378 
 
85 
 Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the10% (*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels.  	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Appendix 4.F: Effect of Dummies for seed producers 
Although the fixed effects in the estimated panel model capture the effect of seed producers’ 
on the dependent variable, this appendix explores the effect of dummies for seed producers on 
market share of seed varieties. The model presented below is a panel regression similar to the 
one presented in Table 4.4 except for the fact that cross section fixed effect are dropped from the 
model in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity with seed producers’ dummies.  
Table 4.F1. Effect of Dummies for Seed Producers in a Panel Model with no Cross-Section Fixed 
Effects.  
Province Manitoba 
Dependent Variable: Market share (%) 
 Estimation Method: Panel Least Squares 
Independent Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant -0.0082 0.0020*** 
T 0.0043 0.0007*** 
T2 -0.0001 0.00003*** 
T3 0.0000004 0.0000002* 
Lag Mu 0.0790 0.0132*** 
Lag YP 0.0018 0.00035*** 
Monsanto 0.0002 0.0019 
Bayer 0.0240 0.0032*** 
Pioneer -0.0032 0.0022 
Dow 0.0052 0.0063 
R-squared 0.50  
Adjusted R-squared 0.49  
F-Statistic 41.83***  
Number of Cross-Sections: 42 
 Number of Periods: 9 
 Observations after adjustment: 377 
 Source: Author’s estimation.  
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the10% (*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels.  
The model includes dummies for Monsanto, Bayer, Pioneer, and Dow. Other smaller seed 
companies including Agripogress, DL Seeds, and Cargill are categorized as “others” and 
dropped from the set of explanatory variables to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
The parameter estimated for Bayer is statistically significant and has a positive sign. This 
implies that farmers are more likely to buy their seed from Bayer than any other seed producer.  
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Appendix 4.G: Manitoba Dataset 
Table 4.G.1. Manitoba Dataset: Degree of Specificity (mu).  
 
 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.22 0.39 0.23 0.19 0.23 
5030 0.00 0.60 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.56 0.81 0.00 0.00 
5020 0.42 0.62 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5070 0.45 0.47 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5770 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.00 
8440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.36 0.58 0.82 0.00 0.00 
5108 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9590 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.33 0.54 0.91 2.02 0.00 0.00 
34-55 0.29 0.54 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
34-65 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.35 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2573 0.28 0.76 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2663 0.36 0.95 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
35-85 0.68 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1841 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.57 0.56 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9553 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.65 1.13 0.00 0.00 
9550 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1145 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.85 0.00 
L120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.84 
L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.20 0.24 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.19 0.32 
L154 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.31 
L159 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 
1012RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.32 
71-45RR 0.00 0.00 1.03 0.20 0.19 0.29 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
73-45RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.47 0.85 
72-55RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6060RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 1.42 
73-75RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.32 
73-65RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00 0.00 
45H21 0.28 0.52 0.35 0.43 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.56 0.37 0.50 
45H28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
46H75 (ST) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.49 
2012CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.31 0.72 
NEX 845CL  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 0.28 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
72-65 (RT) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.99 1.26 0.00 
NX4 105 RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.62 1.19 0.00 0.00 
V1037 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V1030 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V2045 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 
Source: Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation and author’s calculations.  
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Table 4.G.2. Manitoba Dataset: Market share (%).  
Variety 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.22 0.23 
5030 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 
5020 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5070 0.09 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5770 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.00 
8440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.00 
5108 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9590 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
34-55 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
34-65 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2573 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2663 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
35-85 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1841 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9553 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
9550 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1145 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
L120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.19 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.32 0.11 
L154 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 
L159 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
1012RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.17 
71-45RR 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
73-45RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 
72-55RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6060RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
73-75RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 
73-65RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
45H21 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 
45H28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
46H75 (ST) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
2012CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 
NEX 845CL  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
72-65 (RT) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 
NX4 105 RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
V1037 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V1030 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V2045 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Source: Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation and author’s calculations.  
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Table 4.G.3. Manitoba Dataset: Yield Potential (bushels/acre).  
Variety 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.80 55.26 52.35 40.05 37.52 57.86 
5030 0.00 49.66 47.34 39.50 52.21 54.61 48.44 41.80 0.00 0.00 
5020 52.09 48.18 46.70 38.61 50.84 54.26 51.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5070 52.43 49.33 46.01 39.90 52.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5770 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.91 41.51 36.79 0.00 
8440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.58 56.14 54.01 43.66 0.00 0.00 
5108 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9590 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.92 51.17 53.76 51.03 42.44 0.00 0.00 
34-55 41.08 41.55 41.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
34-65 0.00 0.00 45.36 34.17 46.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2573 47.56 48.00 42.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2663 47.11 47.51 44.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
35-85 43.86 42.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1841 0.00 0.00 46.46 38.01 48.62 47.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9553 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.65 45.25 39.69 0.00 0.00 
9550 36.74 35.46 38.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1145 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.21 0.00 38.12 0.00 
L120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.23 57.89 
L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.40 37.82 56.31 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.57 36.11 57.95 
L154 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.39 56.94 
L159 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.88 
1012RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.98 53.82 
71-45RR 0.00 0.00 46.90 35.81 46.72 49.32 43.16 0.00 
 
0.00 
73-45RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.67 36.30 49.54 
72-55RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.28 44.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6060RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.82 57.21 
73-75RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.88 53.22 
73-65RR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.68 0.00 0.00 
45H21 43.91 42.96 43.13 38.06 50.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.49 42.34 39.08 54.64 
45H28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.47 48.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.62 52.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45H25 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
46H75 
(ST) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 57.47 
2012CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.38 35.56 51.25 
NEX 
845CL  
0.00 0.00 0.00 37.67 46.62 47.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
72-65 
(RT) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.98 41.39 33.22 0.00 
NX4 105 
RR 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.38 48.22 37.83 0.00 0.00 
V1037 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.93 43.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V1030 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
V2045 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.92 
Source: Manitoba Agricultural Services Corporation and author’s calculations.  
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Table 4.G.4. Manitoba Dataset: Variety’s Age (months).  
Variety 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5440 0 0 0 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 
5030 0 19 31 43 55 67 79 91 0 0 
5020 7 19 31 43 55 67 79 0 0 0 
5070 7 19 31 43 55 0 0 0 0 0 
5770 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 21 33 0 
8440 0 0 0 0 12 24 36 48 0 0 
5108 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9590 0 0 0 11 23 35 47 59 0 0 
34-55 47 59 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34-65 0 0 12 24 36 0 0 0 0 0 
2573 48 60 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2663 47 59 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35-85 27 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1841 0 0 47 59 71 83 0 0 0 0 
9553 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 36 0 0 
9550 15 27 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 33 0 
L120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20 
L130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 19 31 
L150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 19 31 
L154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 
L159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 
1012RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 
71-45RR 0 0 10 22 34 46 58 0 0 0 
73-45RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 25 37 
72-55RR 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 0 0 0 
6060RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 32 
73-75RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 
73-65RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 
45H21 24 36 48 60 72 0 0 0 0 0 
45H29 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 36 48 
45H28 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 0 0 0 
45H26 0 0 0 0 24 36 0 0 0 0 
45H25 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46H75 (ST) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
2012CL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 26 
NEX 845CL  0 0 0 1 13 25 0 0 0 0 
72-65 (RT) 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 36 48 0 
NX4 105 RR 0 0 0 0 0 12 24 36 0 0 
V1037 0 0 0 0 0 18 30 0 0 0 
V1030 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V2045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency and author’s calculations.  	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Table 4.G.5. Manitoba Dataset: Seed Producers.  
Variety Producer 
5440 Bayer 
5030 Bayer 
5020 Bayer 
5070 Bayer 
5770 Bayer 
8440 Bayer 
5108 Bayer 
9590 Bayer 
34-55 Monsanto 
34-65 Bayer 
2573 Monsanto 
2663 Agriprogress 
35-85 Pioneer 
1841 Unknown 
9553 Bayer 
9550 Bayer 
1145 Bayer 
L120 Bayer 
L130 Bayer 
L150 Bayer 
L154 Bayer 
L159 Bayer 
1012RR Dow 
71-45RR Monsanto 
73-45RR Monsanto 
72-55RR Monsanto 
6060RR DL 
73-75RR Monsanto 
73-65RR Monsanto 
45H21 Pioneer 
45H29 Pioneer 
45H28 Pioneer 
45H26 Pioneer 
45H25 Pioneer 
46H75 
(ST) 
Pioneer 
2012CL Dow 
NEX 
845CL  
Dow 
72-65 (RT) Unknown 
NX4 105 
RR 
Dow 
V1037 Cargill 
V1030 Cargill 
V2045 Cargill 
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency.  
 
	   128	  	  
Appendix 4.H: Saskatchewan Dataset 
Table 4.H.1. Saskatchewan Dataset: Market Share (%).  
Variety 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3151 D 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 
43 E 01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
4414 RR 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
45H28 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.00 
45H73 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
5020 INVIGOR 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.00 
5030 INVIGOR 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 
5440 INVIGOR 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.27 0.14 
5525 CL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
5535 CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5770 INVIGOR 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 
6040 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
8440 INVIGOR 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.00 
9553 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 
997 RR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.23 
Source: Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation and author’s calculations. 
Table 4.H.2. Saskatchewan Dataset: Degree of Specificity (mu).  
Variety 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3151 D 0.00 3.07 2.14 2.14 
  43 E 01 0.00 0.00 1.57 1.57 
  4414 RR -1.48 2.88 2.88 0.00 
  45H28 0.00 3.34 2.01 2.01 
  45H73 -1.55 2.69 2.20 2.20 
  5020 INVIGOR -1.73 2.98 2.16 2.16 
  5030 INVIGOR -1.83 2.98 2.31 2.31 
  5440 INVIGOR -1.81 3.07 2.40 2.40 2.28 1.99 
5525 CL 0.00 0.00 2.07 2.07 1.97 1.69 
5535 CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97 1.57 
5770 INVIGOR 0.00 0.00 2.45 2.45 2.08 
 6040 0.00 0.00 3.42 3.42 
  8440 INVIGOR -1.69 3.06 2.31 2.31 
  9553 0.00 2.87 2.02 2.02 
  997 RR 0.00 2.78 2.78 0.00 
  L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.24 2.02 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.26 2.18 
Source: Canola Council of Canada and author’s calculations. 
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Table 4.H.3. Saskatchewan Dataset: Yield Potential (bushels/acre).  
Variety 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3151 D 0.00 105.63 95.86 95.86 
  43 E 01 0.00 0.00 36.38 36.38 
  4414 RR 69.27 99.11 99.11 
   45H28 0.00 110.65 94.58 94.58 
  45H73 75.31 101.52 96.30 96.30 
  5020 INVIGOR 80.00 110.43 98.94 98.94 
  5030 INVIGOR 87.87 112.05 104.81 104.81 
  5440 INVIGOR 87.88 114.87 108.42 108.42 97.02 75.23 
5525 CL 0.00 0.00 96.39 96.39 85.90 67.89 
5535 CL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.90 63.65 
5770 INVIGOR 0.00 0.00 109.96 109.96 93.09 
 6040 0.00 0.00 105.60 105.60 
  8440 INVIGOR 82.09 112.87 103.13 103.13 
  9553 0.00 103.24 95.78 95.78 
  997 RR 0.00 96.80 96.80 
   L130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.94 73.96 
L150 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.69 77.45 
Source: Canola Council of Canada and author’s calculations. 
Table 4.H.4. Saskatchewan Dataset: Variety’s Age (months).  
Variety 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3151 D 0 0 12 24 36 48 
43 E 01 0 0 12 24 36 48 
4414 RR 5 17 29 41 53 65 
45H28 0 0 12 24 36 48 
45H73 12 24 36 48 60 72 
5020 INVIGOR 43 55 67 79 91 103 
5030 INVIGOR 43 55 67 79 91 103 
5440 INVIGOR 0 12 24 36 48 60 
5525 CL 0 0 0 9 21 33 
5535 CL 0 0 0 0 12 20 
5770 INVIGOR 0 0 0 9 21 33 
6040 0 0 0 0 6 18 
8440 INVIGOR 0 12 24 36 48 60 
9553 0 0 12 24 36 48 
997 RR 5 17 29 41 53 65 
L130 0 0 0 0 7 19 
L150 0 0 0 0 7 19 
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency and author’s calculations.  	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Table 4.H.4. Saskatchewan Dataset: Seed Producers.  
Variety Producer 
3151 D Pioneer 
43 E 01 Pioneer 
4414 RR DL 
45H28 Pioneer 
45H73 Pioneer 
5020 INVIGOR Bayer 
5030 INVIGOR Bayer 
5440 INVIGOR Bayer 
5525 CL DL 
5535 CL DL 
5770 INVIGOR Bayer 
6040 DL 
8440 INVIGOR Bayer 
9553 Pioneer 
997 RR Brett Young 
L130 Bayer 
L150 Bayer 
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency.  
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5.1. Introduction 
The present study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the physical and 
economic forces that influence the dynamic path of hybrid seed pricing for a broad acre crop 
over time. Of the physical and economic forces influencing the dynamic path of hybrid 
development, the sequential and cumulative nature of crop development is particularly discussed.  
This study provides a better understanding of the development of a seed industry that is 
characterized by the hybrid system and sequential and cumulative innovation. Specifically, the 
canola hybrid seed industry in Canada is studied. Given the high rates of return to research, and 
the scope of the potential costs and benefits for producers, economic research in this area could 
have profound impact on producers and the economic future of the region.  
Policies put in place to strengthen IPRs over the next few years will shape the future of the 
grain industry for many decades to come. A more complete understanding of how an industry, 
characterized by sequential and cumulative innovation, can develop with hybrid systems or 
stronger intellectual property rights will inform better policy choices and investment decisions. 
This study will have particularly important implications for industries that are considering 
stronger intellectual property rights inside and outside Canada.  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation presents the background, literature and research objectives. 
Chapter 2 introduces a theoretical model that explains the incentives to create new characteristics 
for crop varieties while incorporating sequential innovation, multiple characteristics, and 
differentiated buyers for the varieties. Chapter 3 performs numerical simulations to provide more 
insight into the findings of the theoretical model. Chapter 4 empirically tests some of the 
propositions presented in Chapter 2. The goal of the current chapter is to present a conclusion of 
the findings of this study.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, conclusions from the important 
findings of the study are presented. Then, policy implications and potential approaches for future 
research are discussed.  
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5.2. Conclusion of the Study 
The model presented in Chapter 2 makes a significant contribution to the “product variety” 
literature. While Chamberlinian models are confined to one representative consumer and location 
models are not very helpful in analysis of more than two characteristics, the model developed in 
Chapter 2 incorporates differentiated buyers and multiple characteristics. What distinguishes this 
model from similar models is the focus on farm input characteristics rather than characteristics in 
consumer products. Although the model may have similarities to monopolistic competition 
models of analyzing product variety (i.e. location, Chamberlinian and hybrid models), it has a 
different perspective in that it uses the concept of “characteristics” introduced by Lancaster 
(1966) to explain the innovation process for production inputs that embody new characteristics.   
This model provides important insight into the incentives for innovation through the creation 
of new characteristics. It shows that even with a yield potential that is lower than its rivals, a seed 
variety still has a chance to profitably enter the market by introducing a new characteristic. 
Schumpeter’s temporary market power can be derived from new characteristics embodied in old 
products. 
Proposition 1 of the theoretical model shows that similar to final consumer products, farm 
input buyers obtain unbounded gains from an increase in number of available products. The 
model finds yield potential and degree of specificity to be very important determinants of seed 
varieties prices, market shares, and profit levels. Also, degree of specificity and rate of yield 
potential growth seem to influence number of equilibrium varieties and length of product cycles. 
Proposition 2 shows that as varieties become more specific, they will each obtain a lower market 
share and number of equilibrium varieties increases. Proposition 3 reveals that more specific 
varieties can be prices higher.  
Propositions 4 and 5 show that a higher rate of yield potential improvement results in higher 
prices and larger market shares for the superior varieties and lower prices and market shares for 
older and lower quality varieties. This, in turn, results in a faster decrease in both price and 
market share.  Faster decrease in prices and market shares implies shorter but steeper disadoption 
cycles. This means, in more progressive industries (i.e. industries with higher rates of quality 
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improvement) product cycles are shorter. This, in turn, results in smaller equilibrium number of 
firms. That is, more progressive industries are likely to have a smaller equilibrium number of 
firms, ceteris paribus. However, rate of innovation, itself, may be endogenous and determined by 
the other exogenous factors.  This issue is discussed in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3 builds on the results derived from the theoretical model to consider other aspects of 
sequential innovation. In Chapter 3, numerical simulations are performed to further investigate 
the validity of the propositions presented in Chapter 2. This chapter provides some important and 
novel insights into dynamic aspects of the model, such as product cycles.  
Chapter 3 endogenizes rate of yield potential growth as a function of firms’ initial investment. 
This chapter identifies 3 exogenous determinants of optimal investment and the consequent rate 
of yield potential growth. These 3 factors are breeders’ investment productivity, degree of 
specificity of varieties, and fixed overhead or maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the 
market. These factors are important determinant of optimal investment level, number of 
varieties, prices, market shares at the equilibrium steady states, length of product cycles and 
consolidation.  
Breeders’ investment productivity also represents economies of size as more productive 
breeders can gain higher yield growth rates per investment dollar. Greater investment 
productivity results in lower optimal investment levels as with higher investment productivity 
levels firms do not need to invest as much to attain similar or higher rates of yield growth. 
Greater investment productivity also results in fewer varieties in the market, shorter product 
cycles, higher prices, higher profit levels, lower optimal investment, and higher consolidation. 
Degree of specificity of varieties also represents degree of consumers’ heterogeneity. More 
specific varieties imply more varieties in the market. However, more specific varieties can be 
priced higher. Simulation results also show that with more specific varieties firms’ optimal 
investment level increases.  
An increase in fixed overhead or maintenance cost of keeping a variety in the market results 
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consolidated market with fewer equilibrium varieties that are priced higher and gain higher profit 
levels. This also results in lower optimal investment.  
The results of Chapter 3 provide very interesting insights into the impact of differentiation on 
equilibrium conditions. While the common belief is that differentiation can increase a firm’s 
profit, the numerical simulations show that this relationship is not as straightforward. It is shown 
that increased differentiation, if followed by the rivals, will certainly result in increased profit as 
long as it is not followed by entry of new firms. However, if increased differentiation creates 
enough space in the market for a new entrant, then entry of a new rival will increase competition 
and may result in a decrease in the incumbents’ profit. 
Chapter 4 uses data from Canadian canola industry to empirically test some of the 
propositions discussed in chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter provides empirical evidence on the 
effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on demand and price of seed varieties.  
Results indicate that variations in yield levels of different varieties at different locations in 
different years can be attributed to variety, location, and weather effects. It is shown that effect 
of weather on variety yield, to a great extent, occurs through locations. This further stresses the 
importance of incorporating both variety and location effects when constructing a demand model 
for a seed industry.  
An important contribution of this study to the literature on adoption of seed varieties is using 
a panel model with variety fixed effects to capture the observable and unobservable seed 
characteristics that are not included in the set of explanatory variables. Previous studies try to 
capture the observables in the set of explanatory variables included in a pooled regression model.  
 Another contribution of this study is to test the effect of yield potential and degree of 
specificity on market share of seed varieties. Results confirm that as a variety becomes more 
specific its market share decreases. It is also shown that degree of specificity is a proper measure 
of adaptability for seed varieties as it provides high explanatory power in the regression models 
and also can be used to make direct economic interpretation since it is easily translatable to 
measures of gross revenue.  
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It is also shown that higher yield potential levels result in proportionately higher adoption 
rates. Moreover, the role of observable and unobservable seed characteristics that are not 
included in the set of explanatory variables is not negligible. These empirical results further 
stress the role of degree of specificity, yield potential, and other observable and unobservable 
characteristics such as the technology embodied in each type of seed in adoption of new and 
existing seed varieties.  
Findings of Chapter 4 reveal two interesting facts about the industry. First, looking at the 
combination of yield potential and degree of specificity of canola seed varieties, it is now clear 
why some varieties such as InVigor 5440 are more successful than other varieties. InVigor 5440 
offers consistently high gross revenue under various weather and location effects. Consistently 
high yield potential and low degree of specificity of 5440 under various weather and location 
effects, that result in high gross revenue, draws farmers’ demand. Second, seed industries’ recent 
attempts to introduce bundled traits can be attributed to lower degree of specificity which results 
in higher market share for varieties with bundled traits. 
5.3. Policy Implications  
Impact of Rate of Innovation on Industry Structure: Although rate of innovation is very likely 
an endogenous factor determined by other exogenous variables such as cost structure, it is 
important to understand the implications of a higher or lower rate of innovation on industry 
structure. The theoretical model introduced in this study shows that a higher rate of yield 
potential improvement results in a faster decrease in prices and market shares of older varieties 
in the market. This, in turn, results in shorter life cycles for the products and smaller equilibrium 
number of firms, ceteris paribus. This implies that more progressive industries (i.e. industries 
with higher rates of innovation) are likely to have fewer products at equilibrium. This is simply 
because in a highly progressive industry older products become unattractive faster than they 
would in industries with lower rates of innovation. This is also evident in the smartphone 
industry where very few highly progressive firms have dominated the market with a few 
products. 
	   137	  	  
Therefore, if investment productivity, cost structure, degree of heterogeneity of consumers, 
and other exogenous factors allow the firms in an industry to have a high rate of innovation, then 
one can expect a highly consolidated market with high prices for products that are replaced with 
newer ones faster than they would in a less progressive industry.  
Degree of specificity and trait bundling: Findings of this dissertation reveal that degree of 
specificity of a seed variety is an important determinant of its success. Varieties that are not very 
specific can be used to obtain consistent yield levels in various locations and weather conditions. 
This is extremely important for farmers, given the great impact of unpredictable weather 
conditions in agriculture. Farmers reduce risk by allocating a percentage of their land to a variety 
that performs reasonably well in various locations and weather conditions even if that variety 
does not have the highest yield potential. A perfect example is canola seed variety InVigor 5440. 
Seed companies’ recent attempts to produce varieties with bundled traits can be explained 
from the perspective of degree of specificity. Varieties with bundled traits are less specific (i.e. 
more adaptable).  
Differentiation: While the common belief is that differentiation can increase a firm’s profit, 
the numerical simulations reveal one of the interesting complexities of this relationship. It is 
shown that if increased differentiation creates enough space in the market for a new entrant, then 
entry of a new rival will increase competition and may result in a decrease in the incumbents’ 
profit. On the other hand, as it is shown in Proposition 1, increase in number of varieties 
improves farmers’ total surplus. Therefore, firms’ attempt to obtain higher profit levels through 
increased differentiation will work if increased differentiation does not result in entry. However, 
if increased differentiation results in entry, then firms’ may or may not obtain higher profit levels 
depending on the change in relative prices and market shares while buyers will certainly benefit 
from increased variety.   
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5.4. Future Research 
This study, if not first, is certainly one of the first studies to introduce a theoretical model that 
incorporates differentiated buyers, multiple characteristics, and sequential innovation for farm 
inputs. Similar to most original theoretical models, the focus has been on keeping the model 
simple enough to remain tractable and transparent. As a result, some potentially interesting 
theoretical and empirical aspects have been unexplored. The purpose of this section is to identify 
some of the research areas that may result in interesting findings.  
Multiproduct firms: The model presented in Chapter 2 does not consider multiproduct firms. 
It is assumed that each firm releases only one product in the market. The model focuses on the 
effect of new differentiated entrants on competition. Therefore, despite the potentially insightful 
results, the multiproduct case is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it would be very 
interesting for future studies to explore pricing decisions of multiproduct firms in a setup that 
incorporates multiple characteristic and sequential innovation. 
Investment decisions: Although this dissertation endogenizes rate of yield potential growth as 
a function of initial investment via numerical simulations, it may be interesting to incorporate 
investment decisions in the theoretical model as well.  
Differentiation: This study attempts to provide a better understanding of the development path 
of an industry characterized by sequential innovation. It is shown that degree of specificity of 
seed varieties is an important determinant of number equilibrium products and consolidation 
level. In the theoretical model and numerical simulations presented in this study it is assumed 
that degree of specificity of products is exogenous. However, at least in long run, degree of 
specificity can be a choice variable for profit-maximizing firms. Firms can choose the level of 
differentiation of their products in order to maximize their profit. Future studies may incorporate 
this choice variable into the theoretical model and numerical simulations. This will add another 
stage and a great deal of complexity to the game, as firms now will have two choice variables. 
However, research in this area may identify the exogenous factors that determine optimal 
differentiation. This will have very important implications for industry structures and number of 
firms in different industries.   
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Land constraint: The existence of outside land would increase the overall elasticity of demand 
for new characteristics as introduction of new varieties with new characteristics may encourage 
farmers to use the marginal land that has not been allocated to that crop previously. However, 
this is unlikely to be quantitatively important except in the case of drastic innovation, where a 
new variety significantly expands total crop area. At least from a theoretical perspective, it would 
be interesting for future studies to incorporate the effect of acreage expansion in case of drastic 
innovation. It is worth noting that allowing for acreage expansion or reduction will help 
incorporate the effect of an “outside good” as well.  
Effect of degree of specificity and yield potential on prices: This study was not able to find 
data on canola seed varieties’ prices to test the effect of degree of specificity and yield potential 
on seed prices. Although these variables are shown to significantly impact market shares, it 
would be insightful to estimate the effect of yield potential and degree of specificity on seed 
prices. Comparison of the relative magnitude of the estimated parameters may intrigue 
interesting and important research questions.   
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